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KEYNOTE: WHAT DOES INTERNATIONAL LAw HAVE TO
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT?

Do WITH

DAVID P. STEWART*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The broad topic of international development, understood with particular
reference to the Millennium Development Goals,' addresses one of the critical
aspects of our global future. Simply put, development is not just a good idea, a
policy option, or a preferred outcome; it is a necessary process, fundamental to the
future of human society.
I believe that without development, growth, progress, whatever you may wish
to call it, the human race will stagnate and expire. That is the gloomy news. The
good news is that it is in our nature to work towards a better future, to invent, to
overcome, to improve, and to develop. At least, that's what several millennia of
human existence suggest to me.
Yet, development is not inevitable. It may be necessary, but it is not
inexorable. We have within us the seeds of our own obliteration. A world that
doesn't develop, a world in which large portions of the human race live in poverty,
in poor health and in political subjugation, where large segments of the population
* Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Member, Inter-American Juridical
Committee; President-elect, American Branch of the International Law Association; ALI project on
Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law of the United States (co-reporter on immunities); member,
Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law and Executive Council, ABA Section of
International Law. It is a pleasure to return to the Sturm College of Law in Denver for this Sutton
Colloquium on "The International Legal Perspectives on the Future of Development," and to share
some thoughts on the relationship between international development and international law. Professor
Ved Nanda has been one of my personal heroes for many years, a truly accomplished international
lawyer and a man of unparalleled grace, wisdom and insight. It's been my privilege to work with him
in a number of circumstances, including the American Branch of the International Law Association and
the American Society of International Law. I am certain you realize how truly fortunate you are at the
Sturm College of Law to be able to study with him, and under his tutelage.
1. The official site for the MDG implementation "indicators" is Millennium Development Goal
Indicators, U.N., http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/host.aspx?Content-indicators/officiallist.htm (Apr. 6,
2014). The eight Millennium Development Goals, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 2000, are
to (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote
gender equality and empower women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6)
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop
a global partnership for development. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000). See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS,THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

REPORT (2013), available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/report-2013/mdg-report-2013english.pdf, for the most recent Millennium Development Goals Report (2013), which assesses progress
toward the 2015 target date.
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are excluded, where resources and wealth and the benefits of progress are not
shared but are reserved for the fortunate few .

.

. well, that is very likely to be a

world of jealousy and hostility, chaos and conflict, war and destruction. We do not
need to be the proverbial rocket scientists to know that down that road lies a real
prospect of annihilation.
If you are with me so far, then we can probably agree that international
development is, as my daughter would say, "like, really important."
But what does it have to do with international law? Or with us as lawyers or
future lawyers? To turn the question around, what does international law have to
do with development? Can international law contribute to development, and if so,
how? How can we, as international lawyers, contribute most usefully to
international development?
In answering these questions, my aim this morning is to speak primarily to the
students and recent graduates in the audience, because I want to suggest some
important possibilities to you. 2 I will be happy to take questions and comments at
the end.
II.

PROPOSITION ON How INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Here is my proposition.
First: Not only can international law contribute to international development,
it is an essential aspect of international development, one of the key ingredients
that promotes and facilitates development. Not the only one, of course. Law alone
cannot make development occur. I am not a believer in a legal "right to
development," or in the notion that development and progress can simply be
legislated or legally mandated. But at the same time, international development is
not likely to take place, and certainly not likely to occur as quickly or effectively,
in a lawless environment. I hope you will agree that development will not thrivecannot thrive-in the face of civil unrest or chaos or armed conflict, or in
situations of widespread human rights abuses, or where corruption is rampant, or
where the affected population seethes with unresolved grievances or is excluded
from the political process.
Second: What is needed is not just economic growth and increased prosperity.
Those things are necessary, of course, but they must also be accompanied by a
stable system of governance, rules for the fair operation of society, mechanisms for
resolving disputes equitably, prohibitions against crime and corruption, protections
for human rights, effective remedies for wrongs-all the things that we generally
say constitute the Rule of Law. That's why Rule of Law promotion is almost

2. For some suggestions about possibilities and resources in this regard, those interested may
wish
to
consult
the
references
at
International Development,
GEO.
L.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/careers/career-planning/practice-areas/intemational-development.cfm
(last visited July 20, 2014).
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always included as part of the "development package." And public sector reform
as part of good governance efforts in developing countries has traditionally been at
the center of the Rule of Law agenda. Traditionally, the principal focus has been
on the promotion and incorporation of public international law principles and
standards at the international, regional, and national levels, particularly those
coming from the human rights framework. This is where international law is
generally thought to have its greatest impact, and where international lawyers can
have a truly significant impact.
Third: What is often overlooked, however, is the importance of developing
legal rules at the next level, in the context of private transactions. In other words,
Rule of Law and public sector ordering is not sufficient, by itself. For truly
effective growth and development to occur, it is critical to have effective rules,
mechanisms and procedures at the transactional level, where businesses and
customers and consumers and individuals connect. This is where the principles of
private internationallaw come into play.
The point is that these principles also have a direct and increasingly positive
role in promoting good governance and the Rule of Law. And they too work to
foster economic growth, by providing clarity of rules and certainty of expectations
in private transactions, by establishing effective dispute settlement mechanisms in
cross-border contexts, and by promoting fair and efficient commerce. This too is
the lawyer's territory. It is where we as lawyers have a broad-and often
overlooked-range of opportunities to be productively engaged in the development
process. It is where you, as lawyers-in-training, can usefully focus your attention.
III.

ROLE OF LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

So let me expand on these general points. In thinking about the role of law in
development, I have found it useful to imagine that there are three overlapping
circles of endeavor: the economic and financial sector, Rule of Law efforts, and the
contributions of private international law. Each is important in its own right, but
all three working together are necessary.
A. Economic Development
Let us first take the economic field. This of course is at the heart of the
process, and it involves mostly the work of the economic, financial, and
development experts and their various projects directly related to sustainable
development-such as building roads and bridges and airports, power grids and
water mains and communications systems, schools and hospitals and factories-all
the parts of the economic infrastructure and all the facilities that are absolutely
necessary to the process of economic development and that in many ways actually
define development.
This is mostly the domain of non-lawyer specialists, the economists and
financial and engineering folks, the agriculture specialists, the hydrologists-all
the technical experts who work at places like the U.N. and UNDP and the World
Bank, the regional development banks, other international organizations such as
the OECD, government agencies such as USAID, entities like the Peace Corps,
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and non-governmental organizations such as Oxfam, the Ford Foundation, all the
contractors-all the "direct action" institutions that provide funding and technical
expertise and assistance.
To be sure, many lawyers are involved in this sector, and many provide
valuable counsel and service to the direct actors, but they are mostly in legal
support roles addressing the needs of the specialists-lawyers advising and
assisting clients. It's good work, necessary work, very satisfying, and I have a
number of colleagues who thrive in that environment. But it is a traditional role
for lawyers serving their clients.
B. Rule of Law
By comparison, lawyers play a much larger and active role in the Rule of Law
effort, which involves various international undertakings aimed at promoting and
developing social and economic and governmental change through "law reform."
The Rule of Law is a term that lacks an agreed definition and can encompass
a wide range of projects aimed at creating the kind of modern, effective structure
of public governance that supports and fosters economic growth. Its content
differs from country to country, depending on the particular circumstances. But
Rule of Law initiatives typically consist of capacity building initiatives aimed, for
example, at creating effective government structures (with a functional, popularly
elected legislature, an orderly and independent judiciary, an effective police
presence and criminal justice system, and so forth) as well as promoting a broad
culture of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in which the
institutions of government comply with the law and can be held accountable for
violations.4
More often than not, folks in the Rule of Law field will say they are working
more broadly to create all the other things that constitute a workable and vibrant
"civil society," including a culture of law, fostering acceptance of nongovernmental organizations, developing the legal profession, effective law schools,
active bar associations, etc.
This is mainstream lawyers' territory, and when people talk about the role (or
rule) of law in development, for the most part this is what they have in mind.
3. One helpful source of possibilities in this regard is Duke Law's Career and Professional
Development Center. See Tips for Students InterestedPost Graduate Careers in InternationalPublic
Interest
Law,
DUKE
L.,
http://law.duke.edulsites/default/files/intemational/IntemationalPublicInterest Tipsheet.pdf
(last
visited July 20, 2014).
4. Consider, for example, the different approaches taken by the United Nations. See U.N. & THE
RULE OF L.: WEBSITE & DOCUMENT REPOSITORY, http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw (last visited July 20,
2014); see also What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/whatrule-law (last visited July 20, 2014).
5. One of the most active organizations in the field, which takes a broad view of "rule of law"
projects, is the International Development and Law Organization ("IDLO"). See About IDLO, IDLO,
http://www.idlo.int/about-idlo (last visited July 20, 2014).
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Without question it is vital, because without the Rule of Law, economic progress is
hardly likely to be lasting. We can probably all think of resource-rich countries
that have experienced stunted growth and development precisely because they lack
the Rule of Law.
Done correctly, the Rule of Law effort requires specialists in many legal
areas, from constitutional law to legislative and administrative law, public
procurement, economic regulations (securities markets, trade and commerce, and
banking), and lots of other areas like the environment, health, education, and
especially human rights. There is a particular need for experts in all the various
aspects of criminal law, for the obvious reason that few threats to developing
societies are more dangerous than bribery and corruption, the predations of
organized crime, those who trafficking in drugs, people, arms-that is why this is
really is an important area for international criminal lawyers.
The Rule of Law challenges are especially critical in situations of conflict or
post-conflict reconstruction, where the criminal justice system may be
dysfunctional and needs to be reconstituted and reformed. Here there is often a
need for criminal law specialists who can work on issues of transitional justice,
including such mechanisms as truth and reconciliation commissions. One of the
most interesting and satisfying courses I teach is in fact international criminal law,
precisely because of its relevance in the development context.
If you look at the increasing number of academic programs which are
addressed to "law and development" or which offer specialized degrees in
"development law," these are the areas of specific knowledge that you will find
they emphasize. Their goal is to prepare folks to work in the Rule of Law
vineyard.6
If this is what calls to you-if this is where you think you might make a
useful contribution-then I want to draw your attention to a recently published
book, which should be of great interest and assistance to those of you who are
called to the Rule of Law endeavor. It is edited by Leila Mooney, a lawyer who
has worked in this field for many years. It's entitled "Promoting the Rule of Law:
A Practitioner's Guide to Key Issues and Developments," published a few months
ago by the ABA. It details the kinds of direct involvement lawyers can have in
this area. It is a wonderful introduction to the importance of this work and the
range of possibilities open to you. It should be assigned reading in every course
related to the process of development.

6. See, e.g., Sustainable InternationalDevelopment Law LL.M. Program, U. WASH. SCH. OF L.
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.law.washington.edu/sid/; LLM International Law and Development, U.
NOTTINGHAM SCH. OF L., https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/prospective/ma-degrees/course-list/lmintemational-law-dev.aspx (last visited July 20, 2014); LLM in InternationalDevelopment Law and
Human
Rights,
WARWICK
SCH.
OF
L.
(Nov.
19,
2013),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/pg/pgprogram/human-rights-law/.
7. PROMOTING

THE RULE

OF LAW: A

DEVELOPMENTS (Lelia Mooney ed., 2013).

PRACTITIONER'S

GUIDE TO KEY

ISSUES

AND
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C. TransactionalLevel
But in my view, the by-now traditional kind of Rule of Law effort is, alone,
not sufficient. Why, you ask? Simply, we can all think of countries with great
economic and natural resources as well as stable systems of governance at the
public level, which do not grow because they lack a vibrant privatesector.
As I indicated, Rule of Law programs focus mostly on the public level, on
issues of governmental structure and functioning, on the need to create institutions
for the administration of justice-courts, legislature, dispute settlement
mechanisms-and the importance of establishing a culture of law in civil society.
I want you to look past that, to the third level I mentioned earlier, the level of
private transactions. This is critical because a society genuinely based on the Rule
of Law also provides its constituents with fair and reliable norms by which they
can organize their affairs and conduct their business, as well as the institutional
means for resolving their disputes effectively and efficiently.
Properly conceived, the Rule of Law is more than just rules and laws, and
promoting the Rule of Law certainly involves more than supporting or facilitating
the creation of functional institutions to administer them. The Rule of Law rests
fundamentally on attitudes and expectations, on a sense of confidence and
commitment on the part of the individuals concerned, on broad acceptance and
participation, and on a belief that reciprocal behavior will lead to orderly and
equitable outcomes. These characteristics must be manifested in dealings between
private parties as much as in their interaction with the courts, the criminal justice
system, and other institutions of the state. It is often overlooked that at this other
level that law and lawyers can also make significant contribution to the process of
development, in the context of interactions between private members of the
community with each other.
This is an area where the institutions and processes of "private international
law" come into play. For many of you, the notion of Private International Law
may be unfamiliar, or at least a bit fuzzy. So let me offer a brief overview and then
give you some concrete examples to demonstrate what I mean and why it is
important.
IV. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

Private international law is often defined as the law governing questions
arising in transnational (cross-border) situations involving private parties, in
particular such issues as jurisdiction, conflicts of law, and enforcement of
judgments.8 It is thus distinguishable from public international law, which deals

8. The narrowest view, equating private international law with conflicts of law, is typically found
in the civil law tradition but sometimes in British textbooks. See, e.g., MALCOM M. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 647 (6th ed., Cambridge 2008). Many U.S. textbooks favor a broader approach.
See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 836

(4th ed. 2011).
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primarily with relations between sovereign states and international organizations
rather than private parties.
Today, private international law covers a vast and growing range of subjects,
far beyond the traditional trilogy of jurisdiction, conflicts of law, and enforcement
of judgments, from transnational commercial agreements to child support and
family maintenance, from consumer protection, bankruptcy and secured
transactions to the transportation of goods by sea and the regulation of
intermediated securities. 9 That's the sense-the broader sense, the contemporary
sense-in which I am using the term.
In point of fact, the global community is deeply and actively involved in
formulating truly international rules and procedures applicable to private
individuals, transactions, and relationships. With greater frequency, these rules
and principles are formulated in international bodies in the form of treaties and
other international instruments (including non-binding "soft law"), and they are
increasingly interpreted and applied by international tribunals as well as domestic
courts and tribunals.
At the international level, the principles and instruments of private
international law are mostly negotiated, agreed, and adopted in five different, but
inter-related organizations. Of these five, three are international in scope and two
are primarily regional. All have a global footprint.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is the oldest of the five,
having been founded in 1893. Largely European in its origins, the Conference
now counts seventy-four member states from around the globe as well as the
European Union, and more than 130 states are parties to at least one of the
Conference's thirty-six modem conventions.' 0
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (known as
"UNIDROIT") was originally created in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League
of Nations; today it is an independent intergovernmental organization
headquartered in Rome entity, with sixty-three member states representing a wide
range of different legal, economic and political systems as well as different cultural
background." It focuses largely on modernizing, harmonizing and coordinating
private and in particular commercial law as between States and groups of States.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL"), established in 1966, serves as the core legal body of the U.N.

9. See, e.g., DON FORD, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [ASIL]: ELECTRONIC
RESOURCE GUIDE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2013); Areas of Private International Law,
HCCH, http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act-text.display&tid=10 (last visited July 20, 2014); Private
International Law, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3452.htm (last visited July 20,
2014).
10. See

Home,

HAGUE

CONFERENCE

ON

PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

[HCCH],

http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php (last visited July 20, 2014), for information about the Conference.

I1. See

UNIDROIT,

INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTE

FOR THE UNIFICATION

OF PRIVATE

LAW

[UNIDROIT], http://www.unidroit.org (last visited July 20, 2014), for information about UNIDROIT,
including the conventions and other instruments it has adopted.
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system in the field of international trade law.12 Its membership consists of sixty
member states elected by the U.N. General Assembly for six-year terms. Despite
its formal title, many of its substantive efforts involve important public
international law issues.
At the regional level, here in the Western Hemisphere, the Organization of
American States ("OAS") has long undertaken work on issues of private
international law. The negotiation of new principles and instruments among the
member states has normally been conducted through specialized conferences on
private international law, the first of which was held in 1975.'1 Over the years that
process produced some twenty-six separate instruments, including twenty
conventions, three protocols, one model law and two "uniform documents."' 4
Today, much of the private international law activity takes place in the InterAmerican Juridical Committee.' 5
For its part, the European Union has become an increasingly important venue
for the articulation of private international law as part of its ongoing integrative
efforts to harmonize the internal law of the Union's member states. 16 It exercises
considerable authority under the various constitutive treaty provisions on which the
EU is based, and decisions of the European Court of Justice play an increasingly
important role in the development of private international law doctrines.'"
In the State Department, where I spent much of my career, a number of
lawyers specialize in this field, in the Office of Private International Law, and
working with these organizations, precisely because of the importance of their
efforts for economic development and trade and business.' 8
The general, unifying goal of these organizations, in their private international
law efforts, is to remove legal obstacles to cross-border business transactions
through greater harmonization and unification of the relevant legal norms and
principles. The objective is to provide the parties to such transactions a much

12. See generally UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

[UNCITRAL], http://www.uncitral.org (last visited July 20, 2014).
13. See
Private
International
Law,
ORG.
OF
AM.
STATES
[OAS],
http://www.oas.org/dil/privateintlaw interamericanconferences.htm (last visited July 20, 2014).
14. Id.
15. See Inter-American Juridical Committee, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/default.asp (last
visited July 20, 2014), for information on the Committee.
16. Increasingly, the rules and regulations adopted by the European Union also exert an important
influence on the formation and content of private international law throughout the world. See, e.g.,
Ronald A. Brand, The European Union's New Role in International Private Litigation, 2 LoY. U. CHI.
INT'L L. REV. 227 (2005); see also Ralf Michael, EU Law as Private International Law? ReConceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIV. INT'L L. 195
(2006).
ON

17. IVANA KUNDA & CARLOS MANUEL GONCALVES DE MELO MARINHO, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK
EUROPEAN
PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL
LAw
3-4
(2010),
available
at

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/practicalhandbook-eu-international-law-en.pdf.
18. See, e.g., FORD, supra note 9; HCCH, supra note 9; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 9.
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greater degree of legal clarity, certainty, and predictability in their civil and
commercial dealings.
At its core, the process of economic development results from private
activity.19 Official development assistance and other government-to-government
programs are vital, but development is driven on the ground by expanding markets,
increasing mobility, quick and reliable financial transactions, and virtually
unlimited, instantaneous information exchange through the mass media and the
Internet. The rules and mechanisms of private international law contribute to
economic growth and prosperity in developing countries, especially those lacking
the legal and transactional infrastructure necessary to participate fully and
efficiently in the modem global economy.
In an increasingly inter-connected world, the harmonization functions of
private international law assume an ever-greater practical importance in promoting
trade, commerce, and economic development. States with little or no experience in
private international law matters, and those that lack the necessary legal
infrastructure to participate actively and effectively in the globalized economy,
tend to be severely disadvantaged in international trade, investment, and capital
markets. One of the purposes of the private international law project is to assist
them in gaining the knowledge and experience needed to overcome this deficiency.
By clarifying and harmonizing the rules and principles that apply to
transnational civil and commercial dealings, and by enhancing party autonomy in
ordinary commercial contracts, private international law facilitates the successful
conclusion of commercial transactions and the avoidance (as well as prompt and
efficient resolution) of disputes arising thereunder. By reducing or removing legal
obstacles to the flow of international trade, especially those affecting the
developing countries, it contributes directly to economic development and
(because economic development is critical to establishment of the Rule of Law) it
thereby contributes as well to the emergence of a robust and functional Rule of
Law.
V.

EXAMPLES OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

So now, let me give you some concrete examples of the kind of work done by
these private international law institutions, which are directly relevant to the
process of development. The examples are intended to illustrate (i) how private
international law projects actually contribute to establishing and strengthening the
rule of law at the intra- and inter-state levels and (ii) what kind of opportunities are
available for lawyers in practice to contribute to the international development
project (broadly conceived).

19. See Heidi Metcalf Little, The Role of Private Assistance in International Development, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1091 (2010), for a discussion on the importance of private development
assistance generally.
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A. Goods and Services
Consider first the importance of clarity and certainty in cross-border
contractual arrangements for the purchase and sale of goods and services.
Differences in the domestic laws of various trading partners complicate the
conclusion of such contracts. Harmonization of substantive commercial law
principles can assist contracting parties in reaching an agreement on the terms of
their deals as well as in the resolution of disputes arising out of those transactions.
In so doing, private international law contributes not only to economic growth and
stability, but also to respect for the Rule of Law.
Here, one needs only to acknowledge UNIDROIT's contributions, in
particular the adoption in 2010 of the third edition of its Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (sometimes described as a "global law of international
commercial contracts"). While not themselves binding (in the same way as a
treaty or domestic law), the Principles have been accepted by parties to transborder commercial dealings, used as a model for domestic legislation, and
frequently applied by tribunals in international commercial arbitration.2 0
In 1980, UNCITRAL adopted the Convention on the International Sale of
Goods and Services ("CISG"), now ratified by eighty-one U.N. member states
(including the United States). 21 As a self-executing treaty in the United States, the
CISG is binding law with respect to contracts that fall within its scope, displacing
state law to the extent of any inconsistency. The United States is a party to this
convention, 22 and some of you may actually have come across the CISG in your
commercial law courses.
UNCITRAL has also played an important role in helping to adapt the rules of
international commercial transactions to new forms of communication. Such
transactions are increasingly carried out through electronic data interchange and
other means of communication, commonly referred to as "electronic commerce."
These involve the use of alternatives to paper-based methods of communication
and storage of information. On the whole, domestic legislatures have been slow to

20. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994), available at

http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-1994. The 2010 revision
has been published by UNIDROIT in a stand-alone volume. See UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

CONTRACTS

(2010),

available

at

http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/blackletter2010-english.pdf
21. Venezuela and Ghana have signed but not yet ratified the CISG. Status: U.N. Convention on
Contracts for
the
International
Sale
of Goods
(Vienna,
1980),
UNCITRAL
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/sale-goods/1980CISG_status.htmi (last visited July
20, 2014).

See UNCITRAL, U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF

GOODS (CISG), U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14 (2010), for the text of the Convention. That site also has the
current list of States Parties and a link to UNCITRAL's Digest of Case Law under the Convention.
22. Status: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/sale goods/1980CISG-status.html (last
visited July 20, 2014).
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adapt to these technological innovations, and inconsistencies between national
legislation have hindered transacting parties.
So in 1996, UNCITRAL adopted a model law intended to facilitate the use of
electronic commerce on a basis acceptable to states with different legal, social, and
economic systems. 23 In 2001, it adopted a second model law, aimed at
legitimizing the use of electronic messaging and identification by making
"electronic signatures" the functional equivalent of handwritten signatures. 24 And
in 2005, it adopted the U.N. Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts. 25 The central premise of the Convention (like the earlier
Model Law) is "functional equivalency," so that information in electronic (data
message) form will not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on
the grounds of its electronic nature.26
With regard to issues of dispute settlement in international commercial
dealings, I imagine most of the students in the audience have had occasion to study
the 1958 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Agreements (the "New York Convention"), along with the 1976 UNICTRAL
Arbitration Rules (amended in 2010) and its 1985 Model Law (amended in
2006).27 These three are among UNCITRAL's best-known achievements, and all
have played essential roles in establishing a framework for settling transnational
commercial disputes between private parties through consensual arbitration rather
than domestic court litigation.
In the context of commercial transactions, disputes and controversies are
inevitable. When both parties are from the same jurisdiction, their disagreement
may be submitted to their domestic courts. When the transaction crosses national
borders, reaching agreement on a particular national forum for dispute resolution is
less likely. International arbitration offers a viable alternative. But to be attractive
to commercial parties, the system of international arbitration must be effective and
efficient. Taken together, this triad of instruments offers parties to international
transactions an alternative framework to domestic litigation for the resolution of
disputes that arise from their civil and commercial dealings. These are critical to

23. UNCITRAL,

UNCITRAL

MODEL LAW ON

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,

U.N.

Sales No.

E.99.V.4 (1996).
24. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES,

U.N. SALES NO.

E.02.V.8 (2001).
25. CONVENTION

ON THE

USE

OF

ELECTRONIC

COMMUNICATIONS

IN INTERNATIONAL

CONTRACTS, Nov. 23,2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/515, E.07.V.2.
26. To date, eighteen countries have signed this treaty, including Russia and China, although only
5-Russia, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Singapore and Congo-have ratified. Status:
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/electroniccommerce/2005Convention-status.html
(last
visited
July
20,
2014).
See
Electronic
Commerce,
UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/electronic-commerce.html (last visited July 20,
2014), for the texts of all three instruments.
27. See UNCITAL Texts & Status: International Commercial Arbitration & Conciliation,
UNCITAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration.html (last visited July 20,
2014), for all three instruments.
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the effective settlement of disputes in transnational commerce, in particular
between developed and less developed countries.
B. Secured Transactions
Another illustrative area concerns secured interests. Access to adequate and
affordable credit is unquestionably an essential element in economic development;
in the case of private trade and commercial transactions, access to secured credit is
frequently a sine qua non. Clarifying and standardizing the rules for such
transactions is an essential Rule of Law task. Among the first international
instruments to address these issues was UNCITRAL's 2001 U.N. Convention on
the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade. 28 The purpose of the
Convention is to promote the development of international trade by providing a
comprehensive approach to the rules governing the transfer by agreement of all or
part of or an undivided interest in the assignor's contractual right to payment of a
monetary sum ("the receivable") from a third person ("the debtor").2 9
Another key private international law instrument in this effort has been
UNIDROIT's 2001 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
(often referred to as the "Cape Town Convention"). 30 As the title indicates, its
focus is on secured interests in easily identifiable, high-value mobile equipment,
which can readily move across national boundaries. 3 1 Among other things, the
Convention provides for the creation of a recognized international security interest
sufficient to protect the interests of the creditors.32 It establishes the means for the
electronic registration of those interests, in order to provide notice to third parties,
and thus to enable creditors to preserve their priority against subsequently
registered interests, any unregistered interests, and potentially, the debtor's
insolvency administrator.3 3
A protocol to the Cape Town Convention (adopted at the same time as the
Convention itself) addresses the particular issues related to security interests in
aircraft equipment. 34 A second protocol was concluded in 2007 covering the
financing of railroad rolling stock (such as engines, freight cars, and passenger

28. U.N.

COMM'N

ON

INT'L TRADE

RECEIVABLES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE,

LAW,

U.N.

CONVENTION

ON THE

ASSIGNMENT

OF

U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.14 (2004).

29. Id.
30. See Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment, UNIDROIT (Nov. 16, 2001),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-town-convention,
for
information about the 2001 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment.
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft
Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 4 U.S.T.
1830, 2307 U.N.T.S 285,
available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf
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cars), and work is currently proceeding on a possible third protocol addressed to
space-based assets.
For its part, the OAS has also been active in the field of secured interests. In
2002 it adopted a Model Inter-American Law on Secured Interests, aimed at
regulating security interests and securing the performance of any obligations in
movable property. 36 States adopting the Model Law undertake to create a "unitary
and uniform registration system applicable to all existing movable property
security devices in the local legal framework."3 7 Proposed Model Registry
Regulations, approved in October 2009, provide solutions to questions concerning
registration and uniformity, and are intended for use in both civil law and common
law systems in a cohesive implementation of the Model Law. 38
C. Transport by Sea
A third illustration concerns the transportation of goods by sea. The
international legal framework governing this area extends back over eighty years,
lacks uniformity, and has failed to adapt to modern transport practices such as
containerization, door-to-door transport contracts, and the use of electronic
transport documents. This outmoded legal system imposes significant costs (direct
and indirect) on international commerce.
In 2008, UNCITRAL completed work on a new treaty to replace the
antiquated rules contained in such earlier agreements as the Hague, Hague-Visby,
and Hamburg Rules. The new U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea was opened for signature in Rotterdam
in the fall of 2009 (and thus was quickly denominated the "Rotterdam Rules"). 39
This multilateral convention is intended to provide both shippers and carriers
with a modernized, balanced and universal regime to support the operation of
maritime contracts of carriage including those involving other modes of transport
(such as road or rail). In scope, it covers the entire contract of carriage, including:
liability and obligations of the carrier, obligations of the shipper to the carrier,
transport documents and electronic transport records, delivery of the goods, rights
of the controlling party and transfer of rights, limits of liability, and provisions

35. Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, Feb. 23, 2007, 46 1.L.M 662, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/rail-protocol; Protocol to the Convention on
InternationalInterests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, UNIDROIT, (Mar. 9,
2012), available at http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/space-protocol.
36. Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions (2002), available at
http://www.oas.org/dil/cidip-vi-securedtransactionseng.htm.
37. Id. art. 1.
38. See OAS, Model Registry Regulations Under the Model Inter-American Law on Secured
Transactions, CIDIP-Vil/doc.3/09 rev.3 (Oct. 9, 2009), for the text of the model registry regulations.
39. New U.N. Convention Rotterdam Rules Open for Signatures, ROTTERDAM RULES,
http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php (last visited July 20, 2014).
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regarding the time for suit to be filed, jurisdiction, and dispute resolution
mechanisms. 40
This new treaty, if widely adhered to, could bring significant benefits for trade
with developing countries, many of which are currently party to the 1976 Hamburg
Rules. To date, only three States-Spain, Togo, and the Congo-have ratified the
Convention, although twenty-two others (including the United States) have signed
it.41

D. Simplified Stock Corporations
One of the most intriguing recent developments concerns the promotion of a
new form of corporate entity, known as the "Simplified Stock Corporation," to
facilitate economic growth at the level of small and micro-businesses. Essentially
a hybrid of what we in the United States might call a limited liability partnership
and a "close" corporation, this innovation is aimed at reducing the time, costs, and
formalities of incorporation of formal companies while providing many of the
benefits (structural and contractual flexibility, protection for investors and the
ability to attract capital, and sufficient governmental supervision to ensure
protection for customers).
Within the OAS, the Inter-American Juridical Committee has studied the
concept, taking into account Colombia's very successful experiences in this area,
and in 2011 the Committee adopted a proposed Model Law on the topic for
consideration of the Member States.4 2 The topic has more recently been taken up
by UNCITRAL's Working Group I on micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises.4 3
E. Electronic Warehouse Receipts
Still another area in which legal creativity and innovation are making real
contributions to economic growth and development involves establishment of
electronic systems of warehouse receipts. In many areas of the world, and
especially in many agricultural sectors, staple commodities (flowers, fruits, grains,
vegetables) are produced by farmers working small plots or parcels of land. In
general, these farmers either sell their surplus commodities locally or bring them to

40. See id.
41. See United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (July 20,
2014),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=Xl-D8&chapter-I l&lang-en (last updated Sept. 20, 2014).
42. Inter-American Juridical Committee, Project for a Model Act on Simplified Stock
Corporation, CJI/RES. 188 (LXXX-O/12) and CHl/doc.380/11 corr. 1 (2012), compiled in OAS, Annual
Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to the 43rd Regular Session of the OAS General
Assembly, at 65-84, OAS Doc. CJI/doc.425/12 (August 10, 2012).
43. See UNCITRAL Working Grp. I Secretariat, Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises:
Features of Simplified Business Incorporation Regimes, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.82 (December
10,2013).
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a storage or collection point (warehouse) for transfer up the supply chain to a very
distant market, in some cases in a different country. In most cases, the transactions
are recorded on some form of paper-based "warehouse receipt" which give the
producer little if any security. Frequently the farmer must wait a long time to
receive his share of the proceeds.
Establishing a standardized and electronically based system of warehouse
receipts can speed up the transactions considerably. If the receipt is secured and
negotiable, both the farmer and his purchaser(s) can take more confidence in the
transactions, and the producers can more easily obtaining financing to invest in the
next crop yield.
In the United States, the 1916 Warehouse Act created a licensing system for
warehouses to provide for financial security, recordkeeping, protection, and other
operational items. The statute was recently revised to accommodate warehouse
receipts in electronic form.44 Both UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT have given some
consideration to the issue, and in 2013 the Inter-American Juridical Committee
undertook a project to prepare a model law on the subject for the consideration of
the member states of the OAS. 45
F. Public Procurement
In most states, government procurement constitutes a significant portion of public
expenditure. Fair, objective, and efficient procurement rules and procedures foster
integrity, confidence, and transparency. They are the hallmarks of a Rule of Law system.
They also promote economy, efficiency, and competition and thus lead to increased
economic development. The lack of such rules and procedures invites fraud, waste, and
corruption.
UNCITRAL's revised Model Law on Public Procurement, adopted in 2011 to
replace the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction,
and Services, contains procedures and principles aimed in large part at avoiding
abuses in the procurement process. 6 The text promotes objectivity, fairness,
participation, competition, and integrity. Transparency is also a key principle,
allowing visible compliance with the procedures and principles to be confirmed. A
year later, UNCITRAL adopted a Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Public Procurement to assist states in implementing the Model Law. 47

44. Warehouse Act, ch. 313, pt. C, § 2 (1916), amended by Pub.L. 106-472, Title II, § 201, 114
Stat. 2061 (2000) (current version at 7 U.S.C. 241-256 (2012)).
45. Inter-American Juridical Committee, CJI/doc.427/13 and CJl/doc.437/13, compiled in OAS,
Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to the 44th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, at 104-12, OAS Doc. CP/doc.4956/14 (Jan. 24, 2014).
(2014),
Development,
UNCITRAL
Procurement
and
Infrastructure
46. See
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/procurement-infrastructure.htm (last visited July 20,
2014), regarding a description of UNCITRAL's work on procurement of goods and services.
47. Id.; see also UNCITRAL Secretariat, Guidance on Procurement Regulations to be
Promulgated in Accordance with Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/770 (Apr. 22, 2013).
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Viable public-private partnerships require a legislative framework that guarantees
transparency, fairness, and long-term sustainability, removes undesirable restrictions on
private sector participation, and provides effective procedures for the award of privately
financed infi-astructure projects as well as the resolution of the inevitable disputes which
arise thereunder. Recognizing these principles, UNCITRAL adopted, in 2002, a
Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, intended to assist in the
establishment of such a legal framework. The Guide was supplemented in 2003 by
Model Legislative Provisions drafted to assist domestic legislative bodies in the
establishment of the necessary legal framework. 48
G. Access to Information
A key component in any system characterized by the Rule of Law is citizen
access to government information. In a democracy, such access is considered an
indispensable right, because it is essential to the citizen's ability to make informed
decisions. It works to ensure government accountability and responsiveness to
public needs. It also serves to protect individual rights. Lack of access
undermines trust, fosters inefficiency, and invites corruption.
In recent years, the OAS has made a number of important contributions to
Rule of Law promotion within the hemisphere. Perhaps the most critical has been
acceptance of democracy as the fundamental principle of governance, in the form
of the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter. 4 9 Among other things, the
Charter recognizes (in Article 4) that "transparency in government activities,
probity, responsible public administration on the part of governments, respect for
social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components
of the exercise of democracy."50 To promote implementation of this principle, the
OAS General Assembly in 2009 directed the preparation of a draft Model Law on
Access to Information, together with an implementation guide, for the
consideration of member states.5 ' The final versions of both documents were
approved by the OAS General Assembly in June 2011, and OAS member states
were urged to consider embracing and implementing the Model Inter-American
Law on Access to Public Information.52
The Model Law and Implementation Guide were drafted to apply in both
common law and civil law systems, and address not only the collection, retention,
and use of governmental information, but also information drawn from the private
48. See Procurement and Infrastructure Development, supra note 46, for the texts of the
Legislative Guide and the Model Legislative Provisions.
49. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept 11,
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res. 1 (2001).
50. Id. art. 4.
51. OAS, Access to Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2514
(XXXIX-O/09) (Jun. 4, 2009).
52. See
Access
to
Information,
OAS
DEP'T
OF
INT'L
LAW,
http://www.oas.org/DIL/access-to-information-modellaw.htm (last visited July 20, 2014), for
information on the Model Law on Access to Information and accompanying legislative guide.
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sector and individuals. In consequence, they recognize that the rights to privacy
and to access information must co-exist and be applied harmoniously. Many
countries in the region had habeas data provisions even before they had considered
adoption of access to information laws. Clearly, this is an area in which private
international law rules work together with principles of human rights and
progressive tenets of political ordering to foster greater respect for the Rule of
Law.
H. Consumer Protection
Another current example of the contributions of private international law to
the Rule of Law comes from the rapidly evolving area of international consumer
protection. A number of international bodies have undertaken significant
initiatives in this field, many of which focus on the importance of governmental
regulation and enforcement, but the international system still lacks any centralized
standard-setting or enforcement effort.
By contrast, within the OAS, recent efforts have addressed means of
facilitating the effective resolution of disputes in cross-border consumer
transactions. Since 2003, when CIDIP-VII was convened, attention has focused on
possible ways to provide parties to cross-border consumer transactions with
effective, economical, and expeditious alternatives to traditional forms of litigation
in their domestic courts, while at the same time facilitating cross-border trade and
lowering transaction costs. 53
Several possible approaches have been under consideration. One, put forward
by Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, proposed a new multilateral Convention on
Consumer Protection and Choice of Law. 54 Alternatively, Canada offered a draft
Model Law on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law for consumer contracts.55 For its
part, the United States promoted a Model Law on Consumer Dispute Settlement
and Redress which would, among other things, establish an expeditious, low-cost,
and "user friendly" procedure for resolving "small claims" in cross-border
consumer contracts as an alternative to litigation in domestic courts. 56
To date, no agreement has been reached. Largely as a result, the issue has
been taken up in other bodies. For the past several years, UNCITRAL's Working

53. See DAVID P. STEWART, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
available
at
14
(2011),
LAW
INTERNATIONAL
THROUGH
PRIVATE
http://www.oas.org/diI/esp/XXXVIII_Curso-DerechoIntemacionalDavidStewart promoting the-ru
le of law and econimic.pdf, for general information on this effort.

54. OAS, Proposals by the Member States for the Seventh Inter-American Specialized Conference
on Private InternationalLaw (CIDIP-VII) Topic 1: Consumer Protection (Brazil), OAS Doc. CP/CAJP2652/08 add. 4 (Nov. 10, 2008).
55. OAS, Proposals by the Member States for the Seventh Inter-American Specialized Conference
on Private International Law (CIDIP-VII) Topic 1: Consumer Protection (Canada), OAS Doc.
CP/CAJP-2652/08 (Aug. 21, 2008).
56. OAS, Legislative Guidelines for Inter-American Law on Availability of Consumer Dispute
Resolution and Redress for Consumers submitted by the United States ofAmericafor CIDIP-VII, OAS
Doc. CP/CAJP-2652/08 add. I rev.1 (May 3, 2010).

338

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 42:3

Group III has been focused on developments in electronic commerce and
communication, and in particular the elaboration of procedural rules for the on-line
resolution of disputes ("ODR") in cross-border electronic commerce transactions,
including through conciliation and arbitration.5 7 These rules would presumably
apply in both business-to-business ("B2B") and business-to-consumer ("B2C")
transactions.
Within the International Law Association ("ILA"), a committee of experts on
international consumer protection has surveyed national legislation and practice in
this area adopted a very thoughtful final report concerning the international
dimensions of consumer protection in cross-border situations, as well as a
"Statement on the Development of International Principles on Consumer
Protection."
.

Choice ofForum in Commercial Contracts

Returning to the fundamental question of dispute resolution, the international
community to date has been unable to reach general agreement about (i) the
permissible bases of domestic court jurisdiction over civil and commercial cases
involving foreign parties or transactions, (ii) a unified approach to choice of law
issues in cross-border transactions, or (iii) the specific grounds on which foreign
judicial judgments will be recognized or enforced in domestic courts. For a
number of years, negotiations on a multilateral "jurisdiction and judgments" treaty
covering these areas were conducted at the Hague Conference, but they ultimately
failed. Thus, at the global level, there is still no "civil litigation" analogue to the
New York Convention or its OAS counter-part, the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration. 9
But from the failed negotiations in The Hague, there arose a new and
ultimately successful proposal for a convention addressed specifically to
contractual "choice of court" clauses in international civil and commercial
contracts. The Hague Conference adopted this new Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements in June 2005, and it is now open for signature and ratification.o

57. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic
Commerce Transactions: Draft Guidelines, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.Ill/WP.128 (Jan. 22, 2014) (Note by
the Secretariat).
58. See International Protection of Consumers, INT'L LAW ASS'N [ILA], http://www.ilahq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1030 (last visited July 20, 2014) for the ILA's "Conference
Report" and "Conference Resolution" from the ILA Biennial in Sophia in 2012.
59. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 249.
60. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. To
date, only Mexico has ratified this Convention, although the United States and the E.U. have signed.
Status Table. Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act-conventions.status&cid=98.
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The Choice of Court Agreements Convention addresses a gap in the current
fabric of international commercial dispute settlement by providing that states
parties must recognize and give effect to "exclusive choice of court agreements"
(in U.S. parlance, these are sometimes called "forum selection clauses"). Such
clauses are often employed when contracting parties do not wish to utilize nonjudicial mechanisms such as arbitration. Obviously, they will agree to litigate in a
specific court or judicial system only if they have assurance that the chosen
jurisdiction will in fact hear the case and that the resulting judgment will be
recognized and enforced in other countries.
Thus, the new Convention sets forth three basic rules to be applied in all
states parties with respect to choice of court agreements falling within its scope: (i)
the court chosen by the contracting parties has (and must exercise) jurisdiction to
decide a covered dispute, (ii) courts not chosen by the parties do not have
jurisdiction and must suspend or dismiss proceedings if brought, and (iii) a
judgment from a chosen court rendered in accordance with such an agreement
must be recognized and enforced in the courts of other states party to the
Convention.61 By its terms, the Convention applies only to exclusive choice of
court clauses, but states parties have the option (by taking a declaration) of
permitting their courts to recognize and enforce judgments of courts of other States
party designated in non-exclusive choice of court agreements.
The potential benefits of the Convention for private parties of qualifying
transnational contracts are significant. Resting on the principle of party autonomy,
the system provided by the Convention will ensure that the dispute settlement
arrangements agreed to by those private contracting parties will be honored in the
case of domestic court litigation in much the same way as private agreements to
arbitrate are respected and given effect, thereby promoting certainty and
predictability in international trade. Moreover, it will enhance the enforceability of
the resulting judgments in the courts of other states parties, helping to redress the
"lack of reciprocity" problem, which arises when foreign judgments are given
more favorable consideration in some national courts than the judgments of those
courts receive in foreign courts.
There continues to be debate about the modalities by which this Convention
might be implemented in U.S. law, should the Senate give its advice and consent to
ratification. Much of the debate centers around the extent to which the method of
implementation would "federalize" matters related to the enforcement of foreign
judicial judgments (there has never been a general federal statute in this area) and
impose requirements on state courts to accept certain cases involving foreign
parties.62

61. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 60, arts. 5, 6, 8.
62. See generally Guy S. Lipe and Timothy J. Tyler, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: CreatingRoom for Choice in InternationalCases, 33 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010); see also
Hague Convention on
Choice of Courts,
NAT'L
CENTER
FOR
STATE
CTS.,
https://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Experts/Government-Relations/Intemational/Hague-Convention-onChoice-of-Courts.aspx (last visited July 20, 2014).
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InternationalFamily Law

The Rule of Law is arguably most important at those junctures where the
interests and activities of the state intersect with the most basic needs and interests
of the individual. Few such intersections are more sensitive than the ones
involving families. In a world characterized by rapidly increasing transnational
contacts and cross-border mobility, international family law has clearly emerged as
a field of specialization in its own right. Here again, one finds private international
law working to bridge gaps, reduce conflicts, and provide orderly and efficient
mechanisms of dispute resolution.
Two multilateral treaties adopted by the Hague Conference, both widely
ratified, constitute the cornerstones of the still-emerging international regime of
child protection: the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction and the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.63 The former (with ninety-one
contracting states) works to prevent (or undo) the removal of a child by one parent
from the country of its habitual residence in violation of the other parent's
custodial rights, and the latter (with ninety-three contracting states) serves to
regularize the process of transnational adoptions, protecting the legitimate interests
of all concerned.M The United States is a party to both, and both are applied and
widely respected in practice on the international level.
In an increasingly globalized world, families frequently span continents. So
do family disputes and dissolutions. How are trans-border maintenance and
support arrangements to be handled in such cases? Some countries address this
issue primarily through bilateral agreements providing for reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of support orders in defined circumstances. The United States,
for example, is party to more than twenty such agreements with other countries.65
Within the OAS, the 1989 Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations has
thirteen states parties.66 But until recently, a global approach has been lacking.
In 2007, the Hague Conference adopted a new multilateral instrument, the
Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of

63. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343
U.N.T.S
98, available at
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/indexen.php?act-conventions.text&cid=24;
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May
29,
1993,
1870
U.N.T.S.
168,
available
at
http://hcch.evision.nl/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69.
64. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 63, art. 3;
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, supra
note 63, art. 1.
65. See

Legal

Considerations,

BUREAU

OF

CONSULAR

AFF.,

http://travel.state.gov/law/familyissues/support issues/support issues 582.html (last visited July 20,
2014), for information about U.S. arrangements for child support and maintenance, including bilateral
treaties.
66. Signatories and Ratifications: Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, OAS,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-54.htmi (last visited July 20, 2014).
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Family Maintenance.67 As in other family law agreements, the basic principle set
forth in this agreement is one of reciprocity: a decision on child maintenance and
support made in one state party must be recognized and enforced in other states
party if the first state's jurisdiction was based on one of the accepted grounds
enumerated in the Convention. In the United States, courts generally do recognize
and enforce foreign child support obligations as a matter of comity, even though
U.S. orders may not be given comparable treatment in the originating country.68
The Convention would regularize this imbalance among all states that adhere to it
and will in general work in favor of the children in question. The United States
has signed the Convention and is actively pursuing ratification. 69
The foregoing is far from a complete description of the growing list of
international family law agreements and projects. Others include protection of the
elderly, recognition of same sex unions, and protection of international migrants, to
name a few. But it should certainly serve to illustrate the many ways in which the
rapidly expanding field of international family law works actively to promote Rule
of Law objectives and fosters development in this critical area.
VI.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Let me just a few words about the often-ignored area of Technical Assistance.
Standing alone, even the best private international law conventions, model
laws, statements of principle, and other texts have little effect; they are just texts.
Their potential can only be realized through acceptance and effective
implementation at the domestic level. The first step must of course be formal
approval and acceptance by the state concerned, either through ratification of the
particular treaty, adoption of the model law, or implementation of other kinds of
texts through regulation or judicial application.
In most instances, an equally important step is to promote uniformity of
application across national boundaries. A convention aimed at harmonization, for
example, will not achieve its objective if its provisions are given disparate
interpretation in the courts of member states. For that reason, it has become
common to see guides to implementation (either in the form of suggested statutory
texts, legislative principles, or "handbooks") adopted at the same time as the
convention itself.
Increasingly, the various international organizations concerned with private
international law have tried to assist states in achieving effective and consistent
67. International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, Nov. 23,
2007, 47 1.L.M. 257, available at http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-conventions.text&cid=131.
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, Protocol, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056
U.N.T.S. 199, available at http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act-conventions.text&cid=133, for the
companion Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations.
68. See Michael J. Peters, International Child Support: The United States Striving Towards a
Better Solution, 15 NEW ENG. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 91, 107-108 (2009).
69. Status Table: Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child
8,
2013),
Other Forms
of Family Maintenance, HCCH (Aug.
Support
and
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-conventions.status&cid=131.
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implementation of the treaties and other instruments in domestic law and practice.
These efforts take a variety of forms. Within the Hague Conference, for example,
the Permanent Bureau (its secretariat) provides technical assistance to promote and
support the delivery of assistance and training to government and legal officials
around the world regarding implementation of the Conference's various
conventions, in particular those involving the international protection of children
and families, international legal co-operation and litigation and international
commercial and financial law. 70 They provide specialized training programs and
customized technical assistance with the stated aim of creating "mutual
understanding of legal cultures, building legal and administrative capacity and
reinforcing the rule of law and good governance." 7' The Permanent Bureau
devotes a substantial portion of its efforts to encouraging uniform interpretation of,
and consistent practices under, these and other instruments (a technical assistance
function it calls "providing post-Convention services"). 72 One focal point for such
efforts has been the Conference's International Centre for Judicial Studies and
Technical Assistance. 73
Both UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL maintain electronic databases providing
ready access to case law and other materials relevant to the interpretation and
application of their conventions and other instruments. UNIDROIT's "UNILAW"
database aims to make available up-to-date information on its uniform law
instruments, 74 and UNICITRAL's "Clout" system includes court decisions and
arbitral awards interpreting and applying the Commission's conventions and model
laws.75
Within the OAS, a Network of Hemispheric Legal Cooperation in the Area of
Family and Child Law provides a means for the relevant authorities in the various
national governments to coordinate with each other regarding application of the
four regional family law conventions (i.e., those concerning support obligations,
the return of children, trafficking in minors, and adoption). This system also

70. Overview, HCCH, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=text.display&tid=26 (last visited
July 20, 2014).
71. CITY OF THE HAGUE, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HAGUE 44 (2013),

available
at
http://www.denhaag.nl/web/file?uuid=ebb86e87-e581-4921-9aa758becl6d899b&owner-a564205f-9b90-4ab4-b47b-ba5fe3736bfl.
72. HCCH, Brief Summary of the 5 April 2013 Meeting of the Technical Assistance Working
Group,
HCCH
Info.
Doc.
9
(Apr.
2013),
available
at
http://www.hech.net/upload/wop/genaff20l3inf09.pdf.
73. GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HAGUE, supranote 71 at 44.

74. See
The
UNILAW Database on
Uniform Law,
UNIFORM
L.
FOUND.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20131207204707/http://unidroit.info/program.cfm?menu=subject&file-con
vention&lang-en (last visited July 20, 2014), for access to the database.
75. See
Case
Law
on
UNCITRAL
Texts
(CLOUT),
UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited July 20, 2014).
76. See Family and Child Law
(the "Network"), OAS
(July 20, 2014),
http://www.oas.org/dil/familylaw.htm.
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provides information to private individuals regarding the conventions and their
application.
The general field of technical assistance is an area where you, as lawyers, can
More importantly, there are many
make a truly important contribution.
opportunities. Let me give you one example with which I am personally involved.
The International Law Institute in Washington, with a presence in Kampala, Abuja,
Cairo, Santiago, and Istanbul, was originally connected to Georgetown Law Center
but has been independent for some 30 years. It is dedicated to contributing to
economic development and effective governance through the provision of
technical assistance including "on the ground" as well as "off-site" training.7 7
Key to its approach is recognition of the necessity of addressing both the
public and private sectors in any discrete development undertaking. Economic
growth and social stability is achieved through the right combination of
enlightened policies, capable administration, and an active private sector. Without
question, among the essential agreements are good government, stable legal and
judicial systems, and functioning capital markets. The ILI's training courses range
further to cover such matters as government procurement, privatization, arbitration,
bank restructuring, borrowing, and debt management. The Institute draws on
professors and academics, partners and other practitioners from top law firms,
government sector specialists, folks from donor organizations, intergovernmental
organizations such the WTO and the World Bank, and non-governmental
organizations such as the International Judicial Academy. It is an excellent
illustration of the ways in which we as lawyers can become directly and
productively involved in international development efforts.
It also offers fascinating internships for those interested in this field.7,
VII. CONCLUSION

So, to conclude: There are many ways for us as lawyers-as international
lawyers and even as students of international law-to contribute to economic
growth and development, and to realizing the policy goals represented by the
Millennium Development Goals.
My effort this morning has been to stress two points:
* First, that law, and in particular international law, has an integral role
(in my view an indispensable role) to play in the process of
development, and
* Second, law makes a critical contribution at the transactional level,
in the form of contemporary private international law.
In my view, there really can be no question that the principles, instruments,
and mechanisms of private international law, as reflected in the diverse endeavors
described above, contribute directly to the trans-border flow of trade, capital,
77. See About the International Law Institute, INT'L L. INST. [ILl], http://www.ili.org/about.html
(last visited July 20, 2014), for general information on the International Law Institute.
78. Internships, ILl, http://www.ili.org/opportunites/internships.htmi (last visited July 20, 2014).
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people and ideas, the effective settlement of disputes, the well-being of families
and children, and therefore to the Rule of Law. By focusing primarily on the
relationship between international.and domestic law, private international law adds
an essential element to efforts to promote the legitimacy of the law internationally
as well as domestically.
This provides an often-overlooked range of possibilities for us as lawyers to
be involved in the development process. We can help to ensure that private
international law continues to play a critical role in this field, by working to
guarantee that the law adapts and responds effectively and creatively to the
changing needs and structure of the international community. The successful
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals depends on it.

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE RIGHT TO SURVIVE
AS A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
UPENDRA ACHARYA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Underdevelopment is a series of complex interacting phenomena that result in
inequalities of wealth, poverty, and access to food, health, security, and education.
Development, then, is the central answer to many of the world's problems.
Development is the only tool that allows people all over the world to internalize a
sense of equality and justice. Yet, it is important to determine the scope of the
right to development. The right to development may be understood within
multiple layers as: 1) an individual's right to survive by having access to minimum
needs such as food, clean water, healthcare, and shelter - the bare minimum
requirements to support human survival; 2) that there be no compromise of civil or
political rights; 3) developing nations' rights and obligations to build capacity to
facilitate survival rights; and, lastly, 4) international financial institutions' and
donor countries' duty to prioritize their programs to these objectives and to be
responsible for any kind of violation of the right to survival, the first and
fundamental right to the right to development, due to their lack of good faith
efforts to implement projects which uplift the human condition.
Human development has been considered at its core the expansion of peoples'
choices, leading to a valuable and quality life.1 Increasing peoples' choices and
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University Law School. This is an expanded version of the
presentation delivered at the 46th Annual Leonard V. B. Sutton Colloquium "International Legal
Perspectives on the Future of Development" conducted by the Nanda Center for International and
Comparative Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law on November 9, 2013. I would like to
thank Professor Ved P. Nanda for the opportunity and his insights with this article, as well as the panel
members and participants for their valuable suggestions. I would like to thank Attorney Jeannie Young
for her insightful suggestions. I would also like to specially thank my research assistant Mary Rupert for
her valuable time, hard work and insights.
1. Two of the most celebrated pioneers of human development are Mahbub U1 Haq and Amartya
Sen. UI Haq is famously quoted as saying,
the basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices. In principle, these choices
can be infinite and can change over time. People often value achievements that do not show
up at all, or not immediately, in income or growth figures: greater access to knowledge,
better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and
physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and sense of
participation in community activities. The objective of development is to create an enabling
environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.
REPS.,
HUMAN
DEv.
PROGRAMME:
U.N.
DEV.
Human
Development,
About
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev (last visited July 6, 2014) [hereinafter History of HDR].
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opportunities allows them to build on human capabilities; people are capable of
having more opportunities to achieve more in their lives. 2 These are "the
substantive freedoms [a person] enjoys to lead the kind of life [they have] reason to
value." 3 Human development may be related to, but is not equal to, economic
development and the increase of income. Economic goals are interrelated with
other human capabilities, foremost of which are healthy lives, education, access to
a decent standard of living, and participation in community and society.4
Increasing the choices in peoples' lives will inevitably lead to fundamental
increases in the quality of living for both individuals and societies. 5
Yet, even given such fundamental notions of individual choice, policymakers
and policy implementers have failed to make the connection between these most
fundamental truths and the fact that the right to development truly means a right to
survival. Consider: whose right is the right to development and when does this
right arise? Some theorists have believed human development is a matter of
national security used to boost countries' economies and undo the damage of world
wars.
But modem thought champions the individual as the subject of
development.
This approach has done much to advance the concept of
development. Still, development has become a subject matter of economic and
political debate and compromise. But the right to development has not reached the
point where it can be realized through legal debate, determination, and legal
methods of technical use. However, through different soft political and economic
commitments, as well as programs related to development, the concept of the right
to development has been legitimized by giving the right the color of law without
the effect of law. By this tactic of legitimization by developed countries and
international financial institutions ("IFIs"), the right to survival has disappeared
and become discretionary in the context of programs of IFls and developed
countries - programs based on national interests. Such an absence of a claimbased approach has diminished a basic and fundamental right, the right to survival,
within the right to development. Therefore, the right to survival must be
recognized as embracing two elements: 1) every individual has a right to live
While Sen elaborated, "Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be the
basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the
economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it." Id. The preamble to the Declaration on
the Right to Development states that development is the, "comprehensive economic, social, cultural and
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and
of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in
the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom." Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A.
Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, at I (Dec. 4, 1986). See also discussion infra, p. 6.
2. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH (2011).
3. HUMAN DEV. AND CAPABILITY Ass'N, BRIEFING NOTE, CAPABILITIES AND FUNCTIONINGS:
DEFINITION
AND
JUSTIFICATION
(2005),
available
at

http://terpconnect.umd.edu/-dcrocker/Courses/Docs/Alkire%20%20Capability%20Functioning%20Briefing%2ONote.pdf.
4. See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEV. REP. 2009 (2009) [hereinafter HDR
2009]; Paul Streeten, Human Development: Means and Ends, 84 AM. ECON. REV 232 (1994).
5. See generally HDR 2009, supra note 4; Streeten, supra note 4.

2014

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: RIGHT TO SURVIVE

347

without infringement of the bare minimum of civil, political, social, and economic
rights; and, 2) developing countries have a right to ensure their citizens' right to
survival is not disturbed and an obligation to work towards fulfilling the right to
survival by making policies and programs toward achieving that goal; these
countries have a duty. 6
Then what is a particular country to do if it does not have such a capacity to
fulfill its rights and duties appertaining to the right of survival? Without the
fulfillment of the development goals that would create this capacity, it is the
country's overall development as well as the individuals' inherent rights that are
affected. When it becomes difficult for a country to fulfill its duty to protect the
right to development due to lack of financial stability and infrastructure and due to
corruption, who will have the duty? Will it be international organizations that
claim to work toward capacity building of underdeveloped societies with different
polices, programs, and technical assistance, as well as other countries with the
capacity to fulfill this duty? International law, through non-binding declaration,
has created a moral obligation to take up this torch. Underdeveloped countries
have difficulty maintaining consistent development due to incapacity and
intentional political instability. The strategy of developed countries to use power
politics to maintain the status quo shows us that the present system of development
is not working. What place can a moral obligation have when there is a legal right
to survival and a duty to protect those rights, which developing countries struggle
to achieve? Current systems and international law provide for a moral sense of
duty through soft law, yet miss very important elements: the acceptance of an
inherent right of every individual to the means of basic survival, a historical
context of the relationship of developed countries with underdeveloped countries,
and a notion of legal responsibility for development in the system of laws and
remedies. Without these elements, human development fails on a basic level
because it becomes a notion of international charity and not a truth of human
rights.
Economists, politicians, sociologists, historians, and many people of
discipline have tried to address the problems of underdevelopment in humanity,
but we have not achieved a satisfactory answer. In this context, international law
also has attempted to address the problem and to shape the future of development.
This paper will begin by giving an overview of the current state of human
development. Next, given the modern state of development, this paper will
explore the future of human development in light of its failure to recognize the
right to survival in a system of legal rights and remedies. Following is an
6. For further explanation, see Armando Barrientos & David Hulme, Global Norms and National
Politics: The Case of Social Protection, in MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
426, 429 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013) ("A rights-based approach [to development] entails the
identification of 'duty-bearers' who are obligated to ensure that the rights of individuals are honoured.
If rights are denied then these duty-bearers can be sanctioned for failure. The MDGs indicate that the
international community and national government are to form a partnership to ensure the MDGs are
met. But they do not specifically identify who the duty-bearers are, nor do they specify sanctions for
failure to meet MDGs.").
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explanation of the parties responsible for the protection right to survive, and the
right to remedies against violations of the right to survive. Lastly, a proposal for
judicial options to remedy violations to the right to survival will be presented in an
effort to resolve the need for a mechanism.
II.

THE MODERN CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. U.N. Charterand InternationalHuman Rights Law
From the very beginning, in 1945, the U.N. Charter impliedly addressed the
issues of development through self-determination, peace, and security concepts.9
The U.N. Charter's principles and purpose highlighted that all peoples should
"promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and
"employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples."'o Article 55 expounded these principles to include
high standards of living, full employment, social progress and development, and
solutions to economic, social, and health problems." Yet, concrete objectives
related to human development expanding on the Charter did not emerge until 1990
at the World Conference Summit.1 2 The purposes and principles of the United
Nations were not developed as concrete goals for human development, but rather
as overarching values of the system at large.
Following suit, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
recognized the inherent human dignity achieved through equal rights to human
freedom, justice, and peace.' 3 The UDHR suggested that all human rights should
be protected by the rule of law in order to promote social progress and better
standards of life for larger freedom. 14 It called for national effort and international
cooperation to fulfill the realization of larger freedoms through human

7. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (The purpose of the U.N. Charter is "[tlo develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace").
8. Id.; see also U.N. Chief Welcomes General Assembly's Adoption of Resolution on Human
Security
(Sept.
12,
2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=42858&Cr-human+security&Crl =#.UxkPEeddX3A
(statement of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon) ("Guided by the principles of the United Nations
Charter, human security brings together the three pillars of the Organization and seeks to promote
greater coherence in our response to various challenges facing people worldwide.").
9. U.N. Charter art. 26 (noting that the Security Council was founded in order to protect the
security of human and economic resources).
10. Id. pmbl.
I1. Id. art. 55.
12. See U.N. Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, The United Nations Development Agenda:
Development
for
All,
U.N.
Doc.
ST/ESA/316,
at
1 (2007),
available at
http://www.un.org/esa/devagenda/UNDA BW5_Final.pdf.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111)A, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217 (Ill) (Dec. 10, 1948).
14. Id.
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development.' 5 Immediately after the U.N. Charter and the UDHR, development
fell into an ideological trap, continuing into the Cold War era. The inalienable
right to human development split into first and second generations of rightsresulting in negative and positive duties within an international legal framework.16
Through the UDHR's predecessor documents, together constituting the
International Bill of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), this division of inalienable human rights could
have been a catalyst to give effect to the right to survival, but its potential was
unfortunately pushed back by political oversight, as little advancement in either
international or domestic jurisprudence occurred.' 7
B. Soft Laws for HardProblems: DiminishingPoint of Claim Based Right to
Survive
Later, the New International Economic Order was created in order to advance
trade and development by improving terms of trade, increasing development
assistance, reducing tariffs, and imposing other economic measures. 1 Next came
the Declaration on Social Progress and Development' 9 and then in 1966 the United
Nations Development Programme ("UNDP"), founded in order to assist economic
15. For example, the right to work, equal pay, standard of living, adequate food, clothing, housing,
medical care, education, and security, without discrimination. Id. arts. 22-26.
16. For a discussion on the development of positive and negative rights, particularly in the
development of human rights in the United States, see Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Frameworkof
InternationalHuman Rights: A Source of Social Justice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 59 (1998). See
also, e.g., Hideaki Shinoda, Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of PeaceBuilding, in 19 IPSHU ENG. RES. REP. SERIES 5, 12 (2004) (noting that Johann Galtung developed
"positive peace as the absence of structural violence in opposition to the concept of negative peace as
the absence of war."). Even before this, Franklin Roosevelt established the four freedoms, declaring
every individuals has the most basic and essential right to four freedoms: "The ... freedom of speech
and expression . . . The . . . freedom of every person to worship God in his own way. . . . The ...

freedom from want . . . [and] freedom from fear." Franklin Roosevelt, Transcript of President Franklin
Roosevelt
Annual
Message
(1941),
available
at
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=70&page=transcript. The focus of human
development encompassed competing goals of avoiding war, achieving economic success, and ensuring
individuals' freedoms In contrast, in terms of positive rights the development of the individual through
access to food, medication, water, education,jobs, etc. came later.
17. See Phillip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 350-51 (1987); see also Kitty Arambulo,
Drafting an Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Can an Ideal Become Reality?, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 116 (1996) In regards to the
ICESCR, "some United Nations studies have found evidence that although economic, social and
cultural conditions can be confirmed by statistical data, they fail to identify the substantive legal
character necessary to turn such conditions into rights." Id. at 111.Arambulo comes to the conclusion
that the ICCPR has been subject to some jurisprudential interpretation, leading to greater understanding
and implementation of the norms, giving it marginally more success than the ICESCR. See id. at 116.
18. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201
(S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9556, at 3 (1974).
19. Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630, at 49 (1969).

350

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 42:3

and political development globally. 20 UNDP was initially a response to the
economic, social, and political state of underdeveloped countries post-WWII. 2 1
During this era, economists primarily used gross domestic product and other
economic indicators to measure the quality of life in individual countries. 22 This
was the institution of trickle-down economics, purporting that there would be a
trickle-down effect of capital, improving basic survival conditions for the poorest
of the world's citizens, and thus improving human development. 23 This was a
major setback to recognizing a claim-based rights approach to human survival and
betterment of the human condition. According to these theorists, the creation of
the economically capable person through economic activities was the solution to
human survival.24 The prevailing thought was that in order for development to
flourish in underdeveloped countries, those countries must follow the economic
and socio-political models of already developed countries. 25 Human development
became a statistical analysis of per-capita income, GNP, and industrial growth-a
notion that economic and capital activities would lead to the betterment of people.
By the late 1970s skepticism about an economic model of human
development was mounting. Countries that experienced rapid economic growth
did not experience proportional growth within their social structures; the poor
remained poor while the rich got richer.2 6 In response, the U.N. affirmed the need
to "recognize the importance of promoting a balanced and sustainable development

20. Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a
United Nations Development Programme, G.A. Res. 2029 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. Nos. 1,
4, 6, U.N. Doc A/RES/2029(XX), at 20 (1965).
21. The UNDP was created out of the combined programs of the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance ("EPTA") and the United Nations Special Fund. Both programs focused on the
development of underdeveloped countries in the area of resources, particularly focused on manpower,
industry, and communications. Notice that development during this era was measured in terms of
economic ability and wealth. See STEPHEN BROWNE, THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME AND SYSTEM 7 (2011).

22. Id. at 8; see also Richard A. Easterlin, The Globalization of Human Development, 570
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 32, 33 (2000).
23. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 78-80 (2002), for a
description how the Washington consensus failed to improve the development situation globally, while
policy makers pushed the trickle down agenda.
24. See GEORGE REISMAN, CAPITALISM: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 310 (1996) ("There is only

the fact that capital accumulation and economic progress depend on saving and innovation and that
these in turn depend on the freedom to make high profits and accumulate great wealth. The only
alternative to improvement for all, through economic progress, achieved in this way, is the futile
attempt of some men to gain at the expense of others by means of looting and plundering. This, the lootand-plunder theory, is the alternative advocated by the critics of the misnamed trickle-down theory.").
25. Id.; see also Stephen Browne, Whatever Happened to 'Development'?, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Apr.
17,
2007),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationinstitutionsgovemment/development browne_4535.jsp ("Development was conceived as a do-as-wedid process in which developing countries should follow the patterns of the developed countries. Capital
was the principal ingredient to fuel growth.").
26. One example of this is Brazil in the 1970s, where income inequalities expanded under trickle
down policies. Browne, supra note 25.
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for all people."27 Finally, after all these labor pains, in 1986 the General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development ("RTD"), a non-binding
instrument offering a consensus on development-soft law for extremely hard
problems. 2 8 The RTD passed almost unanimously; the United States was the only
country to vote against it. 29 Yet, it became clear that among the myriads of U.N.
agencies and reports on development, a consensus about the practical
consequences of the RTD could not be reached. Even with shifting views of
human development from an economic model to a sustainable development model,
little progress took place as underdeveloped countries became skeptical of
assistance and advocated for liberalization.30 Additionally, during the 1980s the
Reagan and Thatcher administrations advanced a conservative agenda, unaffected
by calls for advancement in human development advocating for transfers of aid
and resources.
The RTD was subsequently reaffirmed in Article 10 of the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, another non-binding soft instrument, in
connection with which the United States changed its stance, supporting the new
principles on human development. 32 However, this change did not occur until
1993, seven years after the RTD. This support for the declaratory approach to the
right to development was the end of an ideological and political conflict during the
post-Soviet era.
Mahbub Ul Haq and Amartya Sen created the Human
Development index ("HDI") in 1990 through the United Nations Development

27. G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141, at 1i3(c)
(Dec. 20, 1993).
28. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp.
No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
29. See CTR. FOR DEV. & HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: A PRIMER 29 (2004).
30. See JOZEF M. RITZEN, A CHANCE FOR THE WORLD BANK 26 (2005) for a description of the
failure of development as evidence by the gap between the rich and the poor, the mounting debt crisis,
and the fact that the ten lowest countries on the Human Development Index through the 1990s and
1980s remained consistently underdeveloped.
31. Among these reports include the famous Brandt Commission's Independent Commission on
InternationalDevelopment and the Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (1982), as well as the
Brundtland Commission's report Our Common Future. Browne, supra note 25.
32. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declarationand Programme
ofAction, 1 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) ("The World Conference on Human Rights
reaffirms the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to Development, as a
universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights. As stated in the
Declaration on the Right to Development, the human person is the central subject of development.
While development facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of development may not be
invoked to justify the abridgement of internationally recognized human rights. States should cooperate
with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development. The international
community should promote an effective international cooperation for the realization of the right to
development and the elimination of obstacles to development. Lasting progress towards the
implementation of the right to development requires effective development policies at the national
level, as well as equitable economic relations and a favourable economic environment at the
international level.").
33. Browne, supra note 25.
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Programme. 34 The HDI was intended to give objective measures of success in
development within countries; the index focused on statistical data of life
expectancy, education, and income.35 The Human Development Report ("HDR")
reports annually on the HDI and milestones achieved throughout the year. 6 The
intent of the reports was to refocus development on the real matters of
importance-the well-being of people-rather than the underlying causes and
indicators of quality of life, such as economics and politics.37 After the production
of more than 600 reports, the information included has advanced to include
gender-related indices, an inequality adjustment, and different measurements of
poverty. In 2010 the HDR reported that many of the poorest countries in the 1970s
had improved dramatically in the areas of health, education, and living standards.
Nevertheless, the same HDR points out the massive variance in development
across nations. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Zimbabwe fell from their original point in the 1970s and others, such as Nepal,
lagging far behind comparable countries despite experiencing some growth.39
In this way, the 20th century introduced this idea of a right to development
and turned it into a program with a kitchen sink full of different measures of
development without addressing the concept of a basic and inherent right to
survive in the context of human development. The right to development remained
an economic object without legal mechanisms to enforce it. Social and political
priorities were focused on national security interests, economic interests, and
ideological warfare, while the competing goals of individual development created
an internal struggle between the trickle-down approach and an approach to human
development as a program focused on the core development of human rights.
III.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: GOOD INTENTION WITH
INCOMPLETE CONCEPT

The dawn of the 21st century brought a new development in the form of the
Millennium Development Goals ("MDG"), a set of eight specific objectives for the
betterment of the human condition including eradicating poverty, and improving
health, equality, and education, with eighteen specific targets related to forty-eight
quantifiable indicators. 40 This became a national and international strategy for

34. History of HDR, supra note 1.
35. U.N. DEv. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, at 23 (2013).

36. Id.
37. In the premiere HDR, Mahbub Ul Haq wrote, "[pleople are the real wealth of a nation....
This may appear to be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the
accumulation of commodities and financial wealth." U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1990, at 9 (1990).
38. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, at 28 (2010).
39. Id. at 26-31.
40. There are eight goals to be achieved by 2015. These goals are 1) Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger; 2) Achieve universal primary education; 3) Promote gender equality and empower women;
4) Reduce child mortality; 5) Improve maternal health; 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other
diseases; 7) Ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) Develop a global partnership for development.
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development. Hunger, unsafe drinking water, HIV/AIDs, malaria, and other
impairments would be cut in half by 2015.41
In 2002 the Monterey Conference on Financing for Development was held to
consider the shortfalls in the resources required to achieve the MDGs, causing
economists to identify the costs and benefits strategies. 42 The Report of the High
Level Panel on Financing for Development found that an extra $50 billion per year
would be required to achieve the goals on time. 4 3 The World Bank assessed the
cost of achieving the MDGs overall, estimating that the total cost would fall
between $40 - 70 billion per year (an estimate vastly different from the High Level
Panel's).44 The World Bank focuses on macroeconomic policy objectives,
inflation, budget deficits, etc., to reduce poverty by an elaborate market approach
of general equilibrium and a demand-supply framework. 4 5 The programs handling
the MDGs were confronted with genuine criticism in their attempt to implement
the development consensus reflected in the MDGs, 4 6 which provided for a
programmatic rather than a claims-based rights approach. The Millennium Project,
headed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs, came up with a practical plan to invest in
development and an MDG needs assessment with a list of technical interventions,
but did not address policy and institutional reform. 47
Many countries could not even afford their development goals due to
diversions in financial priorities because of International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
and World Bank conditions that focused on developing the private sector and legal
48
reform. Furthermore, MDG cost estimates did not consider the factorial nature of
See Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015: Background, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml (last visited July 6, 2014).
41. Id. (the target date for attaining the MDGs is 2015).
42. See International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18-22,
2002, Monterrey Consensus on Financingfor Development, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/11 (2003),
available at http://www.un.org/esalffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf.
43. U.N. Secretary-General, Executive Summary of the Report of the High-level Panel on
Financingfor Development, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/55/1000 (June 21, 2001).
44. Shantayanan Devarajan, et. al., Goals for Development: History, Prospects and Costs I
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. WPS 2819, 2002), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/1 0.1596/1813-9450-2819.
45. Id. at 15; see also James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and
Cormption, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 125, 181 (2009) (the Asian Development Bank has taken successful
measures to account for local conditions in their policies, yet, in Africa, World Bank measures have
largely focused on a system favoring economic interests over human rights).
46. Gathii, supra note 45, at 181.
47. JEFFREY D. SACHS, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL
PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, ch. 7 (2005) [hereinafter MILLENNIUM

available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MainReportCompletePROJECT],
lowres.pdf.
48. See id. at 29-52; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals:
Health in the Developing World, Speech at the Second Global Consultation of the Commission on
Macroeconomics
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interlinked goals; for example, reduction in child mortality will increase the
school-aged population, causing an increase in the cost of universal primary
education. 49 Nor did the estimates account for meaningful comparisons of absolute
poverty across time and space. Global comparison is based on a dollar-a-day
poverty line and does not take into account that China, India, Bangladesh, and
Nepal account for a great deal of the total global poverty.s0 The Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO") uses a food balance approach to measure the
nutritional MDG target; this approach combines information on the net food
resources in a country with distributional assumptions of nutritional intake." This,
perhaps, is an effective means of measuring potential food consumption within a
country, but still falls short because it fails to account for disproportionate
distribution of food sources. 52 Lastly, the cost predictions fail to account for

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jan/23/whos-going-to-pay-formdgs (noting that aid alone is not enough, but transparency and accountability are essential if tax
revenues are to be used to plug the financing gap).
49. There is undisputed evidence that education is interrelated to poverty, which is interrelated to
infant mortality. See Sanjay Reddy & Antoine Heuty, Global Development Goals: The Folly of
Technocratic Pretensions, 26 DEV. POL'Y REV. 5, 17 (2008) ("[A]chieving certain goals may increase
the cost of achieving others."). The assertion then is that if poverty and lack of education are linked to
higher infant mortality, then it is possible that lower infant mortality may be linked to higher education
rates and greater needs for resources as a byproduct of more children being born and needing those
resources to continue a quality life. In the same way, if life spans are longer then more resources are
necessary to maintain those people and give them a quality of life. This is purely conjecture, but one
might also wonder if the quality of life increases will the cost of more invasive health care decrease?
Or, as the adults become healthier because of greater resources and access to health care, will the cost
of some social services, such as orphanages decrease? These are important questions, which on a macro
level seem to have been left out of the equation. See, e.g., JULIA GRIGGS & ROBERT WALKER, THE
COSTS OF CHILD POVERTY FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 4 (2008), available
at http://www.jrf.org.uk/system/fles/2301 -child-poverty-costs.pdf ("Infant mortality is higher amongst
children born into poverty."); cf James F. Fries et al., Reducing Health Care Costs by Reducing the
Need and Demandfor Medical Services, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321 (1993) (discussing the possibility
of lowering health care costs through preventative care).
50. The dollar a day poverty level was first introduced in 1990 and has periodically been revised
to account for inflation against the U.S. dollar. According to one World Bank analyst the use of an
average, fixed global poverty line may not be the most representative, as poverty must take into account
varying consumption levels. See Martin Ravallion, et al., Dollar a Day Revisited 2, 23-24 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. WPS
4620, 2008), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/09/02/000158349_20080902095754/R
endered/PDF/wps4620.pdf.
51. Food Balance
Sheets:
A
Handbook,
U.N.
FOOD
&
AGRIC.
ORG.,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9892e/x9892e0l.htm (last visited July 6, 2014).
52. Food Security Statistics, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/essfs/en/ (last visited July 6, 2014) (The food balance is determined by comparing the "domestic supply of
food commodities" to the "domestic food utilization" and the "food supply available for human
consumption."); see also FAO Basic Definitions of Hunger, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.,
http://ecsw.org/files/global/world-hunger/news/fao-basic-definitions-of-hunger.pdf (last visited July 6,
2014) (The security statistics are used to determine the probable rate of undernourishment, which is a
person who consumes roughly less than 1800 kcal/day, depending on age, size, health, and other
conditions.).
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natural events such as tsunamis, disease and illness, or other accidents.s" For
example, between 1960 and 1987 Botswana experienced a rise in life expectancy
from forty-seven to sixty-one, but in 2000, as a direct result of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, life expectancy fell drastically from sixty-one to thirty-nine.54 Such
unpredictable events are likely to continue in one form or another.
Another strong criticism of the MDGs is the superficiality of the goals. The
MDGs seek to make local change through external forces (financing and
resources), which seems counterintuitive when these external forces lack both
sustainability and cultural understanding.5 5 Furthermore, the MDGs fail to create
strong objectives within those local communities, particularly with regard to
human rights. 56 The goals do not take into account the wants and views of those
they seek to assist, nor does the local community take ownership of the particular
initiatives.5 7
In September 2010, 140 countries' leaders, along with leaders of NGOs, met
at the Millennium Development Goals Summit.5 1 One thing everyone could agree
on was the importance of human rights in the effort to achieve the MDGs. 59 Yet

53. See U.N. System Task Team on the Post-2015 U.N. Development Agenda, Discussion Note,
Review of the Contributions of the MDG Agenda to Foster Development: Lessons for the post-2015
2012),
8,
(Mar.
at
Agenda,
U.N.
Development
MDG framework
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/843taskteam.pdf("[T]he
failed to account for the vulnerability of countries to natural disasters and the possibility of sudden
reversals of years of development gains.").
54. Reddy & Heuty, supra note 49, at 21; see also RITZEN, supra note 30, at 26 ("A new setback
Late in 2002, UNAIDS
for development came in the 1980s and 1990s in the form of HIV/AIDS ....
reported that in Southern Africa national adult HIV prevalence rates had risen higher than was thought
possible, exceeding 30 per cent in four countries . . . . Fields in Southern Africa are lying fallow
because there is no one to work . . . . Whoever is not sick is tending to the sick and dying or taking care
of the orphans. Food can no longer be produced. We encounter for perhaps the first time in world
history a food shortage . .. due to illness.").
55. See AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

AND CAPABILITY APPROACH:

FREEDOM AND AGENCY 66-68 (Severine Deneulin et al. eds., Earthscan 2009).

See also NAILA

KABEER, INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, CAN THE MDGs PROVIDE A PATHWAY TO SOCIAL
at
6 (2010), available
INEQUALITIES
INTERSECTING
THE CHALLENGE OF
JUSTICE?

http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/MDGreportwebsiteu2WC.pdf;

THE E-CONSULTATION ON HUNGER,

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY: COLLECTION OF THE CONTRIBUTION RECEIVED FROM THE 19TH

NOVEMBER 2012 TO 10TH JANUARY 2013, at 390 (2013) [hereinafter CYINDEP] (describing the
Cyprus Island-Wide NGO Development Platform).
56. CYINDEP, supra note 55.
57. According to one author, these concerns are not only legitimate, but pressing considering the
nearing 2015. Among the list of serious concerns is,
tensions between MDG progress and authoritarian governance; procedural and legitimacy
concerns; problems relating to poor specification; inappropriate scale of ambition based
upon unreliable and arbitrary assumptions about feasibility; misinterpretation and
misapplication of the MDGs at the national level; the failure to address growing inequalities;
tensions with international human rights legal standards; and colonisation . ...

Mac Darrow, The Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights Priorities
for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 55, 60 (2012).
58. G.A. Res. 65/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/1 (Sept. 22, 2010).
59. Id. Jlj 53, 55.
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global summits are convened at the expense of taxpayers everywhere. In such
summits promises are easily set, but seldom met. If previous summit's promises
had been met, global trade would have been healthy by the year 2000; 24,000
children would not be dying each day from preventable causes.60 The Millennium
Development Goals Summit promises suffered from two factors. First, basic
human survival elements that are recognized in the MDGs were reduced to
programs instead of relying upon a claim-based rights approach. This transformed
into bureaucratic and political welfare assistance, based on a dirigisme model, 61 to
those who should have the enforceable right to survival. Even worse, those people
could not participate and represent their concerns in the MDGs' process in
determining their fate. Second, it is clear from the discussion above that the
programs and administrative modus operandi of the MDGs were not well thought
out. The recognition of the enforceable inherent right to survive with well thought
out programs is necessary for the future of human development.
IV. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY CYCLE?

Yet another popular 21st century trend of human development is sustainable
development. Sustainable development is the notion that development should
facilitate a "sustained yield;" each country should balance consumption with
reproduction of resources in order to sustain and balance resources over time. 62
Sustainable development became a staple of human development starting with its
d6but in the famous Brundtland Commission report Our Common Future in
1987.63 While historically sustainable development has been couched in the
context of environmental law, the 2013 report of the U.N. Conference on
Sustainable Development described voluntary commitments to creating sustainable
60. Ernest C. Madu, The Convention on the Rights of the Child-People and Partners,UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/364 617.htm (last visited July 7, 2014).
61. See Charles Sabel & Sanjay Reddy, Learning to Learn: Undoing the Gordian Knot of
Development Today, 50 CHALLENGE 73, 74 (2007) (the dirigisme model is "the assumption, common to
nearly all development theory, that there is an expert agent-the state for the dogmatist and orthodox
left, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or other guardians of market orthodoxy for the right-that
already sees the future of development and can therefore issue instructions for arriving there." These
theories, which comprise the dirigisme model, are in constant conflict and revision. They "suppress
diversity" and stagnate the actual potential for development to effectively help the people who most
need its effects, the poor).
62. See Ulrich Grober, Deep Roots: A Concept of "Sustainable Development"(Nachhaltigkeit) 7,
(Social Science Research Center Berlin for Social Research, Working Paper No. P. 2007-002, 2007).
("'Sustainability' is a semantic modification, extension and transfer of the term 'sustained yield.' This
had been the doctrine and, indeed, the 'holy grail' of foresters all over the world for more or less two
centuries. The essence of 'sustained yield forestry' was described for example by William A. Duerr, a
leading American expert on forestry: 'To fulfill our obligations to our descendents and to stabilize our
communities, each generation should sustain its resources at a high level and hand them along
undiminished. The sustained yield of timber is an aspect of man's most fundamental need: to sustain
life itself.' A fine anticipation of the Brundtland-formula.").
63. See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987) (according to the report, sustainable
development is, "development, which implies meeting the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs").
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development in education, economics, energy, water/sanitation, food security,
climate change, transportation, oceans/seas, gender equality, and more.64 Despite
the fact that sustainable development has been the prevailing lens through which
human development is viewed, it is not without extreme criticism.
Sustainable development presents three challenges as a theory for
development: 1) sustainable development was put forward in an environmental
context, with no direct connection to human rights; 2) sustainable development is
but a program of action; and 3) sustainable development can provide a pretext for
capitalism to support inequality.
Politically, sustainable development was created in the context of protecting
the environment and creating development that would sustain the environment.
This was a compromise between the North's environmental priorities and the
South's development priorities.65 Economically, sustainable development is a
result of the fear that if the production and consumption patterns of the North
continued and were adopted by the rest of the world, natural resource-based
economies could not endure, and their demise would create a domino effect
reaching every aspect of human lives all over the world.66
Twenty years after the first U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development in 1992, which formally incorporated the idea of sustainable
development as a balancing approach between the environment and development,6 7
world leaders met for the Rio+20 conference in 2012 to continue exploring this
theme of environmental protection, discussing "a green economy in the context of
sustainable development poverty eradication" and the institutional framework for
The Rio Declaration and the preceding Rio+20
sustainable development.
highlight that while sustainable development still has concerns for the wellbeing of
humanity, it is fixed on a nexus of environmental protection and does not
recognize the importance of human rights, particularly in the context of the right to
survival.69
Therefore, another issue with sustainable development is the lack of a sense
of entitlement or recognitions of rights; without such a notion of any rights or
duties, the delivery of any aid is a charity rather than a manifestation of rights.7 1
Accordingly, cooperation between the developed world and the developing world

64. See generally U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
1111-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288 (July 27, 2012) (the Rio
+20 Conference prefaced this notion highlighting seven priority areas of sustainable development:
decent jobs, energy, sustainable cities, food security, sustainable agriculture, water, oceans and disaster
readiness).
65. Upendra D. Acharya, Is Development a Lost Paradise? Trade, Development and
Environment: A Triadic Dream of International Law, 45 ALBA. L. REV. 401, 403-07 (2007).
66. Id. at 404.
67. Id. at 410.
68. G.A. Res. 66/288, supra note 64, 1 12.
69. Acharya, supra note 65, at 410-11.
70. Frank J. Garcia, A "Fair" Trade Law of Nations or a "Fair" Global Law of Economic
Relations?, 45 ALBA. L. REV. 303, 305 (2007).
ACTION (2013). See also G.A. Res. 66/288,
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is mandatory, a cooperation in which there is a legally binding obligation to
collaborate in the transferring of capital, technology, or other goods and services,
and such transfers should be seen as a right, not welfare or charity.7 ' Current
theories of sustainable development do not view development assistance as a legal
obligation corresponding with the legal right to survival, and thus fail to achieve
success in development goals. 72
Lastly, a particularly strong criticism is that while development is the answer
to the problems of global poverty, particularly hunger, sustainable development
provides a convenient pretext to both protectionism and capitalism.73 The notion
of sustainable development, as imposed by already developed Western
civilizations, does not take into account the incredibly unbalanced struggle to
balance economic, environmental, cultural, and social justice needs.74 This creates
an inequality cycle where, in order for one country to maintain its standard of
living, another country must inherently stay underdeveloped generating neverending inequality and legitimization of such inequality through the existing
concept and practice of sustainable development. There must be an equal
distribution of wealth, technology, and capabilities in order for all countries to
achieve development, but this undermines the control and interests of developed
countries.
V.

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS LEARNED

Without change in the development model, the future of human development
will continue on a path of perpetuating poverty and making only superficial
changes to development. A major cause of this is the dirigisme model of
development policy and programs. There is an assumption that there are expert
agents who understand development problems, see the future, know the solution,
and can fix the system.75 The "expert agents" are those of U.N. agencies-nothing
71. Philip Alston, Revitalizing United Nations Work on Human Rights and Development, 18
MELB. U.L. REV. 216,218-19 (1992).
72. Acharya, supra note 65, at 420.
73. See Roger Keil, Sustaining Modernity, Modernizing Nature. The Environmental Crisisand the
Survival of Capitalism, in THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PARADOX: URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

INTHE UNITED STATES 41, 49 (Rob Krueger & David Gibbs eds., 2007) (citation omitted) ("Inadequate
responses to ecological exhaustion abound. Corporate elites and most governments promote a form of
sustainability that is more about sustaining capitalism, growth, and profits than sustaining living
environments."). See also OLANIKE F. DEJI, GENDER AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCTION 363,

369 (2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Joan Veon) ("Sustainable development has continued to evolve
as that of protecting the world's resources while its true agenda to control the world's resources. It
should be noted that [it] sets up the global infrastructure needed to manage, count, and control all of the
world's assets."). This sentiment is echoed by Mary Jo Anderson, who stated "the real purpose of
sustainable development is to contain and limit economic development in developing countries and in
so doing control population growth." See Austin Aneke, Principle of Sustainable Development; One of
the Greatest Impediments to Africa Development, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 20, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/austin-aneke/principle-of-sustainableb 1610720.html?view-print&comm ref-false.
74. See, e.g., Aneke, supranote 73.
75. Sable & Reddy, supranote 61, at 73.
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more than bureaucratic czars created with taxpayer's money. 76 That is, the World
Bank and IMF, the guardians of marketplace orthodoxy committed to the
Washington consensus; donor countries, which push their own agendas in
determining problems and priorities; and the national elites of each country, using
development goals and strategies as tools to forward their own political and
economic goals. n These parties control the fate of development goals, but ignore
the fact that victims should be their primary concern and should be the decisionmakers in own their lives. In this context, the victims' claim-based right to
survival is just a daydream; the right to survival is reduced to programs based on
available resources, followed at state discretion, resulting in an immunity of
politicians from whatever violations they commit against the right to survive.
Even if a national government wants to prioritize problems of development,
placing the most pressing needs first-food, clean water, etc.-they must adhere to
the austerity plans of the IMF and World Bank, development plans benefiting the
private sector and placing constraints on other pro-development policies. 78
Furthermore, development has taken on the character of technical and
bureaucratic programs based on political delivery of charity, instead of a claimbased rights movement of survival of human life. There has been a failure to
factor in any legal obligations concerning basic human survival rights yet, at the
same time, human development rights can be abstracted from positive rights
enshrined in the UDHR that have only been put into practice through voluntary
U.N. programs. 7 What's more, development goals fail to address the root causes
of poverty, particularly the historical context of colonization and imperialism in
parts of the underdeveloped population. According to the modem imperialism
theory of development, developed countries that once relied on underdeveloped
countries to sustain them during the colonial. periods continue to do so because of a
technological-industrial relationship where "[i]ndustrial countries invest in the
production and export of raw materials in developing countries, influence with
their potential of power the terms of trade in their favour, and thus perpetuate the
international division of labour."8 1
Lastly, few or no accountability mechanisms have been created to address the
failure of institutional financial programs in their attempts to achieve development

76. Id. at 73-74.
77. Id.
78. See Gustav Ranis, Giving Up on Foreign Aid?, 31 CATO J. 75, 76 (2011) ("Aid effectiveness
has been subject to mounting doubts for several reasons. One, and critical, is the by now general
acknowledgement-even by the World Bank and IMF-of the failure of the Structural Adjustment
Lending of the 1980s and 90s, tied to conditionality enshrining the Washington Consensus, but usually
deteriorating into annual ritual dances, with donors initially insisting on reforms but ultimately yielding
to the need to disburse.").
79. See suprap. 6.
80. See Robert Hunter Wade, Globalization, Growth, Poverty, Inequality, Resentment, and
Imperialism, in GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 373-409 (John Ravenhill ed. 2008); Frithjof Kuhnen,
Causes of Underdevelopment and Conceptsfor Development, 8 J. INST. DEv. STUDIES 11 (1987).
81. Kuhnen, supra note 80, at 20, §2.2.2.
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goals. 82 This is not to deny that some accountability mechanisms do exist within
IFIs and international organizations.83 For example, the World Bank inspection
panel reviews complaints of human rights violations occurring as a direct result of
World Bank projects. 84 However, such panels issue only recommendations and,
while some complaints result in effective change, others result in none at all.85
These pitfalls do not bode well for the future of development since they set it
up to become merely a programmatic approach with extreme problems, and fail to
recognize the right to survival in the legal system of rights and remedies. A
solution to these problems could be a radically new structure for human
development. This new structure requires the recognition and enforcement of the
right to survive. The right to survival is a customary international jus cogens
norm, developed out of the recognition of the consensus of non-binding
instruments proclaiming the right to development; 86 the numerous human rights
instruments giving weight to component rights to the right to survival, primarily
food, water, shelter, and security;87 and incorporations of such rights into almost all
constitutions and national and international jurisprudence.
VI.

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES TO THE RIGHT TO SURVIVE

The new reconstructive approach needs to consider the existing failed
elements of human development and analyze the roles of different parties the
enfranchised/disenfranchised context. In this new structure, the global community

82. See SiobhAn McInerney-Lankford, International Development Actors and Human Rights, in
(Malcolm Langford, et al. eds.,
2013).
83. See Matthew Parish, An Essay on the Accountability of InternationalOrganizations,7 INT'L
ORGS. L. REV. 277, 283 (2010). These are most often seen in the context of employment disputes, but
even these tribunals seem to have major short fallings. See also Report of the Redesign Panel on the
U.N. System of Administration of Justice, U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/issues/resolutions/a-61-205.pdf describing the Internal Justice
System as "outmoded, dysfunctional inefficient and that it lacked independence ... [it] fails to meet
many basic due process standards established in international human rights instruments."
84. See
The
Inspection
Panel,
WORLD
BANK,
http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last visited July 7, 2014).
85. Consider the case of the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala, where the Inspection Panel could only
provide reparations after the project, which they funded, resulted in hundreds killed and more displaced.
There was a question of if and how adequate reparations could be made. The victims took the case to
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights; however, the government refused to make a settlement
official. See Malcolm Langford, A Sort of Homecoming: The Right to Housing, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 160, 162-64

RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 166, 181 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly, eds. 2010);

U.S. Congress Takes Strides Toward Reparationsfor Chixoy Dam Survivors, BIC BANK INFO. (Jan. 22,
2014), http://www.bicusa.org/us-congress-takes-strides-toward-reparations-for-chixoy-dam-survivors/.
86. See supra pp. 7-11.
87. Personal security is a basic tenant of the UDHR, supra note 13, art. 3. The General Assembly
has recognized water as a human right in GA 64/292. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A.
Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc A/RES/64/292 (Aug. 3, 2010). Additionally, food as a human right has been
derived from Art. 25 of the U.D.H.R. as integral to the right to an adequate standard of living. See Note
by the Secretary General, Right to Food, U.N. Doc A/68/288 (Aug. 7, 2013) (Summary by the SG of
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Oliver De Shutter).
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must make a distinction between the enfranchised and the disenfranchised. The
disenfranchised are those who lack the basic necessities for survival: food, clean
water, access to basic medical care, housing, etc. This new structure must take into
account the causal relationship between the enfranchised and the disenfranchised.
A. Right to Survive and InternationalFinancialInstitutions
Firstly, the parental nature of international organizations, imposing a
particular economic ideology without giving consideration to alternatives, is onesided and fails to account for domestic input and local development goals. The
imposition of institutional arrangements, such as those by IFIs, over the World's
One well-known example is the
poor results in stagnation in development."
impact global lenders such as the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank, and
the World Bank have had on Jamaica, forever changing the climate of the
economy, collapsing markets such as the dairy and banana industry.89 In another
example, the IFI effect was more subtle: in Kenya pressing human rights needs
were largely absent from the judicial reform agenda and include the lack of
interpretation of court proceedings into native languages, inadequate opportunity
for trial preparation, improperly long periods of pre-trial detention, and abhorrent
prison conditions. 90 These judicial reforms were intended to favor international
investors. 91
Underlying fundamental principles and policies, by which IFIs are structured
and function, do not directly reconcile with the essential needs of the poor and,
therefore, are contrary to the right of survival. For example, in the interest of
remaining politically impartial, the World Bank requires that "[o]nly economic
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be
weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.",92 Article
I highlights a purpose driven by economic pursuit: to assist in reconstruction "by
facilitating the investment of capital," to "promote private foreign investment," and
to "promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade."93 Similar
provisions were introduced at the IMF and the International Development
Association ("IDA").94 This is not to say that the banks never consider human
rights in decision making, but rather that the nexus of decision making is
88. Ranis, supranote 78, at 76-77.
89. See Stephanie Black, LIFE AND DEBT (Tuff Gong Pictures 1990) speculating that the financial
aid made condition on financial reforms and structural adjustments, such as trade liberalization and
privatization failed to improve the economic situation of Jamaica and left the country $4.6 billion in
debt.
90. Gathii, supra note 45, at 187-94 (quoting Richard E. Messick, JudicialReform and Economic
Development: A Survey of the issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999)).
9 1. Id.
92. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement art. IV § 10,
Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 (as amended effective June 27, 2012).
93. Id. art. 1.
94. Peter T. Muchlinski, InternationalFinance and Investment and Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 263, 267 (Scott Sheeran & Sir Nigel Rodley eds.,

2013).
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intrinsically tied to economics, a truth that is entirely related to the view of the
banks that development is a matter of economic success, not survival rights.9 5
In a similar context, the IMF systematically uses conditionality in its lending
process to impose goals based on quantitative, objective measurements of
economic success in order both to resolve balance-of-payment problems and
safeguard the funds' resources.9 The purpose of conditional lending is to improve
the economic and political situation in developing countries, yet the policy of
conditional lending puts forth a particular economic agenda while failing to
account for either input from the countries themselves or the macro effect on
society, culture, and the economy.9 7 However, in a more encouraging effort, the
Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank mandated the IDB
to explicitly pursue two objectives, "reducing poverty and inequality and achieving
sustainable growth. Alongside these objectives are two strategic goals: addressing
the special needs of the less developed and smaller countries and fostering
development through the private sector." 98
B. Right to Survive and Developed Countries
Developed countries have resisted the recognition of a claim-based right to
survive and the right to development, but instead have recognized a soft approach
to development, turning these rights into "fake" or "pseudo-rights."
The
programmatic approach of the MDGs and international instruments is non-binding,
and does not create a legal context for these rights. The concept of the right to
survive is limited to a program-only concept of sustainable development by
politically compromised, economically supportive developed countries' economic
interests.
Developed countries play a part in undermining development in this way by
controlling IFIs, making them puppets to serve ideologically loaded economic
financial systems. 99 Monetary imperialism from the global powers and the lack of
95. Id. at 267-69.
96. INT'L MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY 1 (2002), available at
https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf. Notice that the guidelines do
attempt to account for subjective, non-quantitative goals in the measure of structural benchmarks.
However, the majority of success measures are objective and quantitative. Additionally, there has been
a recent move to make more concessions to flexible lending procedures. See IMF Conditionality
Factsheet,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND
(Oct.
1,
2013),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/conditio.pdf However, there is still little mention of
human rights or human survival as a factor in lending conditions.
97. The IMF did not consult local legislatures in their decision making process for lending, and
removed the state's decision-making power over financial policy. Additionally, "[s]tructural reforms
also result in several negative socioeconomic outcomes that generate social unrest and political
opposition. Increasing unemployment and poverty rates, greater income inequality, and reduced social
services result in the diminished living standards commonly observed after economic reform
programs." See Chelsea Brown, Democracy's Friend of Foe? The Effect of Recent IMF Conditional
Lending in Latin America, 30 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 431, 434 (2009).
98. Mandates, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/mandates,6280.html (last
visited July 13, 2014).
99. Sabel & Reddy, supranote 61, at 76-77.
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political infrastructure created a struggle between meeting financial demands and
maintaining basic necessities for life in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle
East.100 For example, in the recent global financial crisis, developing countries
blamed developed countries for pushing "the free-market or neoliberal model,
which emphasizes a small state, deregulation, private ownership, and low taxes,"
agendas strongly advocated by the United States and IMF in the 1990s. 0'
Financial institutions continue to work from outdated economic models based on
the perspective of developed countries; financial institutions such as "the World
Bank and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development have
supported programs that strengthen public sectors, promote good governance, and
combat corruption for the last 15 years with little to show for it." 02
Moreover, developed countries ignore the facts of their colonial past and
continue dominating underdeveloped countries, destroying the independent policymaking capacity with which they would have been able to address their own
problems. Rapid decolonization of the vast majority of the world left many
countries exposed to "the failure of colonial powers to lay firm foundations for
democratic political development."' 0 3 For example, global expectations for Africa
to develop during this period were high yet,
within the space of a decade, democratic independence governments
were eliminated through coups and civil wars, replaced by military
dictatorships or authoritarian one-party states governed by political
strongmen and dominated by large tribal groups. Underdevelopment,
the condition of stagnant or falling incomes relative to the rest of the
world, combined with declining life expectancy rates, high infant and
maternal mortality, extensive and increasing illiteracy.'0
The developed countries that left underdeveloped countries in a sad state after
decolonization tend to be the same countries that justify humanitarian intervention
through the Right to Protect doctrine ("R2P"). While R2P is established
international law providing that a national government of a sovereign state has a
responsibility to protect its own citizens from human rights abuses, 05 R2P places a
strain on traditional notions of sovereignty in that it creates a new justification for
foreign intervention. 0 6 For example, the means used in the NATO air strikes
against Yugoslavia constituted warfare with the aim of taking down the Milosevic
regime and destroying military resources rather than directly providing

100.

Nancy Birdsall & Francis Fukuyama, The Post-Washington Consensus: Development after the

Crisis, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 45, 46 (2011); PAUL BATTERSBY & JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA, GLOBALIZATION
AND HUMAN SECURITY 19-22 (2009).

101. Birdsall & Fukyama, supranote 100, at 46-47.
102. Id. at 51.
103. BATTERSBY & SIRACUSA, supranote 100, at 19.

104.
105.
299-301
106.
INT'L&

Id.
Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral ConstitutionalMoment?, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 298,
(2012).
John F. Murphy, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes ofAge? A Sceptic's View, 18 ILSA J.
COMP. L.413,425 (2012).
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humanitarian aid and security assistance. 0 7 Similar criticisms have been lodged
against the U.S. when humanitarian intervention and human security were asserted
to justify intervention in Iraq.'os Another example is Security Council Resolution
1973, meant to protect civilians in Libya. 0 9 Several critics argued that the
resolution was used as an abuse of power to oust Muammar Gaddafi from power in
Libya.11o These abuses of discretion in the name of human security and human
development use underdeveloped countries as pawns in politics and war without
any regard for the loss of life that might result or the unnecessary delays to
development committing violation of the right to survive.
C. Right to Survive and PartnershipBetween Corporationsand National
Governments
Corporate activity in underdeveloped areas of the world additionally lead to
continued underdevelopment. Perhaps one of the most current examples is that of
the garment belt in Bangladesh, where disregard for the basic safety of factory
workers has cost thousands of lives in factory fires and collapses."' Despite the
overwhelming evidence establishing a lack of safety conditions for more than a
decade, corporate brand owners continue to permit unsafe labor conditions and
plead ignorance to factory conditions.11 2 Another example of this is the Coca-Cola
Plachimada in India, which contributed to significant water use in the droughtstricken area in the mid-2000s, contributing to the deprivation of farmers and

107. Gerd Oberleitner, Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?, 11

GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE 185, 194 (2005).

108. Zachary D.A. Hingst, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Building Block or Roadblock?,
22 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 250-51 (2013).
109. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17 2011).
110. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 751-52 (2013).

111. See Dhaka Rana Plaza Collapse: Pressure Tells on Retailers and Government, BBC NEWS
(May 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22525431 (an estimated 1,100 died in the
factory collapse at Rana Plaza); Bangladesh: Tragedy Shows Urgency of Worker Protections, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/bangladesh-tragedy-showsurgency-worker-protections (four examples noted by Human Rights Watch are: in April 2005, 73
garment factory workers died in a factory collapse in Savar, again in February 2006, 18 workers were
killed in a garment factory collapse in Dhaka, and in June 2010, 25 workers were killed in a different
collapse in Dhaka, in November 2012, 100 workers died in a factory fire in Dhaka). See also Stephen
Frost, Garment Factory Collapses in Bangladesh, CSR ASIA WEEKLY (Apr. 19, 2005), http://csrasia.com/csr-asia-weekly-news-detail.php?id=3946 (the article described the 2005 factory conditions as
deplorable, citing poor workers conditions, withheld wages, and the discouragement of unions as part of
the problem for unsafe and unhealthy factory conditions); Ataur R. Belai & Robin W. Roberts,
Stakeholders' Perceptions of Corporate Social Reporting in Bangladesh, 97 J. Bus. ETHICS 311, 317
(2010) (one interviewee reported that, "[t]ruly speaking, the garment factory owners are very shrewd
people. They buy labour at a very cheap rate. They don't care about the health and safety measures. As
a result, we lost hundreds of human lives in recent days due to factory fires. The victims who survived
are not even getting proper compensation. The offenders go away without being brought to justice.
Isn't it a human crime?").
112. See supra note 111.
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villagers of drinkable water." 3 The High Court of Kerala stilled the injunction
prohibiting the Coca-Cola plant from continuing to draw water from the area,
reasoning that the plant was only a minor cause of the drought; yet critics point out
that it is negligent to continue to allow the plant to draw 500,000 liters of water a
day from the villagers' common water in the middle of a life-threatening
drought.114
What's more, corporations become explicitly responsible for their human
rights violations when they derive power from state actors, in both "power with"
Accordingly, "[s]tates share 'power with'
and "power over" models." 5
corporations to solve states' economic, political, diplomatic, and security
problems. In this process, corporations may enjoy sovereign immunity and profit
from their expertise by opening up the market for state functions.""' 6 Anne-Marie
Slaughter describes the "power with" dynamic as "[t] he power of co-creation, the
power of mass collaboration, the power of diverse minds coming together and the
ability then to solve problems in ways we have never been able to do before."" 7 A
prominent example of this is the Doe v. Unocal case, where the Myanmar military
built roads and helipads, provided security, and relocated Myanmar citizens
through armed violence at the very least acting in concert with Unocal's efforts to
build a natural gas pipeline running through the same area.
VII.

THE RIGHT TO REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SURVIVE

While the relationship between victims and violators of the right to
development and survival is a causal relationship, it has not been recognized as a
legal relationship and is not accounted for in the international system of rights and
remedies. Yet, it is an accepted principle of international law that when
individuals' rights are violated, they must have recourse and remedies." 9 The
113. See Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages v. Perumatty Grama Panchayat, (2005) 2 K.L.T. 554
(India), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/580673/.
114. Id. See also Case Against Coca-Cola Kerala State: India, THE RIGHTS TO WATER &
http://www.righttowater.info/rights-in-practice/legal-approaches/legal-approach-caseSANITATION,
studies/case-against- coca-cola-kerala-state-indial (last visited July 13, 2014).
115. Upendra D. Acharya, Globalization and Hegemony Shif: Are States Merely Agents of
Corporate Capitalism?, 36 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 937, 959-60 (2013).
116. Id. at 960.
117. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Commentary, The Grotius Lecture: Asil 2010 International Law in A
Time of Change: Should International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1315, 1375
(2011).
118. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2002) on reh g en banc sub nom. John
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
I19. But a few examples of the numerous expressions of this in international instruments are the
U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities, the UDHR, and the ICCPR. Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. art. 8 § 29, Feb. 9, 1946, I U.N.T.S. 15, 30 ("In all civil cases
against the organization, the U.N. must provide "appropriate modes of settlement"); UDHR, supra note
13, art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."). See also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2,113(a), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 1.L.M.
368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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General Assembly itself has explained that every individual has the right to
"[e]qual and effective access to justice; . . . adequate, effective and prompt
reparation for harm suffered; and . . . access to relevant information concerning
violations

and

reparation

mechanisms"

when

a

state

commits

human

rights

violations.' 20 Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights has even held
that sovereign immunities and immunities for international organizations only
apply insofar as "the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means
to protect effectively their rights under the Convention."' 21 Thus, the courts have
recognized that individuals' inherent rights permeate all other obligations;
international organizations as well as nation-states must conform to human rights
standards.12 2 These examples definitely demonstrate that the right to remedies for
violations of the right to survival is a well-established principle of international law
and has matured to the status of customary international law.
A. InternationalOrganizations
The global community is growing more and more receptive to the trend that
both corporations and international organizations are responsible for the impact
they have over the countries they interact with, both positively and negatively.1 23
International organizations particularly must be made strictly accountable for any
violations of the right to survive, whether due to negligence in policies and
operations of programs or operations of programs and policies without reasonable

120. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, 1111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
121. See Beer & Regan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 54 (1999); Waite &
Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 261, 261 (1999).
122. See W. European Union v. Siedler [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Dec. 21, 2009, AR S040129F
(Belg.), reviewed and reprinted in Cedric Ryngaert, Oxford Reports on Int'l L. in Domestic Courts
(Andre
Nollkaemper
&
Erika
de
Wet
eds.,
2010),
available
at
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ildc/1625be09.case. 1/law-ildc-1625be09#law-ildc-1625be09headNote-1. Article 6 (1) of the ECHR guarantees a complainant the right to a fair trial, regardless of
immunities.
123. E.g., G.A. Res. 66/100, 1 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/100 (Feb. 27, 2012) (stating that, "the
subject of responsibility of international organizations is of major importance in the relations of States
and international organizations"). Compare U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect,Respect and Remedy' Framework: Rep.
of the Secretary-General,at 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 7/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (the Ruggie Principle, though
non-binding, are a perfect example of the multitude of non-binding principles which impute a duty on
corporations to practice due diligence in their international relations), and YANN QUEINNEC, THE
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: AN EVOLVING LEGAL STATUS 25 (2007),

available at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication 3064 (arguing that Corporate Social
Responsibility ("CSR") guidelines have become customary among states and enterprises, and therefore,
the OECD Guidelines and Ruggie Principles, which are based on CSR, are customary international
law), with Christian Schliemann, ProceduralRules for the Implementation of the OECD Guidelinesfor
Multinational Enterprise-A Public International Law Perspective, 13 GERMAN L.J. 51, 57 (2012)
(positing that while the guidelines themselves have not reached the level of customary law, "it should
be kept in mind that the Guidelines are referring, in large part, to already-existing international
standards, of which some present binding law.").
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discretion. This is important because many developed countries' programs relating
to development and survival are heavily directed or implemented by international
organizations. For example, a case filed in U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of New York against the U.N. by the Institute for Justice and Democracy
in Haiti alleges gross negligence on the part of the U.N. for allowing U.N.
peacekeepers to enter Haiti without taking proper precautions to prevent cholera
from contaminating the water supply through waste generated from the
peacekeepers' campsite. 124 The contamination resulted in a mass epidemic killing
thousands and infecting even more.125 The complainants argue that there is an
obligation to provide individuals who are victims of violations of international law
with an effective remedy, which is required both under international law and the
Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations.126
Similarly, the General Assembly officially took notice of the Draft
Responsibilities for International Organizations in 2011, commanding "[the
regulations] to the attention of Governments and international organizations
without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate
action. ,27 Articles 3 and 4 of the Draft Resolution state:
Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization
entails the international responsibility of that organization... . There is

an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when
conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to that organization under international law; and
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that
organization.128
The Draft Responsibilities includes extensive provisions defining "wrongful
acts" and remedies for wrongful acts, but fails to establish an enforcement
mechanism for the breaches.129 However, such accountability has not gone
unnoticed in a legal context. Vera Gowlland-Bebbas' testimony during the Russell
Tribunal on Palestine analyzed the accountability of the U.N. for its part in both
Rwanda and Srebrenica, and drew the conclusion that as an international

124. Rick Gladstone, Rights Advocates Suing U.N. Over the Spread of Cholera in Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at A4.

125. Id.
126. Petition for Relief from Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti to U.N. Stabilization
Mission in Haiti 25-27 (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/201 1/1Il/englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf (relief denied); Complaint at 40, Georges v.
United Nations, No. 13CV07146 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://www.ijdh.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Cholera-Complaint.pdf.
127. G.A. Res. 66/100, supra note 123,13.
128. Id. arts. 3-4.
129. Id. (notice that the draft resolutions are set to be officially accepted in the 2014 session of the
GA).
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organization, the U.N. had a responsibility to protect in those situations. 130 Here,
she made the assertion that under international law the U.N. is responsible for
actions taken by the Security Council and General Assembly, particularly with
regard to Palestine.' 3 1 She notes that international law is largely rendered
irrelevant because no suitable court exists to enforce international law against the
U.N., yet this does not negate the fact that international organizations should be
accountable when they break the law. 132
B.

Corporations

Corporations enjoy a unique immunity from all kinds of violations of human
rights, including the right to survive, because most restrictions on human rights
violations under international law apply only to state actors or a natural person.'33
Litigation against corporations for human rights violations has been largely
unsuccessful,1 34 even though a number of non-binding principles continue to
establish a trend of accountability for corporations' impact. The National Contact
Points through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") routinely engage in mediation to hold international corporations
accountable for their failures to prevent human rights violations.' 35 Furthermore,
corporations are compelled to perform due diligence audits to ensure they do not
adversely affect human rights in the countries with which they do business because
of domestic legislation requiring due diligence, including legislation in the United
States, France, Finland, and Germany.136 Additionally, corporations seem to have
130. See Vera Gowiland-Debbbas, Testimony to the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, YOUTUBE
(Oct.27, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-tPVcHUeMcY&feature=player embedded#at-25.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Dana Weiss & Ronen Shamir, CorporateAccountability to Human Rights: The Case of the
Gaza Strip, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 156, 175 (2011) (discussing the historical nexus between
human rights and corporations, and calling for more accountability measures for corporations
committing human rights violations).
134. Litigants have been largely discouraged by the leverage gained by corporations in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). However, this should not necessarily deter
from past success in litigation for corporate liability in human rights violations, such as Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) on reh g en banc sub nom. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). There are those scholars who believe all is not lost in the world of corporate
liability. E.g., Austen L. Parrish, State Court InternationalHuman Rights Litigation: A Concerning
Trend?, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 25, 42 (2011).
135. See, e.g., Cmty. Legal Educ. Ctr. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Inc. (Cambodia v. U.S.), Case No. 276,
(U.S. Nat'l Contact Point 2013), availableat http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_276 (the NCP engaged in
mediation involving the illegal eviction of Cambodian residence by the American Sugar Refining Co.);
Clean Clothes Campaign v. Adidas (Austria v. Ger.), Case No. 27, (Ger. Nat'l Contact Point 2004),
available at http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case 27 (The NCP negotiated positive steps improving labor
condition for workers in Adidas' factories).
136. See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (2012)
(compelling any company doing business in the state of CA, with international business over a stated
monetary value to perform and publish due diligence audits); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Publ. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(b)-(d), 124 Stat. 2213-16 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m) (compelling companies utilizing conflict minerals to perform due diligence audits);
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made an intentional point of keeping such cases out of litigation; for example,
when Nordstrom was sued by Saipan workers for damages related to RICO Act
violations, which asserted, among other things, using manufacturers in Saipan that
engaged in forced labor, the company settled outside of court. 3 7
In a recent report by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr.
John Ruggie, pronounced the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.' 3 8 The report came up with the "Protect, Respect, and Remedy"
framework. 139 The report clearly imposes states with the duty to protect against
human rights abuses within their jurisdictions, including those abused committed
by corporations.1 40 In order to fulfill their human rights duties and obligations,
states should enact and enforce laws to require corporations to uphold human
rights obligations regardless of whether a corporation is privately-owned or stateowned.14' The report pronounces that it is corporations' responsibility to respect
human rights by addressing adverse human rights impacts and asks corporations to
acknowledge the International Bill of Human Rights and the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.142 It also suggests that corporations
come up with their own volunteer policies of human rights and operate their
functions based on the principles of human rights assessments and due diligence. 4 3
The third element of the report is the access to remedy through judicial,
administrative, and legislative means.144 It suggests that state based and non-state
based remedy be utilized for remedy. 145
Although this report is a progressive step toward the issue of the corporate
abuse of human rights and the right to survive, it fails to address how states can be
held liable for the violation of the duty to protect. This has been an ongoing

Schliemann, supra note 123, at 57 ("[The Netherlands requires] a declaration from companies that they
are aware of the [OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise] and endeavor to comply with them to
the best of their ability. In France, Finland, Germany, and Denmark, multinational enterprises applying
for and receiving state subsidies have to sign a clause that they are well aware (avoirpris connaissance)
of the Guidelines. In many other countries, the Guidelines are at least mentioned within the process of
granting subsidies to enterprises.").
137. Nordstrom Settles Lawsuit Over Sweatshops, KoMONEWS.COM (Aug. 9, 1999, 8:05 AM),
2006, http://www.komonews.com/news/archive/3976951.html. See also Lisa Girion, Nike Settles
Lawsuit
Over
Labor
Claims,
L.A.
TIMES,
Sep.
13,
2003,
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/sep/13/business/fi-nikel3. But see Puck Lo, Forever 21 Fails to
Comply
with
Sweatshop
Investigation,
CORPWATCH
BLOG
(Nov.
30
2012),
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15799.
138. Special Rep. of the Security Council on the Issue of Human Rights and Transaction
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, annexed in the final
report to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011).
139. Id. Jil 1-2.
140. Id. 11| 5-10.
141. Id.Jil 11-12.
142. Id. ifl 12.
143. Id. J 17-21.
144. Id. 1125.
145. Id. Jl 26-3 1.
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obstacle in realizing human rights or the right to survive. The report does not
guarantee that corporations are subjects of international law, but instead keeps
them within the traditional notion of territorial jurisdiction of states. The report
recognizes that corporate abuses of human rights are a new phenomenon, but is
reluctant to treat them as such. On the remedy matter, the report does not provide
a special forum for special cases of corporate abuses of violations that may cause
another setback to the right to survive.
C. Sovereigns
Since the conclusion of World War II, when the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials
commenced, the international community has attempted to create mechanisms for
holding governments accountable for humanitarian and human rights violations.1 46
Regional courts have been established, including the European Court of Human
Rights,14 7 the Inter-American Court on Human Rights,148 and the African Court of
Human and People's Rights,149 each of which allow victims to bring complaints
against member states that violate human rights. One problem with these courts is
their inability to enforce rulings without some sort of executor branch; the courts
rely on individual states to implement norms of international law, including the
judgments of the courts, yet these quasi-courts experience relatively low
compliance.' 5 0 For example, in the case of torture, almost every international court
has expressed concerns that there is no mechanism to ensure reparations awarded
to victims will actually be honored.' 5' In the international arena, the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") arose out of a gradual call for a permanent international

146. See
COURT:

NUREMBERG HUMAN

NUREMBERG

TO

RIGHTS CTR., THE ROAD

THE

HAGUE

8,

TO THE INTERNATIONAL

16

(2007)

CRIMINAL

available

at

http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FromNurembergtoHague 07july eng.pdf
147. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (and its Protocols).
148. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 1, Oct. 1979, O.A.S.T.S. No. 448.
149. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 1, June 9, 1998, O.A.U. Doc
OAU/LRG/AFCHPR/PROT(IIl) (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004).
150. EMILY HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 112-13 (2013).
151.

REDRESS TRUST,

ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS

FOR VICTIMS

OF TORTURE AND

OTHER

available
at
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/master-enforcement%2030%2OMay%202006.pdf ("All
international bodies have expressed concern over ensuring that their views, decisions, and judgments
are made effective so that full reparation is afforded to the victims of human rights violations. But even
in cases where such views, decisions and judgments are legally binding . . . there is a tension between
their binding force and the finality of domestic decisions. In particular, there is no established collateral
procedure for cases in which international courts and tribunals find a violation by a domestic decision
(particularly when it has been reviewed by the highest judicial body of the State). In practice, a
respondent State's political and judicial divisions are mobilised to varying degrees depending on the
nature of the judgments, views or decisions: Do they require purely executive remedial action or
legislative and/or judicial action? It appears that compliance depends on the extent to which each
governmental division rallies to respond to a specific judgment and on the pressure that each
international enforcement procedure is able to exercise over the State.").
INTERNATIONAL

CRIMES

17

(2006),
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court following the tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 52 The ICC
has jurisdiction over any person, regardless of immunities, who commits crimes
Despite the victory of gaining a permanent
under the Rome Statute.'53
have not signed or ratified the Rome Statute are
countries
that
international court,
not accountable to the Court. And the ICC is already criticized for focusing almost
exclusively on Africa; further, since the Court's opening in 2002, only twenty-one
cases have been brought before it.154 While these human rights courts appear to be
in their infancy, and it remains to be seen whether they prove to be effective
solutions, one thing is clear: they are an indication that sovereigns are responsible
for the effects they have on human rights.
VIII.

NEED FOR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REMEDIES
FOR THE RIGHT TO SURVIVAL

Once the global community accepts these basic assumptions, they can begin
working toward creating a system of accountability for the maintenance of the
most basic human rights that allow for the right to survival. This approach would
force governments, organizations, and corporations that interact with
underdeveloped countries to perform a survival-impact assessment of policies and
programs. Programs and policies that are intended to aid in development must
consider first the sustainability of basic survival rights, and policies and programs
that are development-neutral must not hinder survival rights.
In a system of rights and remedies, there must be an accountability measure to
ensure survival-impact surveys are performed and followed. An independent,
international body that represents both developed and developing nations, NGOs,
and human rights commissions should first carry out such accountability. Two
options to rights and remedies should exist:
A. A PermanentSurvival Court
A permanent "survival court" could be developed, allowing victims of
survival rights violations to bring suit against those with causal relationships to the
violation. This court should be created by the Security Council to consider such
cases and issue binding rulings. If these rulings are not followed, the General
Assembly could recommend action against the violators, or the Security Council

http://www.iceCT.,
CRIM.
INT'L
Court,
the
152. About
cpi.int/en menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited July 13,
2014).
153. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998),
available at http://Iegal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm (entered into force 1 July 2002); HAFNERBURTON, supra note 142, at 9 ("Since 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent
tribunal, has been empowered to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
committed not only by representatives of the treaty's participants but also by other governments, like
Sudan, that never agreed to participate.").
http://www.iccCT.,
CRIM.
INT'L
Cases,
and
154. Situations
cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited
July 13, 2014).
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could take enforcement action against them. It should be clear that Council
members should not be allowed to veto decisions of the court, as survival rights are
inherent in nature. Unlike the Security Council, this court should carry universal
jurisdiction, since the right to survival is a human right and a jus cogens norm.
Additionally, the court should be able to apply retroactive justice as the Nuremberg
and the Tokyo courts did.'s
B. Already Existing Domestic and InternationalCourts
Victims should also be able to take advantage of existing domestic and
international courts, should these be the most appropriate venues. In the case of
international organizations, victims should first bring the complaint to the
organization itself. If the complaint were not remedied, the victim would have the
option to appeal to the highest court of their country. If the case is not remedied in
the highest court, the case could be appealed to the International Court of Justice.
In the case of corporation's violations, the victim could bring the case either in the
home country of the corporation, or in the host country, at the victim's discretion.
Either forum should be appropriate under international law, because the right to
survival is an inherent right and jus cogens norm. In the case of sovereigns
(government officials of donor countries and receiving countries etc.) victims
should be allowed to bring suit in their respective countries, and appeal to that
countries highest court. If no favorable outcome is found, the victim could appeal
to the ICJ.
IX. CONCLUSION

The modern context of development in international law has made significant
advancement to recognize the importance of social progress, peace and economic
freedoms in a larger context of human development. Yet, the current state of
human development has taken a largely programmatic approach, turning human
development into a charity as opposed to a legal recognition of a fundamental
right, established in a system of rights and remedies. Without the recognition of a
legal right, IFIs, lOs, state's policies and programs will stagnate over time,
bringing little success to human development platforms. If human development is
to achieve the success hoped for, there must be fundamental changes in developing
a system recognizing remedies for violations of the right to survive.

155. William 0. Douglas said of the Nuremberg Trials, "I thought at the time and still think that the
Nuremberg trials were unprincipled," he wrote. "Law was created ex post facto to suit the passion and
clamor of the time." However, the Tribunal denied that the London Charter created ex post facto as that
law had been articulated in some manner already in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the
Hague Convention. Further, these principles on trial were jus cogens norms of human rights. See Mark
Weber,
Nuremberg
Trials
and
the
Holocaust,
INST.
FOR
HIST.
REV.,
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/vl2/vl2pl 67_Webera.html (last visited July 13, 2014).

HUMAN RIGHTS TAKE A BACK SEAT: THE SUPREME COURT
HANDS OUT A PASS TO MULTINATIONALS AND OTHER WOULD BE
VIOLATORS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
W. CHADWICK AUSTIN AND AMER MAHMUD

I.

INTRODUCTION

The significance of the recent Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co.' decision
cannot be understated. Imagine a United States that is a safe haven for civil suits
for multinational corporations ("MNCs") that are complicit in committing heinous
human rights violations abroad, such as genocide, and torture. That sounds
repugnant to many proud, patriotic, and law-abiding Americans, but that's exactly
what Kiobel may possibly allow. The case dealt with Nigerian residents that filed
a class action under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"). 2 The plaintiffs claimed that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian MNCs, while engaged in oil exploration and
production, "aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human
rights abuses in violation of the law of nations."3 The defendants had been
engaged in oil exploration and production in the Ogoni region of Nigeria since
1958. In response to these activities, residents of the Ogoni region eventually
organized to protest the environmental effects of oil exploration there.4 The
Defendants "responded by enlisting the aid of the Nigerian government to suppress
the Ogoni resistance." 5 Subsequently, "[t]hroughout 1993 and 1994, Nigerian
military forces . . . shot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni villages ...
."6 During these attacks, there were allegations of beatings, rapes, unlawful arrests,
and destruction and looting of property by the military forces with the assistance of
the defendants. 7 The victims subsequently brought claims in the United States
against the defendants for aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in violation
of the law of nations, also known as customary international law ("CIL"), and the

Disclaimer: W. Chadwick Austin serves in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps
reserves. Major Amer Mahmud serves in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps. The
views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors' and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.").
3. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,117 (2d Cir. 2010).
4. Id. at 123.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. While certiorariwas originally
granted to determine whether corporations could be sued under the ATS, the Court
after oral arguments ordered supplemental briefings and argument on a new
question: To what extent could U.S. courts recognize a cause of action under the
ATS for conduct that occurred within the territory of a foreign sovereign? The
Court then unanimously concluded that the Nigerian nationals' case seeking relief
for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States was barred
because the presumption against the extraterritorial application of domestic law
applied to the claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the ATS rebutted that
presumption.9 "It [left] for another day the determination of just when the
presumption against extraterritoriality might be 'overcome."'lo This conclusion
was largely supported by the canon of statutory interpretation known as the
presumption against extraterritorial application, which provides that when a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none, and reflects
the presumption that U.S. law "governs domestically but does not rule the
world."" "This presumption 'serves to protect against unintended clashes between
U.S. laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord."'l 2
The controversial opinion, which has many human rights activists up in arms,
undoubtedly deals a significant blow to international law and its undertaking to
protect fundamental human rights since the United States is a proclaimed leader in
this area. After all, it's one of the reasons that the U.S. is currently concerned with
using armed force in Syria-thousands of innocent civilians have died reportedly
due to violations of international law by the Assad regime. 13 Accordingly, despite
the unanimous decision, Kiobel appears to send a precarious message and likely
takes off the table a significant deterrent to would be corporate violators of human
rights or other serious laws of nations. At first blush, the decision seems harmless
since victims of human rights violations could technically pursue legal action in
their home states instead of the U.S. pursuant to their domestic law. This defense
of Kiobel flies in the face of reality, however, because human rights violations that
generate ATSl 4 litigation primarily occur in countries with meager legal systems
and corrupt governments. As a result, the victims typically cannot get sufficient
relief from their countries of citizenship where the crimes are typically committed.
In addition, many of the foreign nations that play host to MNCs are financially
beholden to the MNC, which makes it impossible to pursue justice.

8.
9.
10.
I1.
12.

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671.
Id. at 1669.
Id. at 1673.
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444,454 (2007).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabain Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
13. John Kerry s statement on Syria-full transcript, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/26/john-kerry-syria-statement-full-transcript ("And there
is a reason why no matter what you believe about Syria, all peoples and all nations who believe in the
cause of our common humanity must stand up to assure that there is accountability for the use of
chemical weapons so that it never happens again.").
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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An egregious example of such a close relationship between a MN4C and a
government that led to extraordinary malfeasance is represented in the case of
5
Rio Tinto is a British-Australian multinational metals
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.1
with
one of its many operations in Papua New Guinea.
and mining corporation
in PNG where thousands of people were killed
atrocities
The case arose from
The
facts of the case are surely well known to the
following Rio Tinto's actions.
a
brief
background will be offered. In short, Papua
so
only
human rights attorney
on
mining
production for two-thirds of its export
New Guinea is dependent
Tinto
sought
to build a mine in Bougainville, an
1960s,
Rio
earnings.16 During the
7
the deal for rights to natural
To
secure
Guinea.'
Papua
New
island province of
government 19.1 percent of
New
Guinea]
the
[Papua
offered
resources, "Rio Tinto
The ensuing
venture."'
in
[the]
its
assistance
to
obtain
the mine's profits
which
poisoning
and
degradation
environmental
in
devastating
operations resulted
9
the
company
In
addition,
islanders.'
of
the
and
subsidence
ruined the health
subjected black islanders to "slave-like" conditions, and it also paid lower wages to
the black islanders it employed compared to the white workers it recruited from off
the island. 20 As a result, "[i]n November 1988, Bougainvilleans engaged in acts of
sabotage that forced the mine to close, [and] Rio Tinto sought the assistance of the
Papua New Guinea government to quell the uprising and reopen the mine." 2 1 "Rio
Tinto warned the impoverished Papua New Guinea government that it would no
longer invest in Papua New Guinea 'if the government did not quell the uprising so
that the company could recommence operations."' 22 Accordingly, the Papua New
Guinea army mounted an attack killing many civilians, and around 15,000
Bougainvilleans died during the conflict. 23 Rio Tinto allegedly provided the army
troops with logistical support, and repeated grave violations of human rights law
and numerous crimes against humanity were committed, including aerial bombings
and burnings of entire villages. 24 Thousands of civilians were killed by systematic
25
acts of cruelty, rape and degrading treatment, often at the behest of Rio Tinto,
who was clearly in a superior position to the poverty-stricken and poorly governed
nation. Unfortunately, the victims could not find justice in the corrupt Papua New
Guinea legal system.26 The case was supposed to return to the district court for

15. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
16. The
World
Factbook,
U.S.
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.htm (last visited July 30, 2014).
17. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1198.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Borchien Lai, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap Measure or Permanent
Remedy?, 26. Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139, 149 (2005) (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp.
2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
23. Id.
24. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1198.
25. Id.
26. See generally Sarei, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004.
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further proceedings; however, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Kiobel, the
case was dismissed citing the Supreme Court's reasoning against the
extraterritorial application of the ATS. 27
The atrocities committed in Papua New Guinea make this example one of the
less complicated to analyze because of the extremity of the behavior, but just one
of many across the world. Many developing nations rely upon the economic
stimulus provided by MNCs and governments find themselves vulnerable to direct
influence from MNCs. Thus, the likelihood of future perpetration of human rights
abuses where MNCs are complicit with governments is high. If there were
adequate and legitimate domestic legal remedies available in countries like Papua
New Guinea during the time of the violations, then Kiobel ruling may not be such a
major concern for the victims or defenders of human rights because the victims
could lean on their own legal systems. But when the victims of such crimes cannot
find a proper remedy in their home states, typically due to the close relationship
between the MNC and the host government, the United States legal system was
seen as a mechanism for redressing human rights violations, until the Kiobel
decision. Kiobel therefore undermines the standing of the United States legal
system as a protector of human rights and appears to slam the door shut on victims
of human rights abuses committed abroad by corporations or individuals. 28
Similarly, rather than advancing the respect for the rule of law, Kiobel further
emboldens MNCs to encourage human rights abuses. Even though there was some
disagreement in the circuit courts over MNC liability under the ATS, the Supreme
Court's ruling in Kiobel flies against a long history of U.S. federal courts having
held that private corporations and individuals indeed owe duties under the law of
nations, and therefore can be subject to lawsuits under the ATS for violations of
the law of nations that occur in foreign lands. 29 Consequently, the Court seems to
tacitly condone irresponsible corporate behavior with its decision because the
reality of current mechanisms to police MNCs in the international arena are
ineffective and allow corporations to essentially monitor themselves. This note
will first identify the curious approach the Court took considering its presumption
against extraterritorial application of the ATS, which essentially avoided the

27. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 722 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the District Court's
judgment to dismiss with prejudice).
28. Arg. Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989) ("The Alien Tort
Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes ofdefendants . . . .") (emphasis added).
29. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.
(Talisman 1), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd. 504 F.3d 254, 258, 260 (2d Cir.
2007); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996); Roe v.
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2000); Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).
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original issue of MNC liability under international law, and then explore a
consequence of the decision as it relates to responsible corporate behavior.
II.

KIOBEL INEXPLICABLY DEFIES EXECUTIVE GUIDANCE AND PRECEDENT
ALLOWING REDRESS IN U.S. COURTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
COMMITTED ABROAD

A plain reading of the ATS clearly evinces that it was enacted with foreign
matters in mind; it specifically refers to "aliens," "treaties," and the "law of
nations."3 o Specifically, the ATS provides jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2)
brought by aliens only, (3) for violations of the law of nations (also called
customary international law).i Its purpose was to address violations of the law of
nations. 32 The statute has been part of the U.S. Code for more than two hundred
years.33 Despite its meager legislative history, there have been executive
governmental actions that provide guidance for courts to resolve ATS matters. For
example, in 1795, Attorney General Bradford of the U.S., shortly after the
enactment of the ATS, opined that a British corporation could pursue a civil action
under the ATS for injury caused to it in violation of international law by American
citizens. 34 The American perpetrators, in concert with a French fleet, had attacked
a settlement managed by the British corporation in Sierra Leone in violation of
international law. 35 Then in 1907, the U.S. Attorney General rendered an opinion
stating that an American corporation could be held liable under the ATS to
Mexican nationals if the defendant's "diversion of the water [of the Rio Grande]
was an injury to substantial rights of citizens of Mexico under the principles of
international law or by treaty." 36 These Attorney General opinions are in conflict
with Kiobel's holding. Kiobel curiously dismissed Bradford's opinion from 1795
as one that "defies a definitive reading and we need not adopt one here.. .the
opinion hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality." 37 Kiobel's quick dismissal of these
opinions, especially Bradford's, seems a bit bizarre since the Supreme Court relied
on Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion in Sosa.38 Since the days of these
Attorney General opinions, the political branches have remained quiet regarding
the ATS.
Furthermore, Kiobel defies Filartigav. Pena-Irala,a celebrated and landmark
Second Circuit case that advanced human rights.39 In the 1970s, a lawsuit was
filed in U.S. District Court "on behalf of Dr. Joel Filartiga and Dolly Filirtiga

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
Id.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
Id. at 712.
Breach of Neutrality, I Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
Id. at 58.
Mexican Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1908).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
Id. at 1667-68.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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charging former Paraguayan official Americo Pefia-Irala with the wrongful death
of Joelito Fildrtiga." 4 0 "Dolly Fitdrtiga and her younger brother, Joelito, lived in
Asuncion, Paraguay with their mother and father, Dr. Joel Fildrtiga." 4' The doctor
was a "well-known physician, painter, and opponent of Latin America's 'most
durable dictator,' General Alfredo Stroessner." 42 "In 1976, 17-year-old Joelito was
abducted and later tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala, the inspector
general in the Department of Investigation for the Police of Asuncion." 43 The
District Court "ultimately granted [Pefia-Irala's] motion to dismiss the complaint
and allowed his return to Paraguay."" The court opined that "although the
proscription of torture had become 'a norm of customary international law,' the
court was bound to follow appellate precedents, which narrowly limited the
function of international law only to relations between states." 45 But on appeal the
Second Circuit reversed by "recognizing that foreign nationals who are victims of
international human rights violations may sue their malfeasors in federal court for
civil redress."46 The court continued by providing that such redress is available
even for acts which occurred abroad so long as the court has subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In addition, the court
stated that freedom from torture is guaranteed under customary international law
and therefore it had subject matter jurisdiction.47 "Upon remand by the circuit in
June 1980, the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment
against [Pefia-Irala] for failure to answer the complaint and referred the case to a
magistrate for determination of the damages due the Fildrtiga family." 4 8 "The
magistrate [then] awarded the Fildrtigas over $10 million in damages," 4 9 although
this was never collected. The Filcirtiga decision set a precedent for claims
involving an increasing number of internationally recognized rights, including
freedom from torture, slavery, genocide, and cruel and inhuman treatment even if
violations were committed outside of U.S. territory. As a result, Filartiga has
"continuously been hailed by international human rights experts in [the U.S.] and
abroad."50
The Kiobel decision is a puzzling about-face. Under the precedent set by
Kiobel, if the current Supreme Court were faced with the facts in Filartiga,the
Court would apparently have required the Filartigaplaintiffs to demonstrate that
torturers, such as Pefia-Irala, committed their acts in the United States or in a
location where it asserts unfettered jurisdiction. Of course no such demonstration
40. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/pastcases/filC3%Alrtiga-v.-peC3%Bl-irala (last visited July 30, 2014).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; Filartiga v.Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884.
48. CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., supra note 40.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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could have been made and the case would have been dismissed. The Filartigacase
was received with little controversy and viewed as methodologically sound. So
sound, in fact, that it is generally accepted that the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") was intended to be a codification by congress of the decision in
Filartiga.' With the apparent retreat in Kiobel, people like Pena-Irala could do
what he did in Paraguay and then move to the United States without fear of
answering to the victims of such heinous atrocities. Absent filing a suit in the
home country, which can be a difficult task, or successful extradition or rendition
efforts, which tend to be riddled with political issues (as evidenced by the recent
U.S. and Russia controversy over Mr. Edward Snowden 52), Pena-Irala could be
sitting safe and sound in the United States without having to pay for his actions.
The ATS acted as a deterrent to would-be violators of the law of nations,
especially corporations complicit in this sort of behavior, but now that deterrent
has effectively disappeared. Therefore, corporations have even less of a reason for
socially responsible behavior, a prudential issue that Kiobel chose not to consider.
III.

ABSENT REDRESS UNDER THE ATS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED ABROAD, CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS FOR MNCS ARE INADEQUATE

The primary enforcement mechanisms to ensure responsible corporate
behavior seem to include the ATS, municipal laws, voluntary corporate codes of
conduct, and pressure from non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").
Unfortunately, Kiobel diminished the scope and reach of the ATS thereby reducing
MNC accountability. By Kiobel not addressing the issue of corporate social
responsibility ("CSR"), Kiobel actually encourages irresponsible MNC conduct.
To exacerbate the problem, there are limited means through which corporations
can be monitored and regulated because "[c]urrently most international laws are
directed at the actions of states, not corporations." 53 The ATS, however, could
have been an influential tool to promote CSR, especially in developing countries
where local legal regimes are weak or non-existent, and where MNCs only halfheartedly follow their codes of conduct. The ATS could also have been a
motivating and "unique mechanism through which corporations could be held
accountable to international standards, and subjected to international law under the
auspices of the U.S. court system."54 But Kiobel razed that possibility. Without
the ATS, and in many cases municipal laws available to keep MNCs in check,

51. Eric Gruzen, The United States as a Forum for Human Rights Litigation: Is This the Best
Solution?,
14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 207, 232 (2001); See also BINDA PREET SAHNI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE
LIABILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN INJURY 318-19 (2006).
52. Mr. Snowden is the former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor that leaked sensitive
information and then fled the U.S. to seek asylum from Russia. Edward Snowden News, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 23, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/us/edward-snowden.htm.

53. Shanaira Udwadia, Corporate Responsibility for International Human Rights Violations, 13 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 359, 390 (2004).

54. Id. at 386.
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MNCs are left to regulate themselves through corporate codes, with scrutiny only
from various NGOs.
A. CorporateCodes of Conduct are Unenforceable and an Ineffective Means
to Police MNC Behavior
"In response to mounting pressures for increased corporate accountability
(from consumer groups and other NGOs, and from potential public regulation,
litigation or prosecution) [during the 1990s,] voluntary private self-regulation was
seen as a possible new way of filling the regulatory void opened up by
globalization." 55 Self-regulation, as demonstrated by the international banking
industry, is more fable than fact. Nevertheless, "the 1990s saw a proliferation of
corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis on corporate
responsibility." 56 Such codes are typically created in one of several ways: (1) by
companies for their own guidance, (2) by industries for other corporations to
follow, or (3) by governments as a model for MNCs to consider (public codes)."
Some commentators optimistically say that "[t]he development of codes of conduct
relevant to human rights and other social issues, as well as standards for greater
corporate reporting and disclosure, [aid] in the promotion of CSR"5 because they
seek to constrain socially undesirable behavior of transnational non-state actors.59
But the problem is that the codes, regardless of how they are created, are voluntary
in nature and MNCs are invited to pledge themselves to the code rather than forced
to do so. 60 Thus, the codes are not legally enforceable, 6 1 and only a few codes
include meaningful monitoring mechanisms or disclosure requirements designed to
enhance compliance.
Can you imagine if all one had to do was to "pledge" not
to break the speed limit, and expect that "pledge" to be followed without any
consequential external pressure? The efficacy of such a pledge to self-regulate
would certainly be ambitious indeed.
Furthermore, since many corporations create their own codes and follow them
to differing degrees, corporate codes lack usefulness and uniformity. In fact,
"there is a growing sense that voluntary codes alone are ineffective and that their
proliferation is leading to contradictory and incoherent efforts." 62 For instance,
"IKEA has agents monitor overseas labor conditions ensuring that children are not

55. HELEN KELLER, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION:
QUESTION
OF
LEGITIMACY
3
(2006),
available

at
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/HelenKeller Paper.pdf.
56. Id.
57. SAHNI, supra note 51, at 35.
58. Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic
Perspectivesfrom the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1265, 1288 (2004).
THE

59. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2006).

60. Id.
61. KELLER, supra note 55, at 4, 23 (discussing very loose compliance mechanisms in the codesa survey of 132 codes found that 41% of the codes did not specifically mention monitoring, and as for
cases of non-compliance, often no clear sanctions are defined).
62. Bunn, supra note 58, at 1291.
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forced to engage in [unlawful employment activities]."63 That certainly is an effort
that seems to be productive, at least genuine, in preventing human rights
violations. Conversely, "Nike has been continually criticized for its lax regulation
of the working conditions in its Indonesian, Chinese, and Vietnamese plants."64
"Although both companies have corporate codes, they are not equally [monitored]
as a means of protecting human rights."65 The inconsistency in complying or
simply disregarding a corporate code reflects factors such as MNC's commitments
to its own financial growth, and other political factors, which could prevent MNCs
from following self-imposed regulations. Therefore, legal accountability may be
needed to provide corporations with the incentive to follow their codes,
particularly in less developed nations where human rights abuses are more likely to
occur. The legal accountability incentive to follow codes to prevent human rights
abuses could certainly come from the fear of a lawsuit, and large U.S. judgments
under the ATS; a consequence of ATS litigation that even the Second Circuit
Kiobel court alluded to in its opinion. As one may imagine, however, even the
threat of legal accountability does not necessarily deter power-wielding MNCs
from engaging in lucrative projects that violate human rights. This is clearly
evidenced from the uncertain record of ATS litigation involving MNCs, especially
if the benefit of profit outweighs the legal ramifications of human rights violations.
Similarly the U.N. working group on MNCs acknowledges that the use of an
entirely voluntary system for codes of conduct is not enough, and it anticipates that
the international community will move toward the codification of binding norms
backed by a range of implementation measures.67 This U.N. finding, along with
the fact that there appears to be a reluctance of many firms to include independent
monitoring to verify code compliance, invites suspicion that the codes may be used
more for public relations purposes rather than a genuine attempt at improving
performance. 68
corporate
Consequently, since there is no legitimate codification of binding norms that
MNCs are required to follow, it appears NGOs have taken the lead to push for
enforcement of human rights. Although a noble effort, it's debatable how effective
those efforts have been.
B. NGO Efforts to Pressure MNC Behavior Generally Fall Short
NGOs are essentially private legally constituted organizations created by
natural persons with no participation or representation of any government. They

63. Udwadia, supra note 53, at 391.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d Ill, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2010) (juries hearing
ATS claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts and such litigation has led many
defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial). In one ATS case, for example, a jury considering
damages after a default judgment returned a $4.5 billion verdict against Radovan Karadzic, former
president of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska. Id.
67. Kiobel, 621 F.3d I11, 116-17.
68. KELLER, supra note 55, at 55-56.
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pursue issues of interest to its members by lobbying and/or direct action.69 And
within this system of corporate code "enforcement," corporate standards are even
sometimes developed with the cooperation of elements of the NGO community
and MNCs. The NGOs then monitor compliance with these self-imposed
standards and, in an effort to compel compliance, report violations to the media.
The media then theoretically publicizes "breaches of standards to the corporation's
consumer, investors, and the financial community, [and] places great pressure on
the corporation to act to correct the deficiencies." 70 "In this way and within this
focused area of relationships, [NGOs basically act as substitutes] for the state in
virtually all respects." 7 As a result of NGO efforts nationally and internationally,
the global presence of NGOs indeed imposes a growing level of accountability on
corporations.
But NGO oversight, although ambitious, is clearly disputed with respect to its
efficacy.

For instance, "many of the codes drawn up by NGOs . . . have been

adopted by a relatively small number of firms." 7 2 In addition to drawing up codes,
"[a]n important area of activity for NGOs involved in questions of corporate
accountability is the review of various policy initiatives [drawn up by
corporations] and other actions aimed at improving corporate standards." 7 3 These
policy initiatives are evaluated for their content as well as their practical impact,
which naturally raises questions for legal research and empirical study.
"Depending on their findings, NGOs can develop appropriate responses ranging
from private consultations to field visits to public testimony and media
coverage." 74 As a result of NGO efforts, some scholars believe that "compliance
with corporate codes is becoming an economic necessity as corporations fear the
consequences of being targeted, shamed, and deemed a violator of human rights."75
This is so because "consumers today are often influenced by the characterization of
corporations and choose not to purchase products that have been made in a socially
irresponsible manner. [Therefore], reports from NGOs on the inappropriate
activities of a corporation have a significant effect on profits."76 For instance,
pressure from NGOs forced Heineken, Motorola, ARCO, and several other
corporations to abandon their investments in Myanmar after Unocal's alleged
endorsement of human rights violations there.7
Yet despite the apparent vigilant monitoring of corporate behavior by NGOs,
a source completely independent of the MNC, some critics have charged that CSR
69. For comprehensive discussion on NGOs, see Peter Willetts, What is a Non-Governmental
Organization?, CITY U. LONDON, http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM
(last visited July 30, 2014).
70. Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global
PrivateLaw Making: Wal-MartAs Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1739, 1762 (2007).
71. Id.
72. KELLER, supra note 55, at 55.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Bunn, supranote 58, at 1275.
Bunn, supranote 58, at 1275.
Udwadia, supra note 53, at 393.
Id.
Id. at 393-94.
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efforts are merely elaborate public relations exercises designed to give the
impression that MNCs are concerned about social issues.7 8 In this respect, it's
important to remember that NGOs as private entities have no power to actually do
anything to the MNC. It's because of the "goodwill" of the MINC and business
prudence that a MINC would work with a NGO in the first place. If NGO efforts
were really so effective, then crimes that have led up to ATS suits would not be so
common. This becomes blatantly evident by examining the recent influx of ATS
litigation across a majority of the federal circuits. 79 Having said that, the thought
of potential legal liability would certainly be more of a deterrent for MNCs than
NGO oversight, which can do no more than apply "toothless" pressure or report
alleged violations to the media for unfavorable coverage. NGO efforts may or may
not persuade the MNC to change its ways.
To illustrate, in March 2006, the National Labor Committee (NLC)s 0
"published a report that detailed a number of violations of Jordanian labor law and
international human rights norms by a number of apparel factories in the Kingdom
of Jordan." 8 1 The report was aimed at Wal-Mart, Gloria Vanderbilt, Target,
Kohl's, Thalia Sodi for Kmart, Victoria's Secret, L.L.Bean and others, and it
asserted that tens of thousands of foreign guest workers were stripped of their
passports and trapped in involuntary servitude sewing clothing, which prompted
the New York Times to publish a story82 about the report detailing the findings.
As a result,
several members of the U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to
the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S. Trade Representative to urge
"that the Administration urgently initiate an investigation of labor
conditions in Jordan, and that the U.S. Government

offer its

assistance to ensure the safety of the workers who courageously
provided information to the NLC, and to protect such workers from
84
retaliation by their employers."
The NLC, in its determined role as monitor, decided to follow up on its
report, and six months after the report, the NLC noted that there was some
improvement in some factories; however, many violations such as human
trafficking, illegal working conditions, and forcible deportations continued to
78. Bunn, supra note 58, at 1291.
79. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 29.
80. Larry Cat Backer, Wal-Mart: The New Superpower, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1739, 1762-1763
(2007) ("The [NLC] is a human rights NGO based in New York. The [NLC] 'investigates and exposes
human and labor rights abuses committed by U.S. companies producing goods in the developing world.
. Outside the United States, the [NLC] monitors the compliance of multinational corporations and
...
the economic entities with which they do business on compliance with a host of legal and other human
rights standards." (citations omitted)).
81. Id.at 1763.
82. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
3,
2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03clothing.html?pagewanted=all.
83. Backer, supra note 80, at 1765.
84. Id.
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occur.85 This example suggests that MNCs, although possibly influenced by
outside pressure, do not really find socially responsible behavior as important as
the duty it has to its shareholders to maximize profits whenever it can.
C. The Ambitious Work ofNGOs and Voluntary MNC Compliance With
CorporateCodes Appears to FallShort Due to Reality ofProfits
We increasingly hear that CSR has become an important business prerogative.
Newspapers, magazines, books, and other media outlets espouse the benefits of
corporations behaving responsibly, and caution managers about the business risks
of a poor CSR performance.86 "Executives are [reportedly] informed that by
demonstrating concern for the environment, human rights, community
development, and the welfare of their employees, both in the U.S. and abroad, they
will make their firms more profitable, . . . and that that their firms will gain a
competitive advantage by appealing to the growing numbers of socially and
environmentally oriented consumers, investors and employees."87 Moreover, some
scholars advocate that there is a positive correlation between CSR and the bottom
line numbers of transnational corporations, and that numerous studies have shown
an empirical edge for companies that are responsible in their business dealings. 88
In that vein, such positive behavior within the world community only stands to
improve their brands because such responsibility is typically rewarded by customer
loyalty, and it reflects a good will with prospective customers.89 Along the same
lines, MNCs rely heavily on investment to satisfy costs. But human rights
violations committed by MNCs are typically "front page" information, which
generally scares off serious investors. 90 The dearth of investors in those
circumstances may be true to some extent, but "main-stream investors still rarely
consider a firm's CSR record in deciding which shares to buy, sell or hold," 9'
which only raises doubts about the genuineness of CSR, and reinforces the need
for a legitimate enforcement mechanism like the embattled ATS.
Whether or not CSR is in fact a profitable activity for corporations is hotly
contested. 92 For instance, it has been said that the corporate world is a self-serving,
opportunistic world. That it's geared for self-preservation and profit maximization
with no regard for human dignity and even less for personal responsibility.9 ' After
all, despite the recent recession in the U.S. where the majority of hard working
85. Id.
86. David
Vogel,
CSR
Doesn't
Pay,
FORBES
MAG.,
Nov.
16,
2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/16/csr-doesnt-pay-lead-corprespons08-cxdv 1016vogel.html.
87. Id.
88. Joe W. (Chip) Pitts Ill, CorporateSocial Responsibility: CurrentStatus and Future Evolution,
6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334, 365 (2009).
89. Id. at 344-345.
90. Chip Pitts, Address at the George Washington University School of Law (Oct. 14, 2010).
91. Vogel, supra note 86.
92. Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law, 28 PACE ENvTL. L.
REV. 145, 155 (2010).
93. Lois A. Levin & Robert C. Hinkley, Is Corporate Social Responsibility an Oxymoron?,
COMMONDREAMS.ORG (July 26, 2004), http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0726-1 1.htm.
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Americans (the ones that are fortunate to be working) are struggling to pay their
mortgages, the corporations are making record profits. 94 The news of astronomical
profits in the midst of economic difficulties naturally strikes a chord with many
observers. As a result, some have the view that corporations are powerful
institutions, yet they do not serve humanity well when their pursuit of profits leads
to strategies that degrade the environment, violate human rights and the dignity of
employees, endanger public health and safety and otherwise undermine the welfare
of communities. Some scholars have even audaciously said that "Corporate Social
Responsibility" is an oxymoron because if the corporations were socially
responsible entities we would not be facing a toxic world and exploited
populations for profit.95 The belief that corporate responsibility "pays" is an
enticing belief indeed. 96 "Who would not want to live in a world in which
97
corporate virtue is rewarded and corporate irresponsibility punished?"
"Unfortunately, the evidence for these rewards and punishments is rather weak." 98
"There is [indeed] a 'market for virtue"' 99 as proponents of CSR advocate, but it is
a very limited one and it is not growing.
"One can certainly find examples of firms with superior CSR performance
that have done well [for their shareholders,] as well as firms with poor CSR
reputations that have performed poorly."loo But one can find "at least as many
examples of firms with good CSR records that have not done well and firms with
poor CSR reputations that rewarded their shareholders"lot handsomely. This is
because "for most [MNCs], most of the time, CSR is largely irrelevant to their
financial performance." 02 "The MNC with possibly the world's poorest
environmental reputation is ExxonMobil largely due to its reputed indifference to
the problem of global climate change and its continued focus on fossil fuels." 0 3
Not to pick on ExxonMobil, but it is one of the world's most profitable
corporations. 1 Conversely, "one can also find examples of successful firms for

94. Catherine Rampell, CorporateProfits Were the Highest on Record Last Quarter, N.Y. TIMES,
at
available
B2,
at
2010,
24,
Nov.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1 l/24/business/economy/24econ.html? r-I (discussing a Department of
Commerce report showing earned profits at an annual rate of $1.659 trillion in the third quarter, the
highest figure recorded since the government began keeping track over 60 years ago, at least in nominal
or non-inflation-adjusted terms).
95. Levin & Hinkley, supra note 93.
96. Vogel, supra note 86.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ben Rooney, Exxon Mobil Profit Nearly Doubles, CNNMONEY.COM, July 29, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/29/news/companies/Exxon/index.htm (the world's largest public energy
company reported net income of $7.56 billion, or $1.60 a share, in the second quarter, up 91% from
$3.95 billion, or 81 cents a share, in the same period in 2009).
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whom CSR has been a core element of their business strategy." 0 5 Patagonia and
Seventh Generation come readily to mind, but it is important not to generalize
from these examples. 0 6
"To assume that the business environment has
fundamentally changed and that we are entering a new world in which voluntary
CSR efforts have become critical to the success of all or even most firms is
misinformed" 07 and arguably naive.
What this discussion simply brings to the forefront is that even if the
corporate codes are voluntarily followed by MNCs or by pressure from NGOs,
MNCs really have only a negligible incentive to do so without the possibility of
public enforcement for violation of human rights. This is especially in light of an
opportunity to make vast profits and to please their shareholders for continued
investment. After all, "a business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders, and the powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end."' "The discretion of Directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself."' 0 9 As a result, "[c]orporations . . . try to deliver the greatest value to their

shareholders, and this leads them to engage in a cost-benefit analysis."'10 "If the
financial rewards of bad conduct are greater than what MNCs may have to pay,
there is no real incentive to stop."'" "The findings from studies of codes of
conduct [that aim to improve corporate behavior] suggest that this is in fact the
dominant attitude."ll 2 A recent Organization of Economic and Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") report authored by a business sector advisory group puts
the point clearly, and it states categorically that "most industrialized societies
recognize that generating long-term economic profit is the corporation's primary
objective. In the long run, the generation of economic profit to enhance
shareholder value through the pursuit of sustained competitive advantage is
necessary to attract the capital required for prudent growth and perpetuation." The
authors of the group did also acknowledge that ethics and ethics codes have a clear
place in corporate governance whose goal is profit maximization." 3
Despite the inadequate system of voluntary codes and the righteous efforts of
NGOs, MNCs continue to operate as they wish, seemingly undeterred. Some
might find that insulting, but Kiobel seemed to simply overlook the issue. Kiobel
did not sufficiently consider this prudential matter that undoubtedly plays a factor
into corporate behavior, especially in third world countries. Still, regardless of

105.
106.
107.
108.

Vogel, supra note 86.
Id.
Id.
Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the "Responsible" Shareholder, 10

STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 34-35 (2005).

109. Id.
110. Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg 's Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials' Influence on
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REv. 321, 365 (2008).
111. Id.

112. KELLER, supranote 55, at 41.
113. Id.
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one's opinion about the lack of policing mechanisms for MNCs, and even if Kiobel
is considered sound reasoning by its supporters, one cannot deny the inequity
behind the majority's logic because the victims of such human rights violations do
not even get a legitimate day in court to tell their story. They are simply left with
the emotional and physical scars left behind by MNC conduct and essentially no
remedy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Inexplicably, the Supreme Court stunted the promotion of and accountability
for enforcing human rights. The ATS' positive impact on human rights blossomed
in the 1980s with the decision in the Filartiga case. Individuals committing
egregious human rights violations in faraway places could no longer escape the
rule of law. The Supreme Court, in restricting the reach of the ATS, has reversed
course on the enforcement of human rights by incorrectly barring the application of
the ATS to human rights violations committed by non-US residents or MNCs with
sufficient jurisdictional ties to the U.S. The Court has eviscerated one of the few
tools for MNC human rights accountability. What tools remain to enforce MNC
accountability are as ineffective as the courts sitting in countries that foster
complicity between MNCs and corrupt governments to inflict human rights abuses
for sake of mutual economic pursuits. Furthermore, monitoring of corporate
behavior by NGOs and self-imposed codes of corporate responsibility are almost
laughable in comparison to potential judicial remedies. Considering the original
intent of the ATS, which is to bring civil justice for the victims of the serious
violators of the laws of nations, the risk of having a bold national reputation by
enforcing human rights violations that occur anywhere in the world is outweighed
by noble efforts to help the underprivileged and abused.
Recognizing that this article presents a rather grim accounting of the potential
impact of the Kiobel decision, it is important to point out a few brief optimistic
observations. First, the holding is narrow. The Court determined all the conduct
took place outside the U.S. and the defendants lacked jurisdictional ties through
mere corporate presence."14 The Court did not say that human rights law does not
apply to corporations and therefore the ATS still could have teeth. Arguably, one
can read the opinion to assume that MNCs can be sued or why did the Court
discuss whether "mere corporate presence" was enough to assert the Alien Torts
Statute?" 5 Second, the Court did nothing to undermine the ability of the United
States to hold its own citizens and residents accountable. The Kiobel decision
involves conduct committed wholly outside the United States involving foreign
plaintiffs and defendants. If, for example, the conduct described in Kiobel
occurred within the jurisdiction of United States or by United States citizens or
residents, then the Court would likely have ruled differently. Lastly, and to a
lesser extent, under the right circumstances foreign courts are still viable
battlegrounds. Therefore, the Supreme Court may not have completely gutted the
I14. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
115. Id.
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ATS, but the Court certainly did not do any favors for would be victims of MNC
conduct that breaches human rights law outside the United States.

INVESTING IN SUSTAINABILITY: ETHICS GUIDELINES AND THE
NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
DR. ANITA M. HALVORSSEN* AND CODY

I.

D. ELDREDGE**

INTRODUCTION

Companies that bring sustainability to the core of their business strategy,
often referred to as "socially responsible," are increasingly outperforming their
competitors over the long term.' The investment world is also gaining cognizance
of this and has begun focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance
("ESG") issues, referred to as responsible investment. Responsible investors are
moving companies toward sustainable development by aligning investors'
2
financial decisions with the companies' impacts on the environment and societies.
This integration process can also be referred to as internalizing the negative
externalities of production, in the broadest sense, both at home and abroad, thereby
eliminating those externalities altogether, or at a minimum incorporating
environmental and social costs into the cost of production. Unfortunately,
investors often overlook the link between environmental and financial returns,
especially if the focus is on short-term returns rather than long-term sustainability.
As a category of investors growing in prominence, sovereign wealth funds stand at
the intersection of sustainable investment and the desire to maximize financial
returns. Due to the sheer size of sovereign wealth funds as investors, it will be to
no small extent their responsibility to push companies to work toward mitigating
* Dr. Anita M. Halvorssen, LL.M., JSD, Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of
Law (amhalvorss@aol.com).
** Cody D. Eldredge, PhD Candidate University of Colorado, Department of Political Science
(cody.eldredge@colorado.edu).
INV.,
PRINCIPLES
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
is
Responsible
Investment?,
1. What
http://www.unpri.org/what-is-ri (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. PRI] (Principles for
Responsible Investment ("PRI") is a U.N. supported initiative). See also Robert G. Eccles, loannis
loanno & George Serafiem, The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and
Performance 4 (Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper No. 12-035, 2013), available at
http://www.hbs.edulfaculty/Publication%20Files/12-035_a3cif5d8-452d-4b48-9a49-812424424cc2.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2014).
2. In this article, sustainable development, sustainability, and ethics and are used
interchangeably. Sustainable development, as defined by the Brundtland Commission (the U.N. World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)), calls for economic "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future generations." WORLD COMM'N ON
ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE, ch. 2 1 1 (1987), available at http://www.undocuments.net/our-common-future.pdf [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. Sustainable development
is also described as an integrative principle, integrating economic with environmental and social
concerns. See Nico Schrijver & Friedl Weiss, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT xii-xiii (Nico Shcrijver & Friedl Weiss eds., 2004).
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these externalities, and in particular climate change, because their investment
decisions can have such a large influence on companies.3
This article will demonstrate that one particular investor, the Norwegian
Sovereign Wealth Fund, Government Pension Fund-Global ("GPFG"), has not
ignored the importance of integrating ESG issues into its investment decisionmaking. The GPFG is the largest sovereign wealth fund ("SWF") in the world and
thus arguably one of the most influential investment funds.4 Since the introduction
of the Ethics Guidelines in 2004, the GPFG has prioritized sustainability within its
investment decision-making, and has in many ways been successful in that
endeavor. 5 Given its successes in achieving high rates of return while facilitating
sustainable/ethical business practices among its investment recipients, the GPFG
should be regarded as a model for best practice for other institutional investors.
The work of the main entity mandated to implement the Ethics Guidelines, the
Council on Ethics, has been described as evolving into a "coherent jurisprudence
of ethics for corporate investment" using public power to influence private
governance among companies.6 Its recommendations have been followed closely
by other pension funds which have, in turn, also excluded the same companies
from their investment portfolio.7
The GPFG engages in responsible investing through two mechanisms: (1)
exercising the ownership rights granted to it through the securities it controls in
corporations (active ownership) to place firms on a path to sustainability, and (2)
observation and exclusion of companies from its investment portfolio when those
firms engage in unethical/unsustainable practices. The empirical analysis set out in
this paper focuses on the latter mechanism, highlighting the ways in which it is
routinely successful in motivating states to adopt sustainable business practices.

3. See Mitch Towner, Norway's Summit on Responsible Investing, 12 J. INV. MGMT. 33, 33-34
(2014) (referring to Christoph Loch's opening speech at the conference). Assets under management of
SWF amounts to over $6 trillion. Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SWF INST.,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings (last visited July 20, 2014).
4. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, supra note 3.
5. See Guidelines for the Observation and Exclusion of Companies from the Government
Pension
Fund
Global's
Investment
Universe,
REGJERINGEN.NO,
§
2,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics-councillethical-guidelines.html?id=425277

(last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion]; Management
Mandate,
NORGES
BANK
INV.
MGMT,
http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/govemancemodel/management-mandate/#Chapter2 (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter NBIM Management
Mandate]. The Ministry of Finance adopted the new guidelines on March 1, 2010 pursuant to
Government Pension Fund Act. See MINISTRY
GOVERNMENT
PENSION
FUND
GLOBAL

OF FIN., MANAGEMENT MANDATE FOR THE
4,
25-26
(2010),
available
at

http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FlN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/mandat spueng.pdf.
6. Larry Cath Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based TransnationalLegislative Power:
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 50 (2013).
7. See VICTOR LUND SHAMMAS, ETIKK I OLJEFONDET: - BARE BUTIKK OG UTENRIKSPOLITIKK?
[ETHICS IN THE OIL FUND: JUST BUSINESS AND FOREIGN POLICY?] 8 (2012), available at
http://www.academia.edu/3678322/Etikk i Oljefondet Rapport Changemaker
(quoting
Dag
0.

Hessen, member of the board of the Council on Ethics).
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To date, there has been little empirical analysis examining the effectiveness of
the GPFG in enforcing its Ethics Guidelines.8 We present evidence showing that
the Council on Ethics, under certain circumstances, is more successful at
influencing corporate behavior. Specifically, we show that the Council on Ethics
is more effective as the relative size of the investment in a given corporation
increases. This serves as a model for other institutional investors who may wish to
implement Ethics Guidelines targeting the behavior of corporations in their
investment portfolios.
Although the GPFG has succeeded in facilitating sustainable behavior while
contributing to the development of best practices for responsible investors, we also
suggest several reform proposals for improving the overall effectiveness of the
GPFG in implementing its Ethics Guidelines. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance
established the Strategy Council for the GPFG in the spring of 2013 in order to
review the work of the GPFG on responsible investment. 9 Elements of its report,
"Responsible Investment and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global,"
published last November, will be examined and other suggestions for change will
also be introduced. io The reform proposals include: expanding the grounds for
exclusion to include, among others, companies that produce energy from fossil
fuels, or at the very least energy production from coal and oil sands; granting the
Council on Ethics more autonomy; increasing the level of transparency in the
active ownership of the investment arm of the GPFG, including when entering into
dialogue with companies; and lastly, amending the mandate for the investment
arm, requiring it to fully consider the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises when managing
the companies currently within its investment portfolio, prioritizing companies for
assessment when they present a significant risk of actual or potential adverse
environmental or social impacts."
Part II introduces the GPFG, its legal framework, and the Council on Ethics
and its efforts at influencing the corporations in which it invests. Part III addresses
the interrelated questions about company compliance with the Ethics Guidelines

8. See ELROY DIMSON ET AL., RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT
PENSION
FUND
GLOBAL
9-10
(2013),
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/38525979/sc mainrreport.pdf; see also The Council on Ethics for the
GPFG, MINISTRY OF FIN., (June 24, 2013), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/thegovemment-pension-fund/responsible-investments/the-council-on-ethics-for-thegovemment.html?id=447010 [hereinafter The Council on Ethics for the GPFG]; infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
9. DIMSON ET AL., supranote 8, at 3.

10. Id. at 3-4.
11. See e.g., NORWEGIAN NAT'L CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINAT'L
ENTERS., FINAL STATEMENT: COMPLAINT FROM LOK SHAKTI ABHIYAN, KOREAN TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS WATCH, FAIR GREEN AND GLOBAL ALLIANCE AND FORUM FOR ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT VS. POSCO (SOUTH KOREA), ABP/APG (NETHERLANDS) AND NBIM (NORWAY) 45-48
(2013), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36798927/nbim final2.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
STATEMENT: POSCO CASE].
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and what drives firm compliance with such guidelines. Part IV sets out the
sustainable pathway using the GPFG as a model for other institutional investors.
Part V introduces some reform proposals focusing on how to strengthen the
GPFG's responsible investment strategy. Part VI concludes with the observation
that the GPFG remains a solid model for other institutional investors, even more so
if it incorporates some of the reform proposals.
II.

NORWAY'S

A.

SWF - GPFG1 2

Origins

Norway began exploiting its oil and gas reserves in 1971.'
In 1990, the
Norwegian government established a sovereign wealth fund, first called the
Petroleum Fund, and later renamed the Government Pension Fund-Global. 14 The
goal of the GPFG is to use revenues from Norway's oil reserves without affecting
general income flow to the government, thereby buffering the impact of volatile oil
revenues on government spending.' 5 The fund also serves as an instrument for
long-term financial savings, ensuring that Norway's oil wealth benefits not just the
current generation, but also future generations, thereby fulfilling an important
ethical obligation 1 6 in line with the principle of intergenerational equity.' 7 The
GPFG is also mandated to function as a responsible investor in fulfilling this
ethical obligation, exercising good corporate governance and promoting
sustainable development in economic, social, and environmental terms.' 8

12. See Anita Halvorssen, Addressing Climate Change Through the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth
Fund (SWF): Using Responsible Investments to Encourage Corporations to Take ESG Issues into
Account in Their Decision-Making, 8 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 1, 4-15 (2011) for background on

sustainable development and SWFs.
13. TORE ERIKSEN, NORWAY MINISTRY OF FIN., THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM SECTOR AND THE

GOVERNMENT

PENSION

FUND-GLOBAL

3

(2006),

available

at

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/TheNorwegianPetroleumSector-te.
pdf.
14. The Government Petroleum Fund, 22 June 1990, Act No. 36 §§ 1-2; The Government Pension
Fund Act, 21 Dec. 2005, Act No. 123 § 2 (establishing the Government Pension Fund as an umbrella
entity comprised of the Government Pension Fund-Global, formerly the Petroleum Fund and the
Government Pension Fund-Norway, formerly the National Insurance Scheme. This article focuses only
on the Government Pension Fund-Global (GPFG)).
15. The Report from the Graver Committee, MINISTRY OF FIN., § I (Nov. 7, 2003),
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/tema/statenspensjonsfond/ansvarligeinvesteringer/
graverutvalget/Report-on-ethical-guidelines.html?id=420232 [hereinafter Graver Committee Report];
see also ERIKSEN, supranote 13, at 7-8.

16. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 2.2.
17. EDITH BROWN WEISS,

IN

FAIRNESS TO

FUTURE

GENERATIONS:

INTERNATIONAL

LAW,

COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 17-18 (1989) (defining intergenerational

equity is defined as justice between generations).
18. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND

IN

2008:

REPORT

NO.

20

(2008-2009)

TO

THE

STORTING

http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2185603/PDFS/STM200820090020000EN
GPF REPORT No. 201.

11

(2009),

available at

PDFS.pdf

[hereinafter
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In terms of benefiting future generations, it is important to focus on
sustainable development and place it in the context of SWFs. Balancing maximum
financial returns with sustainable development is difficult for any profit-making
entity, but SWFs, having a longer investment timeframe, are in a better position to
promote sustainable development. In an effort to address this challenge, the
Norwegian Parliament adopted Ethics Guidelines for the GPFG in 2004,
specifically prohibiting investments that would put the fund at an unacceptable risk
of contributing to serious or systematic human rights violations, severe
environmental damage, and gross corruption,' 9 essentially spelling out the
requirements of sustainable development. After an evaluation process in 2008,
these guidelines were amended in 2010.20
B.

Legal and InstitutionalFramework

While the GPFG was established in 1990, 21 it did not receive any funds until
there was a budget surplus in 1996.22 The government's net cash flow from
petroleum operations is transferred in its entirety to the GPFG through the state
budget, whereas the fiscal guidelines stipulate that only the expected real return on
the fund-four percent of the fund should be returned to the budget for general
spending purposes-hence the real value of the fund itself will be protected.23
The Norwegian State is the official owner of the GPFG, and the Ministry of
Finance manages it on behalf of the Norwegian people. However, in order to have
political backing, major changes to the GPFG's investment strategy are presented
to Parliament before being implemented.2 4 The Ministry of Finance determines the
overall investment strategy for the GPFG, and follows up on its operational
management. 25 The operational management of the GPFG has been delegated to
the Norwegian Central Bank, Norges Bank.26 This role, however, is not a Central
Bank function, and is therefore strictly separated from the Central Bank's other
27
activities and referred to as the Norges Bank Investment Management ("NBIM").
The GPFG is not established as a separate legal entity, but as a deposit account at
the Norges Bank. Norges Bank has a management agreement with the Ministry of

19. See Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, § 2 (3); NBIM Management
Mandate, supra note 5 (replacing 2004 ethical guidelines); infra note 55 and accompanying text.
20. See GuidelinesforObservation and Exclusion, supranote 5.
21. The Government Petroleum Fund, 22 June 1990, Act No. 36.
22. Oystein Olsen & Yngvar Tveit, Statens Petroleumsfond-Et Redskap For Langsiktig
ForvaltningAv Oljeformuen, in HVA GJOR OLJEPENGENE MED OSS? [WHAT DOES THE OIL INCOME DO
TO us?] 99, 105 (Ame Jon Isachsen ed., 2002).
23. ERIKSEN, supranote 13, at 6.
24. See, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global
Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425, 453 (2010); GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 11.
25. Backer, supranote 24, at 454.
26. Id. at 455.
27. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 37.
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Finance specifically delegating the operational authority over the GPFG to the
bank and this agreement is publicly disclosed.28
The GPFG's assets are invested strictly in foreign financial instruments
(thirty-five to forty percent in bonds, sixty percent in equities, and five percent in
real estate), in over seventy developed and emerging markets.2 9 Unlike traditional
pension funds, the GPFG is not earmarked for specific liabilities, but is an
instrument for general savings on the part of the State. 30 Because it has a very long
investment horizon and is not subject to short-term liquidity requirements, the
GPFG has a higher risk-bearing capacity than many comparable funds." As of
2013, the market value of the GPFG is NOK 5,038 billion (approx. U.S. $840
billion).32 Currently, the GPFG is invested in over eight thousand companies and
owns approximately 1.3 percent of global listed shares. 33
The goal for the investment strategy of the fund is to achieve maximum
financial return with moderate risk to help ensure that future generations will be
able to draw the maximum possible benefit from the oil wealth.34 In order to
achieve a maximum financial return, and as a long-term investor, the government
sees its role as being a responsible investor, promoting good corporate governance
and safeguarding environmental and social concerns. 35 This applies particularly to
the broadly diversified, economy-wide investor-often referred to as "universal
investor," such as the Norwegian GPFG.36
There is broad political support for the ethical framework for the responsible
management of the GPFG. Being a responsible investor is defined as ensuring
28. Id.; see also Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global, 21. Dec. 2005
No. 123, §§ 2, 7, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/l719656/gpfg madate 042013.pdf.
29. Investments, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments (last visited
July 20, 2013).
30. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 12.
31. Id.
32. Market Value, NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT, http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/market-value/
(last updated Mar. 28, 2014); NORGEs BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (NBIM), GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL: QUARTERLY REPORT: SECOND QUARTER 2013, at 10 tbl.1-10 (2013),
available
at http://www.nbim.no/en/press-and-publications/Reports/2013/quarterly-report-2q-2013
(listing market value of GPFG as 4,397 billion NOK as of June 13, 2013).
33. NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2013
27
(2014),
available
at
http://www.nbim.no/globalassets/reports/2013/annual-report/annualreport_2013_web.pdf
34. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 11-12.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Interview with Anne Kvam, former Head of Corporate Governance, Norges Bank Investment
Management, (July 23, 2008); see NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND IN 2009: REPORT NO. 10 (2009-2010) TO THE STORTING 133-36 (2010),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2500165/PDFS/STM200920100010000ENPDFS.pdf
[hereinafter GPF REPORT No. 10]. "A universal owner (UO) is defined as an owner with investments

spread across a large number of companies in many industries and countries." Id. at 133; see also
JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: How
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 3 (2000).
37. GPF REPORT NO.20, supranote 18, at 12.
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that the GPFG is managed in a way that "promotes better functioning, legitimate
and efficient markets and sustainable development in the broadest sense."38
Promoting sustainable development in economic, environmental, and social terms
is regarded as a precondition for good financial returns over time.39 This goal is in
keeping with the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment ("U.N. PRI") that the
Ministry of Finance, as formal owner of the GPFG, has signed. 4 0 These principles
emphasize that ESG issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios.41
C. Ethics Guidelines
In 2004, based on the work of the Graver Committee, 42 the Norwegian
Parliament debated and then accepted unanimously the Ethics Guidelines for the
GPFG-to better fulfill its ethics obligations for future generations. 43 The Graver
Committee focused on two main ethical obligations: (1) the obligation to ensure
financial returns so that future generations will benefit from the oil wealth
contingent on sustainable development, and (2) the obligation to respect
fundamental rights of those who are affected by the companies in which the Fund
invests.44 These obligations became the premise for the Ethics Guidelines.45
After an in-depth review process in 2008-2009, the Ethical Guidelines of
2004 were replaced on March 1, 2010, adding several new measures to fulfill the
ethical obligations.4 6 These were mostly procedural with few changes to the
substantive provisions of the guidelines. After consultations, two new sets of
guidelines were adopted by the Ministry of Finance. The first set of guidelines, the
Guidelines for Norges Bank's work on responsible management and active
ownership was integrated into the new regulations on the management of the
GPFG.47 The second set of guidelines was the Guidelines for observation and
exclusion from the GPFGs investment universe, the main focus of this paper.48
These two sets of guidelines constitute the new Ethics Guidelines. 49

38. Id.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id.; see also Signatories to the Principlesfor Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INV., http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories (last visited July 20, 2014).
41. See U.N. PRI, supra note 1.
42. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 6 Annex I (describing the committee as a
government appointed committee with a mandate to propose a set of ethics guidelines).
43. NORWEGIAN

MINISTRY OF FIN., GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND

GLOBAL: RESPONSIBLE

at
available
(2010),
8-9
INVESTMENT
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FlN/brosjyre/2010/spu/english 2010/SPU hefle eng ebook.pdf.
44. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 6.
45. Id.
46. The Council on Ethicsfor the GPFG, supranote 8; see also GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note
36, at 93.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 92-93 (The Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) gave its approval to the Government's
plan. See § 3.2 of Recommendation no. 277 (2008-2009) to the Storting).
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The mechanisms used by the GPFG to fulfill these ethical obligations are
active ownership and observation or exclusion of companies. 50 In order to
safeguard the GPFG's financial interests, Norges Bank, through NBIM, is
mandated to exercise active ownership rights for the fund's investments.' The
Council on Ethics makes recommendations on the observation and exclusion of
companies to the Ministry of Finance, which then makes the final decision.52 This
process could give the appearance of such decisions being subject to political
considerations, yet the Ministry emphasizes that it is acting in its capacity as an
investor with the goal of maximizing the long-term real return and that other
political objectives must be pursued by other means, for instance through foreign
affairs or environmental policies. The Ministry of Finance has stated "we risk
losing our credibility as a financial investor if we use the Fund [GPFG] as an
instrument in our foreign policy."53
The exercise of the ownership rights by NBIM is based on the U.N.'s Global
Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance, and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 54 NBIM's exercise of its ownership
rights in the GPFG are considered active in the sense that the NBIM is an active
shareholder observing standards of corporate governance in the form of
shareholder rights and informal means to influence the corporations' adherence to
the Ethical Guidelines.55 As part of its ownership activities, the NBIM uses several
approaches to influence corporations in its investment portfolio, including
shareholder proposals and voting at annual general meetings, dialogue with
companies, legal action, meeting with regulatory authorities, and collaboration
with other investors. 56 In recent years, the NBIM has also published documents
outlining their social and environmental expectations of companies in which the
GPFG invests in order to strengthen its active ownership effort, the first being on
children's rights, entitled the NBIM's Investor Expectations on Children's

50. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 5.1.
51. NBIM Management Mandate, supra note 5, §§ 2.2-2.3.
52. The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8.
53. Hilde Singsaas, Former State Sec'y, Ministry of Fin., Opening Speech at the Responsible
Investment Conference at the Norwegian Business School (BI) (June 20, 2013), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/aktuelt/taler-artikler/taler-ogartikler av ovrigpolitisklede/tal
er-og-artikler-av-hilde-singsaas/2013/opening-speech-at-the-responsible-invest.html?id=73 1193.
54. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 5.1; see ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
OECD

GUIDELINES

FOR

MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES

(2011),

http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm

available

[hereinafter

at

OECD

GUIDELINES ON MULTINATIONALS].

55. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, §§ 3.1, 5.1; see also GPF REPORT No. 10, supra
note 36, at 125.
56. GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note 36, at 125.
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Rights. The NBIM's Investor Expectations on Climate Change Management and
Water Management were soon to follow.
The Council on Ethics, in charge of recommending observation and
exclusion, was established by royal decree in 2004." It has five members and a
secretariat of seven people. 60 The Council on Ethics works with a number of
consultants. 61 Furthermore, it uses software programs to monitor newswires and
other sources for reports or information related to or involving companies in the
GPFG's portfolio in order to flag the worst offenders of the Ethics Guidelines. 62
If a company is involved in the production of weapons that through normal
use violates fundamental humanitarian principles, it is identified through a
negative screening process and excluded from the investment universe (product63
Furthermore, companies producing tobacco have been added
based exclusion).
to the criteria for exclusion. 64 Companies will be excluded from the investment
universe (conduct-based) if there is an unacceptable risk of the GPFG contributing
to or being responsible for:
a) Serious or systematic human rights violations such as murder,
torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labor, the worst forms of
child labor, and other child exploitation;
b) Serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war
or conflict;
c) Severe environmental damage;
d) Gross corruption;
e) Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical
norms.65

57. See
Children's
Rights,
NORGES
BANK
INV.
MGMT.,
http://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/responisble-investments/childrens-rights (last updated Feb. 27,
2014) (providing link to brochure on NBIM's Investor Expectations on Children's Rights).
BANK
INV.
MGMT.,
Climate
Change,
NORGES
58. See
http://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/responisble-investments/climate-change (last updated Feb. 27,
2014) (providing link to brochure NBIM's Investor Expectations on Climate Change Management);
Water Management, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/responisbleinvestments/water-management (last updated Feb. 27, 2014) (providing link to brochure NBIM's
Investor Expectations on Water Management).
59. The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8; see also Guidelinesfor Observation and
Exclusion, supra note 5, §§ 2-5.
60. GPF REPORT No. 20, supra note 18, at 89.
61. REGJERINGEN.No
,
no.
9
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-radutvalg/ethics-council/frequently-asked-questions.html?id=605599#OLE LINK 16 (last updated Nov.
30, 2012).
62. Id. no. 16.
63. Guidelinesfor Observationand Exclusion, supra note 5, § 2(l)(a).
64. Id. § 2(l)(b). This was one outcome of the evaluation process in 2008-2009. Id The criterion
is limited to production of tobacco products, and does not include associated products, such as, filters
and flavor additives, or the sale of tobacco products. Id.
65. Guidelinesfor Observationand Exclusion, supra note 5,

§ 2(3).
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The premises for the Ethics Guidelines clearly state that the GPFG's
investment should generate a sound return, contingent on sustainable development,
and not represent an unacceptable risk of complicity in grossly unethical acts,
including the areas of human rights and the environment. Only states can violate
their human rights obligations directly under international law (outside the realm
of international criminal law), yet companies can contribute to human rights
violations committed by states and the GPFG, in turn, may contribute to the
companies' complicity through its ownership. 66 No evidence of contribution needs
to be provided for the GPFG to take action; the presence of an unacceptable risk is
sufficient to trigger a response. This also applies to acts or omissions in regard to
the environment. Only the most serious violations of the ethical standards should
provide a basis for exclusion. The fact that a risk is deemed unacceptable is linked
to the seriousness of the ongoing act, whether a company is accused of several
counts of unethical conduct, and the degree of probability of the act taking place in
the future.68 Past acts alone are not enough for exclusion from the GPFP, yet past
patterns of conduct can be relevant when they indicate future conduct. 69 The
Council on Ethics also makes sure that there is factual evidence to support the
accusations leveled at the company.
To date, the Ministry of Finance, based upon recommendations from the
Council on Ethics, has screened out investments in eighteen companies on the
basis of their production of certain kinds of weapons, such as central parts of
nuclear weapons, and involvement in the production of cluster munitions and
landmines." In addition, one company has been excluded for selling military
material to Burma.72 Twenty-one companies have been excluded for tobacco
production. In order to avoid the unacceptable risk of the GPFG contributing to
serious or systematic human rights violations or severe environmental damage,
eighteen companies have been excluded from GPFG.74 Two companies were
excluded on grounds of other particularly gross violations of fundamental ethical

66. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 45 (2006), available at

ANNUAL
[hereinafter
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/l 957930/Arsmelding%202005%20eng.pdf
REPORT 2005].
67. Id.
68. GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note 36, at 77; see also Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion,
supranote 5, § 2(4).
69. ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 66, at 47-48.
70. GPF REPORT NO. 10, supranote 36, at 77.
OF
FIN.,
the Investment
Universe, MINISTRY
71. Companies Excluded from
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u.html?id=447122 (last updated Apr. 9, 2014).
72. Id. (referring to Dongfeng Motor Group Co Ltd. (28 Feb. 2009)).

73. Id.
74. Id.
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norms75 and three for serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of
war or conflict.76
No companies have yet been withdrawn from the investment universe of the
GPFG due to their lack of action to mitigate climate change, under the "severe
environmental damage" criterion under the Guidelines for Observation and
Exclusion. Currently, this criterion does not cover climate change. The NBIM, on
the other hand, has entered into dialogue with companies lobbying against
regulations requiring action to mitigate climate change and has used its voting
rights as a shareholder on climate change resolutions introduced by shareholders at
the general meetings of targeted companies. The NBIM has also communicated its
expectations to companies in regard to addressing climate change, as mentioned
above.
In addition, in 2012, NBIM expanded its climate change focus area to include
deforestation of tropical rainforests as a means of emitting carbon, in addition to its
existing focus on emissions of greenhouse gases through the burning of fossil fuels
as stipulated in its expectation documents.77 Based on that decision, it divested
stocks from twenty-three palm oil companies from GPFG's investment portfolio
determining that they were producing palm oil in an unsustainable manner,
contributing to tropical rainforest deforestation.78
Ill. GPFG's - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS

The observation and exclusion mechanisms employed by the GPFG to
monitor compliance with the Ethics Guidelines leave open the possibility that
firms found to be in breach of these guidelines can alter their unethical behaviors
and shift their internal practices toward sustainability. Given that unsustainable
practices can lead to divestment and exclusion from the GPFG, corporations face
some incentives to adhere to its Ethics Guidelines; this is especially the case where
corporations may wish to avoid the costs, both material and reputational, of being

75. Id. (Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (6 Dec. 2011) and Elbit Systems Ltd. (31 Aug.
2009)). For Potash Corporation, see COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND - GLOBAL,
COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 53

(2011), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/Annual_Report_2011.pdf [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 2011]. For Elbit Systems, see COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOv'T PENSION FUNDGLOBAL, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND - GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT

available
at
(Sept.
3,
2009),
2009,
at
26
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/I957930/EtikkradetE2009.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT2009].
76. Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe, supra note 71 (Shikun & Binui Ltd. (31
May 2012), Africa Israel Investments (30 Jan. 2014), and Danya Cebus (30 Jan. 2014)).
77. NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2012,

at 35 (2012), available at http://www.nbim.no/globalassets/reports/2012/annual-report/annual-report2012.pdf; see also id. at 19 (deeming some economies' "long-term business model ... unsustainable.").
78. Id. at 35; see also COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, COUNCIL
ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2012 18, at 66 (2012),

available at

http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/aarsmelding_2012_engelsk.pdf

ANNUAL REPORT 2012].
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divested and publicly identified as having unethical and unsustainable practices.
Thus, in addition to monitoring compliance with the GPFG's Ethics Guidelines,
through observation and exclusion, the Council on Ethics has the additional effect
of redirecting unsustainable corporate behavior and frequently placing corporations
on more sustainable pathways.
This section provides an empirical analysis of this process; it assesses the
effectiveness of the GPFG in altering corporate behavior once violations of Ethics
Guidelines have been detected. It begins with two case studies of corporations,
Germany-based Siemens AG and U.S.-based FMC Corporation, both of which
have been publicly identified for engaging in unsustainable practices by the
Council on Ethics, and have subsequently addressed these unsustainable behaviors.
Then the section provides a large-N empirical analysis of all firms that have
similarly been identified by the Council on Ethics since 2005.
A. The cases of Siemens and FMC Corporation
In 2007, the GPFG publicly identified the Germany-based multinational
conglomerate Siemens AG as the subject of a Council on Ethics investigation for
gross corruption. In its investigation, the Council on Ethics highlighted instances
where the corporation had actively engaged in corrupt behaviors spanning more
than a decade, including bribing public officials in over twenty-five countries to
win various tenders and to obtain government contracts. 79 At the time of the
investigation, the GPFG held investments worth approximately U.S. $500 million
in Siemens stocks and bonds.80
Siemens undertook immediate efforts to respond to the concerns raised by the
GPFG, providing to the Council on Ethics information about its guidelines relating
to corruption and arguing that compliance with such guidelines had become "a top
,,81
priority.
In its letter to the Council on Ethics, Siemens further emphasized that
it was "committed to clearing up all misconduct no matter who was responsible,
and will endorse the necessary consequences." 82 Indeed, Siemens' high level of
responsiveness to the Council on Ethics drew acknowledgement in the Council's
annual report.
In 2009, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance placed Siemens on an
"observation list" for a period of four years, during which the Council on Ethics
and NBIM were both tasked with monitoring and reporting on Siemens' efforts to
redress its corrupt practices. During that period, the Council on Ethics continued

79. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 47 (2008), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/I957930/etikkradet engelskO8.pdf.
80. Id. at 45.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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to observe Siemens and engaged in direct dialogue with the company to monitor its
efforts at implementing more sustainable business practices. 83
In 2012, Siemens was removed from observation following a report by the
Council on Ethics that emphasized a shift within the corporation toward addressing
and eliminating corrupt practices. The Council on Ethics noted that "it [was]
unlikely that there was a higher risk of corruption in Siemens than in other
comparable companies" and thus recommended that its observation period come to

an end.8 4
This process reveals that efforts undertaken by the GPFG helped facilitate a
change in Siemens' corporate behavior in a more sustainable direction. While
Siemens' corruption was widely publicized and became the subject of a number of
lawsuits, market-based pressure from investors such as the GPFG no doubt
influenced Siemens' decision to implement more sustainable practices over time.
This is corroborated by Siemens' high level of responsiveness to inquiries from the
Council on Ethics.
An additional case further illustrates the ways in which the Council on Ethics
can be successful in motivating companies to engage in more sustainable
behaviors. In 2010, the Council on Ethics recommended to the Ministry of
Finance that it exclude the U.S.-based FMC Corporation for "particularly serious
violations of ethical norms" tied to its practice of purchasing phosphate minerals
mined from the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara.8 5 The Ministry of
Finance concurred with the Council's recommendation and divested securities
86
worth some U.S. $50 million the following year.
During the course of the investigation into alleged unethical practices, FMC
Corporation revealed to the Council on Ethics that it was party to long-term
contracts with Moroccan companies to purchase phosphates from Western Sahara,
and that it intended to continue this practice into the future.87 Indeed, FMC
Corporation notified the Council on Ethics that its operations were in many ways
dependent on access to such phosphates.8 In its Annual Report, the Council notes
that, "FMC Corp[oration] makes it clear that FMC Foret [its Spanish subsidiary]
will continue to buy phosphate from Bou Craa [northern Western Sahara], and that
the company's plant in Huelva, Spain, to a great extent is dependent on access to

83. ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 75, at 5.
84. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 78, at 6-7.
85. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 6-7. FMC Foret's phosphate trade with the stateowned Moroccan mining company was contrary to the interests of the local population and not for their
benefit. Id. This breach of the Ethics Guidelines fell under the category "other particularly serious
violations of fundamental ethical norms." Guidelinesfor Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, §
2(3)(e).
86. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supranote 75, at 6; Norway Blacklists US/CanadianFertilizerFirms
over

Sahara

Imports,

WESTERN

SAHARA

RESOURCE

http://www.wsrw.org/al05x2177.
87. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 57-58.
88. Id. at 58.

WATCH

(June

12,

2011),
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phosphate of the quality found at Bou Craa." 89 The Council on Ethics regarded
this information as an assurance that FMC Corporation intended to continue
engaging in what it considered to be grossly unethical behavior; this information
formed the basis of the Council's decision to recommend exclusion. 90
Following FMC Corporation's exclusion from the GPFG, the Council on
Ethics continued to contact the corporation to determine whether it continued to
purchase phosphates mined from Western Sahara.91 This practice is established in
Paragraph 5 of the GPFG's Ethics Guidelines, which directs the Council on Ethics
to "routinely assess whether the basis for exclusion still exists and may, in light of
new information, recommend that the Ministry of Finance reverse an exclusion
ruling." 92 In August 2012, FMC Corporation notified the Council on Ethics that it
had ceased purchasing phosphates from Western Sahara. Notably, the company
also stated that it had no "plans or agreements that include future purchases of
phosphates from Western Sahara." 93 This marked a significant shift in behavior
for FMC Corporation, which had purchased phosphates extracted from Western
Sahara for some forty years. 94 In light of this information, the Council on Ethics
recommended to the Ministry of Finance that FMC Corporation's exclusion be
reversed.95 The Ministry of Finance accepted the recommendation, and FMC
Corporation subsequently reappeared in NBIM's investment portfolio. 9 6
The above cases illustrate the ways in which the Council on Ethics' screening
and exclusion mechanisms can have the effect of redirecting unethical behaviors.
Both Siemens AG and FMC Corporation were highly responsive to the Council on
Ethics and eventually redressed their unethical practices in ways that placed each
firm on a more sustainable pathway. These shifts in corporate behavior are
attributable to investor-side concerns over long-term sustainability. The remainder
of this section turns to a larger quantitative test of these mechanisms to evaluate
their ability to motivate firms to change unethical behavior.
B. Influencing corporatebehavior
We propose that the ability of the GPFG to influence corporate behavior
toward more sustainable practices is tied to the degree of market leverage it
possesses over a given corporation. We argue that the magnitude of this leverage,
in turn, is a reflection of the relative size of the investment the GPFG maintains in
a given corporation. Larger relative investments lead to more leverage because
they magnify the consequences of observation and potential exclusion when the
Council on Ethics identifies companies for unethical practices. We thus conduct
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 58, 62.
ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supranote 78, at 50.
Guidelinesfor Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, § 5(5).
ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supranote 78, at 50-51.
ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supranote 75, at 57.
ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 78, at 51.
Id. at 6-7.
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an empirical test that models the likelihood of a corporation altering its unethical
behavior as a function of the relative size of investment the GPFG maintains in that
firm. We hypothesize that larger relative investments are more likely to influence
corporate behavior in a direction toward more sustainable practices than smaller
relative investments.
1.

Sample

The high level of transparency within the GPFG permits us to test our
hypothesis on all corporations that have been publicly identified as subjects of
investigation by the Council on Ethics, as well as all corporations that have been
negatively screened for unethical practices. These are firms such as Siemens AG
and FMC Corporation that have been investigated for engaging in unethical
behavior by the Council on Ethics. In the process of being investigated, these
companies have the option to alter their practices to bring them into alignment with
Ethics Guidelines before they are excluded from the fund. There are seventy-nine
such corporations that appear in our sample.9 7
2.

Variables

Our Dependent Variable ("DV") is a dichotomous measure that captures
whether a corporation changes its unethical practice following an investigation by
the Council on Ethics. If the corporation alters its behavior, it is coded as a one. If
a corporation is investigated for unethical practices and is subsequently divested
and never alters its behavior, it is coded as a zero.
Our primary independent variable ("IV") is designed to capture the degree of
market leverage the GPFG maintains over a target firm. It measures the
percentage of outstanding shares of a firm that are owned by the GPFG. We
calculate this variable by dividing the value of the GPFG's investment in the firm
in Norwegian Kroner ("NOK") by the value of the corporation's total outstanding
shares in NOK. All figures are calculated based on values taken from the year the
corporation was publicly revealed as the subject of investigation. The minimum
percent ownership in the sample is zero, while the maximum percent ownership is
2.07 percent of total outstanding shares. In cases where the percent ownership of a
corporation is zero, the GPFG has typically engaged in negative screening, and has
never owned shares in that corporation. These data are publicly available from
NBIM's annual reports. 98
We also include a number of control variables ("CV") in our analysis. Our
first CV is the size of a corporation by market capitalization the year it was

97. Information on each of these corporations was compiled from the Council on Ethics' annual
REGJERINGEN.NO,
Reports,
2013.
See
Annual
2005
to
reports
for
years
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics council/annual-reports.html?id=458699 (last
visited July 20, 2014).
98. Reports, NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT, http://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/reports/ (last
updated Feb. 27, 2014).
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identified as the subject of investigation by the GPFG. Market capitalization is
presented for all corporations in NOK, even if that corporation's shares and bonds
are traded in a currency other than NOK. We include this control under the
assumption that the size of a corporation may influence its likelihood of altering an
unsustainable behavior. For example, large firms may be less wary of the costs of
divestment and thus less sensitive to any market leverage exerted by the GPFG.
Conversely, large firms may be more sensitive to the reputation costs of being
identified as the subject of investigation for unethical behaviors; in such cases,
these firms may be more likely to alter an unethical behavior.
Our second CV measures the level of democracy of the country within which
the firm is chartered, or the state within which the violation of the Ethics
Guidelines occurred where that country is different. For example, Wal-Mart USA,
which appears in the sample for violations of human rights, is coded based on the
level of democracy in the United States, while Wal-Mart de Mexico is coded based
on the level of democracy in Mexico. To measure the level of democracy, we use
the 21-point "Polity Score" scale, where states with the lowest level of democracy
are coded as -10 and states with the highest level are coded as 10.9 We include
this control under the assumption that corporations in more democratic countries
may be more receptive to efforts at incorporating sustainable practices than
corporations from less democratic countries.
Our third CV is a dichotomous measure indicating whether a firm has been
negatively screened or investigated for the production of munitions. This category
of companies represents a uniquely difficult set of cases for the Council on Ethics.
For most of these companies, weapons production is a core business function. It is
therefore less likely that these firms will cease the production of munitions to align
their behavior with the GPFG's Ethics Guidelines. This is especially the case
when compared with other types of unethical behaviors, like corruption or
environmental degradation, which companies may be more willing to address
insofar as they do not constitute a central function of the business.
A similar logic motivates the inclusion of our final CV, which indicates
whether a corporation produces tobacco. While tobacco-producing firms have the
opportunity to alter their unethical behaviors, none to date have. 0
This is
unsurprising, as implementing sustainable practices for these corporations would
imply abandoning tobacco production altogether. There are eighteen tobaccoproducing firms that have been excluded from the GPFG. The dummy measuring
tobacco production predicts a perfect rate of corporations failing to alter their
unsustainable behaviors; it thus has the statistical effect of dropping these
observations from the sample. Notably, this accounts for the drop in the number of
observations used to estimate our model.

99. Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics
and

Transitions,

1800-2012,

CENTER

FOR

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last updated June 10, 2013).
100. See Annual Reports, supra note 97.

SYSTEMIC

PEACE,
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Case Selection

Testing our hypothesis on this sample raises the potential for selection bias. If
the Council on Ethics systematically investigates corporations that are more likely
a priori to alter their unethical practices, then only these corporations will select
into our sample, while corporations that are less likely to alter unethical practices
This selection problem threatens to undermine the
will be excluded.
generalizability of our results. The obvious econometric solution, a two-stage
Heckman selection model,' 1 is infeasible due to the exclusion restriction requiring
us to identify some instrument that predicts whether a corporation will select into
an investigation for unsustainable practices.
While we cannot model any selection bias, we can determine whether there is
anything systematically different about firms that select into Council on Ethics
investigations from those that do not. To determine whether there is anything
substantively different about companies that select into our sample from
companies that do not, we take two random draws of seventy-nine corporations
from the GPFG's investment universe. This is equivalent to the number of
corporations in our sample. For each randomly drawn firm, we calculate the
percent of total outstanding shares controlled by the GPFG. We then perform
difference-in-mean tests (two-tailed) to determine whether there is a statistically
significant difference across means for firms that select into our sample and the
firms that do not. If there is no sample selection bias, there should be no
statistically significant difference in means between the corporations in our sample
and the corporations randomly drawn in terms of the percent of shares owned by
the GPFG.
The results of the difference-in-means tests reveal no significant differences
(at ninety percent confidence) between the mean percentages of outstanding shares
controlled by the GPFG for corporations that select into our sample.' 02 There is
thus nothing systematically different about firms that select into our sample versus
those that do not in terms of the relative slice of shares controlled. This suggests
that the Council on Ethics does not choose corporations that it believes will be a
priori more amenable to implementing more sustainable practices, while failing to
investigate firms that will be less willing to address its concerns.
We test our hypothesis using logistic regression; our model is laid out in
equation form below: 0 3

101. James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,47 ECONOMETRICA 153
(1979). The Heckman selection model is a common method for correcting parameter estimates that are
biased due to sample selection effects. See id.
102. For the first random draw, t(79)=1.2406, p-0.1096; for the second random draw,
t(79)= 1.2407, p=0.1096.
103. The beta coefficients represent the parameters estimated by maximizing the likelihood
function associated with the equation we present. These coefficients, in turn, allow us to use data
simulations to calculate the probability of a company changing its unethical behavior following
negative screening or exclusion.
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Logit (Firmcompliance) = /0 + /31 * Percent Firm Control
+ /2 * Firm Size
+ /3 * Democracy
+

#4

+ /5

4.

* Weapons
* Tobacco

Results

The results (presented in Table 1) provide support for our hypothesis that the
likelihood of a corporation changing an unethical behavior increases as the relative
size of the GPFG's investment in that corporation increases. This suggests that
corporations tend to be more receptive to investors' efforts at implementing
sustainable practices as the relative size of the investment increases. Notably, it
only requires small relative increases in investment size for companies to change
their practices. In other words, small relative increases in investment share yield
disproportionate increases in the probability of a corporation changing its behavior.
This also suggests that, under certain circumstances, corporations can be highly
sensitive to the expectations of investors with regard to sustainable practices, even
when those investors own only small relative slices of a corporation's tradable
securities.
For example, based on simulations (presented in Table 2), the model predicts
a forty-one percent likelihood of a firm abandoning an unethical practice following
negative screening or an investigation when the GPFG controls zero shares. This
low likelihood is perhaps unsurprising given that the GPFG maintains almost no
market leverage over such firms. However, when the GPFG controls a quarter of
one percent of outstanding shares in a firm, the probability of that firm changing an
unethical behavior rises to 0.52. Stated differently, there is about a fifty percent
chance that a firm will change its behavior when investigated or negatively
screened when the GPFG controls 0.25 of the total outstanding shares of that firm.
The likelihood of observing a change increases substantially to 0.71 when the
GPFG controls as much as 0.75 percent of outstanding shares in a corporation.
When this increases to one percent, the likelihood of a firm changing some
unethical behavior further increases to 0.78. The pattern is consistent throughout
simulations as the percent of shares controlled rises; indeed, the model predicts a
ninty percent chance that a corporation will discontinue an unethical behavior
when the GPFG controls 1.75 percent of outstanding shares. This again suggests
that only small relative increases in the amount of securities controlled by investors
has the ability to magnify substantially market leverage in terms of convincing
corporations to adopt more sustainable practices.
The size of a corporation by market capitalization has a weakly significant
relationship (p<0.10) to the likelihood of that corporation altering its behavior
following investigation or negative screening from the Council on Ethics. While
the relationship is not significant at conventional thresholds, it is notable that the
relationship is positive, suggesting that larger companies may be more likely to
change their behavior than smaller companies. This could indicate that larger
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companies may be more sensitive to investor interests related to sustainable
practices.
As expected, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether a
company engages in weapons production is significant and signed negatively; this
demonstrates that companies engaged in weapons production are indeed less likely
to alter their unethical practices than are companies that are investigated or
screened for violations in other areas. Indeed, the model predicts only a thirty-two
percent likelihood of such a company changing its behavior following negative
screening or an investigation when the GPFG controls one percent of total
outstanding shares. When the relative slice of control doubles to two percent, the
model predicts only a sixty-four percent likelihood of a firm changing its behavior.
Substantively, this suggests that it is more difficult to wield market leverage over
weapons manufacturers in an effort to implement more sustainable practices.
Last, the level of democracy of the country in which a given firm is located
bears no significant relationship to the likelihood of that company changing some
unethical behavior. In other words, companies in highly democratic countries are
no more (or less) likely to change their behavior than are companies in
undemocratic countries. This null result is perhaps heartening for investors who
may wish to target companies in undemocratic countries, as they appear to be just
as receptive to implementing sustainable practices as companies chartered in
countries that are highly democratic. Substantively, this result suggests that the
location of a company bears little relationship to its receptiveness to investor
pressures over implementing more sustainable practices. Market leverage appears
to have the same effect on firms, whether they're chartered in democratic countries
or otherwise.
Table 1: Explaining Changes in
Corporate Behavior

Percent Shares Owned

1.741*
(0.857)

Firm Size

2.510Ovs
(1.420)

Democracy

0.553
(9.143)

Weapons

-2.279*

Constant

(0.867)
-0.524
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(0.874)

Pseudo R2

0.243

Percent Predicted Correctly
N

67.92
53

* p<0.05, WS p50.10; robust
standard errors reported in
parentheses, two-tailed tests.

Table 2: Predicted Probability of a
Firm Changing its Behavior at
Levels of Percent Firm Ownership

Percent
Ownership

Likelihood
Change

Confidence
Interval

0
0.25

0.41

0.20-0.65

0.52

0.50

0.62

0.33-0.70
0.44-0.77

0.75

0.71
0.78

0.51-0.87

1.00
1.25

0.84

1.50
1.75

0.87
0.90

0.57-0.97
0.58-0.99

2.00

0.92

0.54-0.93

0.59-0.99
0.60-0.99
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* Estimated using CLARIFY104; firm size and
democracy are held at their mean values, while
weapons production is held at its mode.
IV.

THE SUSTAINABLE PATHWAY-GPFG AS A MODEL FOR OTHER INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS

The GPFG has been referred to as the "gold standard of sovereign wealth
funds" by the President of the European Commission.'05 The GPFG is also listed
among the most transparent of the SWFs, with a rating of ten, the highest score on
the Lindaburg-Maduell Transparency Index.' 06 This rating is based on several
factors, including: whether the fund discloses its "history including reasons for its
creation, origins of wealth, and government ownership structure"; whether the fund
provides "up-to-date independently audited annual reports," and its ownership
stakes in companies, and provides guidelines with regard to "ethical standards,
investment policies, and enforcement of guidelines." 0 7
Measured against the U.N. PRI, and considering its most recent revisions, the
GPFG is a workable model for other institutional investors. Now that it has
brought environment and climate change to the forefront, it is more likely to take
ESG issues into account in a broader fashion. The exclusion mechanism is a long,
time-consuming process which some may claim is not necessary if investors take
ESG issues into account in a more holistic manner in their investment decisionmaking. However, as with all voluntary approaches, they will only be as effective
Having an exclusion
as the reliability of the self-reporting mechanisms.
shown, and should
as
we
have
effective,
be
very
can
indeed
available
mechanism
remain as a 'stick'. The best approach is to address ESG issues at all levels,
having both investors and companies integrating ESG issues into their decisionmaking process. States should be encouraged (or assisted) to adopt practical
legislation addressing ESG issues.
Currently, there are few globally accepted best practice standards for SWFs
regarding taking ESG issues into account. 0 s The Norwegian Ministry of Finance
considers the U.N. PRI an important initiative because it "combines the need for a

104. MICHAEL TOMZ, JASON WITTENBERG & GARY KING, CLARIFY:
INTERPRETING
AND
PRESENTING
STATISTICAL
RESULTS
(Version

SOFTWARE

2.0

FOR

2003),

http://scholar.harvard.edu/gking/clarify.
105. Jose Manuel Barroso, President, Eur. Comm'n, Sovereign Wealth Funds: No European
available at
25,
2008),
(Feb.
Approach
a Common
Rather
Legislation but
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/president/pdf/statement 20080225 02_en.pdf.
106. Carl Linaburg & Michael Maduell, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, SWF INST.,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index/ (last visited July
20, 2014).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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common platform and understanding of the issues and the need for a certain
amount of flexibility in execution on the part of the individual investor."' 0 9
The work of the GPFG may itself form the basis of a new global best practice
standard. Actions taken by the GPFG may have a wider multiplier effect,
prompting responsible investment not just by other SWFs, but also private sector
institutional investors."i 0 There seems to be a growing preference toward engaging
with companies rather than excluding them. However, there is a dilemma in "the
paradox of the opportunity to positively influence a company by being an active
shareholder, while inherently supporting their irresponsible practices by being an
investor.""' The NBIM Investor Expectations on Climate Change Management is
a promising tool, since it is followed up with an annual compliance report,
assessing whether the companies the GPFG is invested in are meeting the NBIM's
expectations. Thereby, the Norwegian GPFG could be viewed as a leader in the
industry and with some tweaking be a model of best practice.
Regarding the GPFG, the Ethics Guidelines can be an effective tool to
influence corporate behavior, especially the observation and exclusion
mechanisms. In addition, the NBIM's environment-related active equity mandates
should help promote sustainable companies ahead of others in the investment
universe. Furthermore, the NBIM's Investor Expectations on Children's Rights,
Water Management, and Climate Change Management and their respective annual
assessment reports will lead to more dialogue between the NBIM and reluctant
companies that are part of the investment portfolio of the GPFG, encouraging them
to get on a more sustainable path.
V.

REFORM PROPOSALS

The Strategy Council for the Government Pension Fund Global, established in
the spring of 2013, with a mandate to strengthen the work of the GPFG on
responsible investment,"l 2 delivered its report, the Responsible Investment and the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, to the Ministry of Finance on
November 11, 2013."
The report of the Strategy Council recommends that an outline for a
responsible investment framework should be set out for the GPFG. It would
include its motivation, mandate, principles, strategies, and evaluation.114
Furthermore, it recommends consistency among the GPFG's objectives, priorities,
109. GPF REPORT No. 10, supranote 36, at 131.
110. Bent Sofus Tranoy, Flexible Adjustment in the Age of Financialisation:The Case of Norway,
14 GEOPOLITIcs 360, 360-61 (2009).
111. Sarah Takaki, Stakeholder Perspectives on Norwegian Investment Responsibility, 12 J. INV.
MGMT. 20, 25-26 (2014) (referencing the acknowledgement made by Mr. Hermstad at the Responsible
Investment Conference in Oslo on 20 June 2013).
112. See The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8 that requires the Council of Ethics to
ensure the GPFG's investments comply with the ethical guidelines.
113. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 4, 31.

114. Id. at 17.
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and activities in the responsible investment framework. In addition, it emphasizes
more transparency and accountability. Based on these recommendations, the
Strategy Council sees a need to integrate all the responsible investment activities of
the fund into NBIM, giving the Board of Norges Bank the final say on divestment
decisions, rather than the Ministry of Finance as it is today." 5
The objective of the GPFG's responsible investment strategy, originally set
out by the Graver Committee, has broad political support." 6 More transparency
and accountability has already been called for by several NGOs." 7 The main issue
being debated about the report is its recommendation calling for the integration of
the resources and competence of the Council on Ethics into NBIM. The authors
strongly disagree with this recommendation, as will be explained below in the
context of the effectiveness of the implementation of the Ethics Guidelines.
The exclusion mechanism the Council on Ethics uses when it makes its
recommendations to the Ministry of Finance at the outset of the investment
process, eliminating producers of unethical products from the investment portfolio,
has been very effective."' Indeed, some manufacturers have been eager to inform
the GPFG if they have stopped producing some products to again be able to be
included in the GPFG's portfolio." 9
In addition, the mechanism to place companies under observation or exclude
them from the investment portfolio if there is an unacceptable risk that the
company contributes to unethical behavior, seems, as the authors' empirical
analysis has demonstrated, to work well as a tool to encourage companies to move
toward sustainable development.' 20 Yet, several suggestions have been made for
improvements, among them, giving the Council on Ethics more autonomy.121
This, however, is contrary to the Strategy Council's recommendation to integrate
the Council on Ethics into NBIM. Keeping the Council on Ethics separate from
NBIM is very important because it allows the Council to focus purely on ethical
115. Id. at 30.
116. See supra text accompanying note 37.
117. See ANITA HASLIE & JOAKIM HAMMERLIN,
STATENS PENSJONSFOND UTLAND,

ENDRINGER I DEN ETISKE FORVALTNINGEN AV

[CHANGES IN THE ETHICS MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

11, (2013), available at http://www.fivas.org/sider/tekst.asp?side=723

PENSION FUND GLOBAL]

[hereinafter HASLIE REPORT].
I18. Originally called the negative screening process. See DIMSON ET AL., supranote 8, at 5.
119. ETIKKRADET, RECOMMENDATION To REVOKE THE EXCLUSION OF THE COMPANIES BAE
SYSTEMS
PLC. AND FINMECCANICA S.P.A. FROM THE INVESTMENT UNIVERSE OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION

FUND

GLOBAL

1

(2012)

(unofficial

translation),

available

at

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FlN/etikk/2013/bae-finmec eng.pdf (BAE Systems plc wrote to the
Ethics Council 10 days before they received the routine enquiry from the Council asking if MBDA-a
company which BAE Systems plc through a joint venture, had a controlling interest in-was still

involved in the production of nuclear weapons. BAE Systems plc stated that MBDA's production of
ASMP-A had now been completed, thus the basis for the exclusion of MBDA's owners no longer

applied.).
120. For example Siemens and FMC Corporation made changes. See discussion supra Part IIl.a.
121. SHAMMAS, supra note 7, at 4.
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issues without being distracted by the financial implications of its
recommendations.1 22 As long as sustainable development is not given priority over
financial issues, the controlling function of the Council on Ethics should be upheld
in an independent entity accountable only to the Ministry of Finance, since it
represents the owners, the people of Norway. The Council is, in fact, evolving into
a quasi-judicial entity in making its recommendations to the Ministry. 123 As
Backer explains, the work of the Council on Ethics has "the beginnings of a
coherent jurisprudence of ethics for corporate investment, utilizing public power to
influence private governance among enterprises."l 24 This value should not be
underestimated as it has, as stated above, been followed closely by other pension
funds that have, in turn, also excluded the same companies from their investment
portfolio.
More autonomy for the Council on Ethics would make sense in some
circumstances. Giving the Council on Ethics greater say in exclusion cases, rather
than just making recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, would keep the
decision further away from politics whose influence has been criticized by some
commentators.1 2 5 Then the Council on Ethics would have to acquire authority over
NBIM regarding ethics issues. This is not compatible with the GPFG's current
structure, which means NBIM's mandate from the Ministry of Finance would need
to be amended. The Council on Ethics could have a final say in the
straightforward exclusion cases and in problematic cases, a recommendation to the
Ministry of Finance could be either accepted or turned down within a deadline of
six months by the Ministry, without second-guessing the Council on Ethics'
thorough analysis. 126 In recent cases, the Ministry has used more than a year to
decide whether to accept some of the Council on Ethics' recommendations, often
leading to the information used in the Council's investigation being outdated as
was also stated in the Strategy Council's report.' 27
The Strategy Council has stated that with the current structure there are "risks
of litigation from companies and other shareholders."' 28 However, this has not
happened to date for the simple reason that "whether or not to invest in a company
is a matter of free choice", as the Graver Committee expressed it in its report in

122. See Magnus Borgen, Frarder 6 la oljefondets Etikkrid bli en del av Norges Bank [Advise
Against Letting the Oil Fund Council on Ethic Become a Part of Norges Bank], BELLONA (Nov. 12,
2013),
http://bellona.no/nyheter/klima/2013-1 1-frarader-la-oljefondets-etikkrad-bli-en-del-av-norgesbank (last visited July 20, 2014).
123. Backer, supra note 6, at 24.
124. Id. at 50.
125. See SHAMMAS, supra note 7, at 9.
126. Kristoffer Ronneberg, For trege medetikk-beslutninger [Too Slow with the Ethics Decisions],
AFTENPOSTEN (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.aftenposten.no/oljefondet/For-tregemedetikk-beslutninger-6785594.html#.UhMK3RbvzJ (citing Ola Mestad the head of the Council on Ethics);
see HASLIE REPORT, supra note 117, at 16-17.
127. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.

128. Id.
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2003.129 There is no public hearing or appeals process regarding an exclusion
decision because it is not a legal process. It is an investor making a decision to sell
because it is not happy with its investment. That happens all the time in the market
place for whatever reason-it is a matter of "free choice."13 0 Yet, the Council on
Ethics does give the companies a chance to respond to the allegation of potential
unethical behavior.' 3 ' In addition, all exclusions are reviewed annually to
determine if any of the excluded companies can return to the GPFG's portfolio and
there is a move towards engaging more with companies rather than excluding
them. However, this system only works if there is a 'stick' in the background to
keep everyone focused on the consequences for not cooperating. If the Ethics
Guidelines were to become legal requirements, then the Council on Ethics, which
is not a legal tribunal, would have to adopt a standard litigation process, including
due process rules, to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the Fund in global
markets.1 32
The exercising of ownership rights is growing in popularity among investors.
Employing environmental-related investment mandates is also growing in use.
Yet, sixty percent of companies still do not consider ESG issues important." The
standard dilemma is weighing the financial returns against the ethical expectations,
which the Strategy Council has deftly expounded upon in its report.14 Yet, the
Norwegian people through their Parliament agreed to focus on ethics when they
established the Ethics Guidelines. That was a political decision. The investment
managers do not have the authority to make decisions on ethics, they have the
expertise when it comes to analyzing the risks involved, but they cannot decide
which risks are the right ones to take.'" 5 NBIM's department dealing with active
ownership policy has the mandate to weigh the Ethics Guidelines up against the
financial interests, while the Council on Ethics focuses only on the ethics.
Obviously, this department, being quite small and definitely not the main focus of
the NBIM is going to have a challenge in fulfilling its mandate. Support and
guidance from the Council on Ethics could strengthen their position.
Many observers have suggested expanding the focus areas for NBIM in its
active ownership and divestment policies to coincide more with the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.' 3 6 Some argue that investor expectations

129. GraverCommittee Report, supranote 15, § 2.2.
130. Id.
131. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 9.
132. SIMON CHESTERMAN, ALBRIGHT GROUP LLC, ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLES 3 AND 4 OF THE ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL 27-28

available
(2008),
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Vedlegg/aff/Albright GroupEthical Guidelines.pdf.

at

133. Towner, supra note 3, at 40.
134. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.
135. Martin Skancke, Ny strategi bar legges p6 is [New Strategy Should be Left on Ice], DAGENS
NERINGSLIV, Nov. 13, 2013, at 3.
136. See OECD GUIDELINES ON MULTINATIONALS, supranote 54, at 13-16.
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should include human rights in general, not just children's rights."' Other
environment and social issues should also be given their own investor
expectations. The current investor expectations, which include children's rights,
climate change, and water management, are quite disparate issues, seemingly
random. One could base the investor expectations on, for instance, gradually
introducing the major areas addressed in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, prioritizing companies for assessment when they present a significant
risk of actual or potential adverse environmental or social impacts.' 3 8 Increased
transparency by stipulating which criteria are used to choose which issues are to be
included in the investor expectations, as the Strategy Council has suggested, and
making them available to the public would likely add to the legitimacy of NBIM
and allow the owners of the GPFG, the Norwegian people, to better hold it to
account. 39
Suggestions have also been made for NBIM to publish information regarding
its dialogues with companies following up on its active ownership.14 0 The list of
top scorers on compliance reporting with regard to investor expectations on
children's rights, climate change and water management is all very well, but does
not encourage accountability by measuring how effective these mechanisms are.141
Compare this to the Council on Ethics that publishes all its recommendations on
exclusions made to the Ministry of Finance, which our empirical analysis has
shown to be effective. 142
Rather than integrating the resources and competence of the Council on
Ethics into the Norges Bank, the Council on Ethics should become more
autonomous and NBIM itself should beef up its active ownership and be
accountable to the Council on Ethics for its work in that area. As long as the
Council on Ethics and NBIM cooperate, then there is less chance of overlap. What
is needed is more funding in the ethics area. The cost of the work of the Council
on Ethics and NBIM on active ownership is a very small fraction of what is used
by the investment managers (internal and external managers). These managers
should also become more sensitive to ESG issues in their investment practices.
Currently, positive screening (environmental investments) amounts to a very small
fraction of the value of the GPFG portfolio;' 43 it needs to be substantially increased
137. Interview with Hans Petter Graver, University of Oslo, Norway (Aug. 20, 2013).
138. See POSCO CASE, supra note 11, at 47.
139. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 27.
140. See HASLIE REPORT, supra note 117, at 22; SHAMMAS, supranote 7, at 11 for an explanation
of how the Swedish national pension fund, AP, enters into dialogue with the companies it invests in.
141. HASLIE REPORT, supra note 117, at 19.

142. See Gunnell E. Sandanger & Arild Hermstad, Slik blir oljefondet best i klassen [That's How
the Oil Fund Becomes Best-in-Class], ENERGI
OG
KLIMA
(Nov.
14,
2013),
http://energiogklima.no/kommentar-analyse/slik-blir-oljefondet-best-i-klassen.
143. It was projected that only NOK 20 billion (less than 1%of the value of GPFG's portfolio)
would be invested between 2010 and 2015. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 27; see also
BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABILITY:
INSIGHTS FROM NORWAY AND NEW ZEALAND, NORDIC J. OF COM. L., no. 2,2011, at 1, 24-25.
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and over time will show much bigger returns as the market receives the signals that
the green economy is our only choice for the future. If Norway is serious about
promoting sustainable development, then it has to bear that short-term cost.
However, as a universal investor, this short-term cost is not as great as the longterm cost of reneging on responsible investment since that is more likely to have a
material effect on portfolio risk and performance.'4
Finally, a much debated theme is divesting from fossil fuel investments
entirely (or at least coal and oil sands). The GPFG, the entity that was supposed to
leverage against shifts in oil prices to safeguard the stability of the mainland
economy, is now giving up that function, since according to the HSBC report, oil
stocks will go down in value due to action taken to address climate change.1 4 5
Furthermore, if the long-term perspective on sustainable development is taken, it is
clear that the goal of staying below the two degree Celsius increase in temperature
will not be reached if most of the fossil fuels are not left in the ground. This, of
course, reflects the oxymoronic situation that the income of the GPFG is based on
the exploitation of oil and gas. Just as other SWFs accumulate income from other
natural resources, Norway should aim to gradually shift from oil and gas to
renewable energy. A first step would be amend the Ethics Guidelines to add
exploitation of coal and oil sands to the list of products excluded from the GPFG
portfolio as has been suggested from several quarters.146
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Albright Group and Simon Chesterman, who were hired by the
Norwegian Ministry of Finance to evaluate the Ethics Guidelines of the GPFG in
2008, stated that "[t]he work done by NBIM and the Council [on Ethics] has
established Norway as a leader on ethical issues in the global economy, in
particular through NBIM's work on child labour and the Council's practice of
publishing thorough opinions." 47 Our analysis corroborates the opinion of the
Albright Group; we show that the Council on Ethics is highly effective in certain
cases at motivating changes in corporate behavior in ways that put the companies
in the GPFG's investment portfolio on a path to sustainability. Though we agree
with the Strategy Council's report of 2013 that coherence and transparency in the
context of the GPFG are important, we strongly disagree with its recommendation
of integrating the Council on Ethics' function into NBIM.

144. See definition of universal investor supra note 36.
145. Will Nichols, HSBC: BP, Shell, Statoil at Risk From 'Unburnable' Reserves, GREENBIZ.COM
(Jan. 29, 2003),
http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2013/01/30/bp-shell-statoli-risk-unbumable-reserves.
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&
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146. CATHRINE
TJERESANDINVESTERINGER ULOVLIGE? [ARE THE OIL FUND'S TAR SAND INVESTMENTS ILLEGAL?] 12-

13 (2013), available at http://klimastiftelsen.no/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Oljefondet-tjaeresandrapport-NK2-2013.pdf.
147. CHESTERMAN, supra note 132, at 3.
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Strengthening responsible investment by giving more autonomy to the
Council on Ethics, and beefing up the transparency of NBIM and expanding its
focus areas to correspond more closely with the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, will place the Norwegian SWF in a position to be an
even better model of a responsible investor. This, in turn, should encourage
corporations to take ESG issues into account in their activities.

KEYNOTE: THE RIGHTS OF THE UNDERCLASS IN 2015
PETER WEISS*

It gives me great pleasure to be here in the company of two old and dear
friends: Ved Nanda, distinguished laborer in the vineyards of international law and
my fellow traveler on the road to a nuclear weapons free world, and George
Shepherd, who worked with me in the early days of the American Committee on
Africa when he returned to teach at the university here after helping to set up rural
cooperatives in Uganda. They invited me to give a talk to a non-legal audience at
the School of International Studies in 1990. 1 called it "The Rights of the
Underclass", which accounts for the peculiar title of my paper today. After
twenty-three years, it is still relevant.
I don't suppose there is any doubt that good development needs good law,
but, just to reinforce the point, let me quote from what Helen Clark, the current
administrator of the United Nations Development Program ("UNDP"), said in a
speech she gave a year ago in Kampala at the Assembly of States Parties to the
International Criminal Court: "The rule of law underpins the UN's mission to
advance peace, development and human rights and, as such, is central to the
mandate of UNDP."'
Now if you will permit me, I will begin with a personal note concerning some
connections between my background and the theme of this conference. My first
full time job was as a translator/investigator on the staff of the Decartelization
Branch of the United States Office of Military Government in Berlin in 1946-47.
The head of this agency was James Stewart Martin, a brilliant young man - he was
thirty-two at the time - whom I had met when he was a professor and I was a
student at St. John's College in Annapolis. Nobody talks about cartels any more,
but our job at the time was to break up the German cartels that had financed
Hitler's rise to power. After Jim resigned from his assignment when it had become
increasingly difficult to carry out, he wrote a book titled All Honorable Men,
which dealt with the collaboration between Wall Street and German industry and

* Peter Weiss, J.D. Yale 1952, has divided his practice between intellectual property law and pro bono
human rights, constitutional, and international law. He is currently Co-President of the International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and Vice President of the Center for Constitutional
Rights. The author acknowledges with immense gratitude the excellent research done by the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy in supplying footnotes.
1. Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator, Speech at the llth Session of the Assembly of States
Parties to the International Criminal Court: Human Development and International Justice (Nov. 19,
at
available
2012),
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/1l /19/helen-clark-humandevelopment-and-intemational-justice-/ (referencing her speech at Kampala).
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banks during the pre-war period of the Third Reich. 2 As an example of the
phoenix like quality of certain literary works, I can tell you that I recently heard
from a professor at a leading university who specializes in the republication of
important out-of-print books and who is interested in republishing All Honorable
Men.
Fast forward, but not too fast. Five years after Berlin, upon graduating from
Yale Law School, I received an offer too good to refuse. The President and Dean
of St. John's, Stringfellow Barr and Scott Buchanan, had retired from the college
after an exhausting and ultimately successful battle with the Naval Academy
across the street, which had come up with the quaint notion that most of the space
occupied by the college could be better used by the Academy. They created the
Foundation for World Government with a one million dollar grant, which was a lot
of money in those days, from Anita McCormick Blaine, the International Harvester
heiress. It soon became clear to them that, given the huge economic disparity
between what were then called developed and underdeveloped countries, talk of
world government was baying at the moon. They therefore focused their efforts on
ideas and institutions aimed at bridging the gap between rich and poor countries.
Barr had written a pamphlet called "Let's Join the Human Race," from which I can
remember only one statistic, namely that the annual budget of the United Nations
for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries was twenty million dollars,
the same as that of New York City's s sanitation department.3
One of the creations of the Foundation for World Government was IDPA, for
International Development Placement Association, the mission of which was to
send young Americans with technical and professional skills to underdeveloped
countries to work for local wages. I was asked to run IDPA and I did so for two
years, during which we placed a fair number of doctors, engineers, city planners,
community development workers and others as employees of local institutions in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Eventually we had to fold our tents because the
two ultraconservative ladies running the Charitable Organizations Section of the
Internal Revenue Service decided that, while IDPA was in a real sense, a precursor
of the Peace Corps, it was just an employment agency and therefore not entitled to
operate on tax exempt foundation funds.
Having established my competence to deal with the subject of today's
conference on the basis of two short jobs I had about sixty years ago, let's get
serious . . . I have a few short suggestions for Development 2015 at the end of this

paper, but in essence I will leave that task to the experts you heard this morning
and will hear this afternoon. For now, I will simply state the obvious: the
challenge in and after 2015 will be to bring up the rear in accomplishing the eight
millennium development goals ("MGDs") on which some progress, but not nearly
enough, has been made.
That said, let me turn to what I would like to see as MDG number nine:
reining in the power of multinational corporations to do harm to the underclass,
2. JAMES STEWART MARTIN, ALL HONORABLE MEN (1950).
3. STRINGFELLOW BARR, LET'S JOIN THE HUMAN RACE (1950).
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which makes up most of the world's population, or, for that matter, the middle
class, where there is one. Let me be clear about this: I do not hate corporations. I
worked for quite a few of them, including some pretty big ones, during the part of
my legal career devoted to intellectual property. In the course of doing so I met
some very nice people. I even felt sorry for some of them, who might have liked
doing some pro bono human rights work, but felt strapped into a modus operandi
which put profit for shareholders above every ethical consideration.
2012 saw the publication of a remarkable legal tome consisting of forty-seven
essays by legal scholars recruited by Antonio Cassese, the eminent Italian
international law professor who died shortly before the publication of this, his last
work.4 He contributed the introduction and the conclusion, as well as a number of
interior pieces assigned to other authors who failed to meet their deadlines, an
occurrence not unusual in circles of academic literature.
What makes the book remarkable is that despite its title, Realizing Utopia,
and its obvious dedication to ideas about how in the next ten to twenty years the
law might be used to bring about a more just and efficient world, one comes away
from its pages without much optimism about achieving that objective. Indeed,
Cassese himself quotes Aldous Huxley, anno 1925, as saying that utopians "are
much too preoccupied with what ought to be to pay any serious attention to what
is.,, 5
Cassese argues that states are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the
main players in the game of international law. It is not easy to disagree with that
proposition when one considers, for instance, how the nuclear weapons states are
flouting the unanimous mandate of the International Court of Justice to negotiate
in good faith for a nuclear weapons free world, or how states fail to take any
serious steps to deal collaboratively with climate change, or how the millennium
goal of eliminating poverty is treated by states as a matter of entitlement rather
than rights.
But then there is another recent book, this one by Ruti Teitel of New York
Law School, felicitously titled Humanity's Law, which largely succeeds in
demonstrating that over the last half century international law has moved from a
state-centric to a person-centric system. 6 Cassese might even agree with that, since
he admits that one of the bright spots in the current development of international
law is transnational litigation. i.e. individuals bringing suits in one country based
on events which occurred in another. This is happening not only in human rights
but also in financial matters. Recently, for instance, JP Morgan settled with the
U.S. government for thirteen billion dollars just before it was about to be sued in
connection with transactions which occurred in London. 7

4. REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Antonio Cassese ed 2012).

5. Id. at xvii (quoting Aldous Huxley).
6. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW 35-36, 55-56 (2011).
7. Aruna Viswanatha et. al, JPMorgan Says 'Mea Cupla' in $13 Billion Settlement With U.S.,
19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/1 1/19/us-jpmorgan-settlementREUTERs (Nov.
idUSBRE9AI00A20 131119.
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What does all this have to do with development after 2015? Only this: That
multinational corporations, which are in many respects more powerful actors on
the world scene than even states, are basically unregulated in their activities in the
developing world. They are poachers on the terrain of the underclass. Some of
their offenses are direct, such as pollution of land and water by Texaco in Ecuador 8
or pharmaceutical testing violating accepted standards by Pfizer in Nigeria.9
Frequently the alleged tort or crime consists of aiding and abetting or actively
participating with repressive governments in murdering union officials (Mercedes
Benz in Argentina)' 0 or making slave labor available by repressive governments to
corporations (Unocal in Burma)."
A great deal of anti-corporate transnational litigation has taken place in recent
years, with indifferent results. I would like to tell you about one case which
illustrates what the victims of corporate behavior in the developing world are up
against in their search for justice.
A decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New
York in 1980 brought back to life a long neglected law dating back to the first
Judiciary Act of the United States adopted by the Congress in 1789.12 Known as
the Alien Tort Claims Act, or Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), it gave an alien the right
to sue in a U.S. court for a tort in violation of the law of nations, as international
law was called at that time. It did not say whether the tort had to be committed in
the United States, nor whether the defendant had to be a US citizen or could be
another alien. The 1980 case, Filartigav. Peiha-Irala,13 in which I happened to be
lead counsel, was brought by the sister of a Paraguayan teenager against a
Paraguayan police official then living in the United States, who had tortured her
brother to death in Paraguay. 14 It was a shot across the bow aimed at their father,
who was a leading opponent of General Stroessner, the long running dictator of
Paraguay.' 5 The Second Circuit, taking the broad language of ATS literally, held

8. See Juan Forero, Rain Forest Residents, Texaco Face Off in Ecuador, NPR (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=103233560.
9. Pfizer: Nigeria Drug Trial Victims Get Compensation, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Aug. I1, 2011)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14493277.
10. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Rules for Daimler in Argentina Human Rights Case,
REUTERS
(Jan.
14,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-usa-court-rightsidUSBREAODOYF20140114.
I1. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2002).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.").
13. Filartiga v. Pefia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
14. Id. at 878.
15. E.g., Mark Philip Bradley, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS AND REVOLUTIONS, at vii, vii
(Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom et al, eds., 2007); Filartiga v. Peila-Irala, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS.,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-cases/filC3%Artiga-v.-peC3%81B-irala (last visited June 7,
2014) [hereinafter Filartiga Summary].
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for the plaintiffs-the father, living in Paraguay, was also a plaintiff-awarding
them 10.5 million dollars, which has never been collected. 16
The Filartigaprecedent opened the door to a steady stream of transnational
litigation, against both individuals and corporations. " It was followed for thirty
years in several other circuits. But then, in 2010, came a totally unexpected
decision from the Second Circuit, dismissing a corporate ATS case on the highly
questionable ground that there is no such thing as corporate liability under
international law. The case was Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. It arose from
the company's activities in prospecting for and extracting oil in the Ogoni region
of Nigeria, which had triggered a strong protest movement from the local people.' 9
The complaint alleged that the company had requested and received the assistance
of the Nigerian army and police in quashing the protest movement, which they had
accomplished through rape, beating, killings and other gross human rights
violations, all of which were aided and abetted by the company. 20
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the first hearing went reasonably well, with
U.S.
government chiming in in support of the plaintiffs, arguing that if the ATS
the
good
enough for individuals it should be equally good for corporations. 2' But
was
then, a few days after the hearing, came the second thunderbolt from Olympus, an
order from Chief Justice Roberts for rehearing and rebriefing on a questions which
neither side had raised in the litigation below, i.e. "Whether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of

action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States."22 As a result, the court was inundated by a
new slew of briefs and amicus briefs from governments, chambers of commerce
and other business organizations arguing for dismissal, as well as human rights

16. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); FildrtigaSummary, supra note
15.
17. For example, Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) where, while rejecting the claim
at hand, the Supreme Court affirmed an individual's right to bring a claim under the ATS; Wiwa v.
Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria Ltd., 355 Fed. Appx. 81 (2d Cir. 2009). This case ended with
Shell agreeing to pay the Wiwa family $15.5 million. Wiwa et at v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et at,
CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum
(last visisted July 30, 2014).
18. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d Ill (2d Cir. 2010), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (affirmed on different grounds).
Together, those authorities demonstrate that imposing liability on corporations for violations
of customary international law has not attained a discernible, much less universal,
acceptance among nations of the world in their relations inter se. Because corporate liability
is not recognized as a "specific, universal, and obligatory" norm, it is not a rule of customary
international law that we may apply under the ATS.

Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 123.

20. Id.
21. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491).
22. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (memorandum restoring case to
calendar for reargument).
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organizations and some legal organizations, taking the opposite view. In the event,
business won and, disappointingly, by a unanimous decision. 23
The five conservative justices declined to answer the question of corporate
liability, which had brought the case to them in the first place. 24 Instead, they
opted for a presumption against extraterritoriality, 25 which sounds to quite a few
lawyers like something the cat dragged in. Indeed, it was not endorsed by the four
liberal justices, who, in a concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, based their
agreement with the result on the lack of a United States national interest in the fact
situation of the case.2 6
What could that national interest have been?
First, the often proclaimed interest of the U.S. government in promoting
human rights throughout the world, as evidenced, inter alia, by the State
Department's annual country by country report on the state of human rights. 27
Second, the fact that Shell, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch, carried out extensive
operations in the United States and that it was not in the national interest of the
U.S. to allow a company belonging to a corporate family that engaged in gross
human rights violations to operate in the United States, Justice Breyer's opinion
took it for granted that the United States should not be a haven for foreign
torturers, but failed to extend that principle to corporations. 28
Third, that U.S. companies, which presumably could be enjoined from
committing gross human rights violations in foreign countries, should not be
deprived of a handy mechanism for leveling the playing field with their foreign
competitors.
And fourth, that the Kiobel case was wending its way through US courts at a
time when the new principle of universal jurisdiction, which holds that certain
practices are so heinous that they should be subject to criminal and civil

23. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum (last visited July 30, 2014) (listing amicus briefs filed after
Mar. 5. 2012 order for rehearing and the unanimous decision on April 17, 2013).
24. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) ("The question here is not
whether petitioners have stated a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct
occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.").

25. Id. at 1669 ("We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to
claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.").
26. Id. at 1670-71.
Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather,
guided in part by principles and practices of foreign relations law, I would find jurisdiction
under this statute where (I) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an
American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
Id. at 1671 (citation omitted).
27. See Human Rights Reports, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt (last
visited July 30, 2014).
28. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
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prosecution anywhere in the world, was gaining acceptance in a number of foreign
countries.29 Thus the Kiobel decision, undoing thirty years of transnational
litigation under ATS, stands as another example of negative American
exceptionalism.
It is, indeed, a giant step backward in American jurisprudence. But all is not
lost. Lower courts, many of which regard international law with suspicion if not
outright animosity, have lost no time in throwing out pending ATS cases, giving
the Kiobel decision an absolutist interpretation which can be summarized as "if it
happened abroad, fagettaboutit". 30 That interpretation, however, is not justified by
a close reading of the decision. Not only the four liberals, but also the Chief
Justice and Justice Kennedy, who knows more international law than any of his
Supreme colleagues, made clear that, presumption against extraterritoriality or not,
the door was not completely closed to ATS cases. 3 ' Even more significantly, two
of the most conservative justices, Alito and Thomas, but interestingly not Scalia,
took their three conservative brethren to task for not having gone far enough in
making the presumption an absolute rule. 32 Appeals being taken from some of the
dismissed ATS cases may provide guidance on how to structure a case that may
make it through the ATS' slightly ajar door. 33

29. See, for example, Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14) for a demonstration of Beligum's universal jurisdiction statute; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 311, (2001) for a discussion
of universal jurisdiction cases from Spain and the United Kingdom. "The court found that the lack of
express authorization for universal jurisdiction in the 1948 Genocide Convention did not mean such
jurisdiction was barred, as it was consistent with the intent of the drafters." Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
30. See, e.g., Roger Alford, Lower Courts Narrowly Interpet Kiobel, OPINIO JURIS,
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/23/lower-courts-narrowly-interpret-kiobel (last visited July 30, 2014).
31. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Chief Justice Robert's majority opinion stating that "[o]n these
facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims touch
and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application") (Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stating "[t]he
opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute").
32. Id. at 1169-70.
33. Two courts have already ruled that ATS claims should proceed on fact situations
distinguishable from those in Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The first concerns a case pending at the U.S.
District Court of Massachusetts, Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304 (Mass. Dist.
Ct. 2013), in which plaintiffs allege that defendant, an American pastor, aided and abetted persons in
Uganda in persecuting members of the LGBTI community in that country. Id. at 310. Defendant's
motion for dismissal based on the Kiobel holding on extraterritoriality was denied on August 14, 2013,
on the ground that he was an American citizen and that his aiding and abetting was carried out both in
Uganda and in the United States from his office in Massachusetts. Id. at 335. The second case, Al
Shimari v. CACI Intern., Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012), in which the Fourth Circuit, on May 12,
2012, also rejected a Kiobel defense. Plaintiffs, former detainees at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, alleged torture
and other abuse by defendant corporation and one of its employees. Id. at 209. The court distinguished
the fact situation from that in Kiobel on multiple grounds, including that defendant, a military
contractor, was incorporated in Delaware and domiciled in Virginia, that the torturers were also U.S.
citizens, and that the contract between CACI and the U.S. Department of Interior was executed in Iowa
and administered in Colorado. Id. at 227.
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A word now about universal jurisdiction. You can think of it as the legal
regime to which Antonio Cassese and his contributors aspire, but which they
despair of seeing realized in their lifetimes. A regime, if you will, in which legal
positivism, in which the law is no more than what lawmakers in each country
prescribe, is replaced by a global system based on certain intransgressible
fundamental principles. And what is more and relatively new, a regime in which
gross violations of fundamental universal norms do, or at least should, give rise to
jurisdiction over such violations even if committed in another country. Universal
jurisdiction is usually thought of in terms of human rights violations, but it need
not be so restricted. Lex mercatoria,the merchant law, was used to facilitate trade
throughout medieval Europe according to a set of agreed upon principles. 34 It
survives today, albeit inadequately, under different names through a network of
international commercial and financial agreements.3 5
It is not difficult to imagine how a regime efficiently based on an updated lex
mercatoria and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 6 and its many
offspring, would make for a more orderly and more just global society, one that
would promote development and prevent conflict rather than perpetually busy
itself with conflict resolution.
I think I am supposed to make some concrete suggestions about bridging the
gap between rich and poor countries after 2015. Here are a few:
1. Stop calling economic and social rights aspirational and start treating
them as real. The failure to be free from hunger is just as harmful as the
failure to be free from torture, if not more so.
2. Stop calling rights entitlements. A decent standard of living is a right that
nobody can take away from you. An entitlement can be taken away by
any number of political organs. Like, for instance, the Tea Party.
3. The Tobin tax, 0.01 percent on financial transactions, could, according to
some calculations, wipe out the deficit. Does anybody seriously believe it
would stop the financial markets from functioning?
4. Since corporations of a certain size are such powerful actors on the world
scene, should they be internationally incorporated and internationally
regulated?

34. Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challengefor
International Commercial Aribitration?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 657, 658 (1999).
35. See, e.g., INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACT, Art. 1.6 (2010). "These Principles set forth general rules for
international commercial contracts. . . . They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like." Id. pmbl. SISU, THE
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 2002, PART

I, II,

AND Ill, art. 1:101 ("These Principles are

intended to be applied as general rules of contract law in the European Communities. . . . These
Principles may be applied when the parties . . . have agreed that their contract is to be governed by
'general principles of law,' the 'lex mercatoria' or the like.")
36. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1ll) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(ill)
(Dec. 10, 1948).

2014

THE RIGHTS OF THE UNDERCLASS IN 2015

425

I am not a great fan of the prison system as currently administered, but
until somebody invents a more humane and restorative form of
punishment, isn't it time that financial crooks other than inside traders and
Ponzi schemers go to jail? After all, even thirteen billion is only money,
particularly if it comes out of corporate funds rather than personal ones.
6. Now that those two ladies are no longer running the charity section of the
Internal Revenue Service, let's bring back IDPA and send idealistic and
competent technicians and professionals to work as employees of local
agencies at local wages in developing countries.
7. Last, but no way least, let us devise a more efficient system for insuring
corporate accountability. Corporations should be free to devote their full
energy to providing the world's people with goods and services, without
becoming bogged down in corruption and human rights violations.
I am jumping around quite a bit here, so let me end with this: I have a friend
who likes to needle me by saying "law is the dead hand of the past laid upon the
present." To which I usually reply "law is the burning vision of the future leading
us onward." Of course we are both wrong. But I still prefer my version.
5.

CAN THE CHINESE BIOGAS EXPERIENCE SHED LIGHT ON THE
FUTURE OF SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT?
JASON B. AAMODT* AND DR. CHEN WENQIN**

"What we have to be is what we are."
- Thomas Merton

I.

INTRODUCTION

In China, a low-tech biogas revolution is providing modem energy services to
nearly forty million rural households-120,000,000 people-that otherwise would
be mired in energy poverty.' Indeed, by the end of 2010, biogas supplied 22.5% of
China's rural population with some part of their energy needs. 2
While China is today well-known for high-tech industrial exports, perhaps
one of the Nation's most significant-and underappreciated-achievements is the
wide-scale development of low-tech household biogas to solve rural energy needs.
Many other developing countries promote the use of biogas to help resolve energy
poverty. However, China's success with biogas in energy poor rural areas is
unique.
This raises two key questions: Why is China's biogas program successful?
Can the factors for China's biogas success also be exported? The need for answers
to these questions is increasingly important. There are approximately 2.6 billion
people-mostly women and children-who cook with three-stone fires and other
devices that cause them to inhale soot and dangerous fumes. More than two
million of those same women and children die each year from exposure to soot and
fumes. China's biogas projects resolve exactly that problem for nearly one-quarter
of all rural Chinese families. The mix of ingredients that makes China's biogas
program successful might hold a key to energy justice for the "Other Third."

* Assistant Dean for Online Legal Education, the University of Tulsa, College of Law.

** Deputy Director of Law Department, China University of Geosciences (Beijing). Dr. Wenqin was
the Visiting Scholar at the University of Tulsa College of Law in the Fall of 2013 and the Spring of
2014. Dr. Wenqin's colleague, Prof. Lei Lei, China University of Geosciences, also a Visiting Scholar
with the Tulsa College of Law in 2013 and 2014, provided some research materials for this paper. Dr.
Wenqin provided most of the research and drafting of Part IV of this article.
1. Wei Qu, Qin Tu & Bettina Bluemling, Which Factors are Effective for Farmer'sBiogas Use?
- Evidence from a Large Scale Survey in China, 63 ENERGY POL'Y 26, 30 (2013) [hereinafter "Biogas
Survey"] (indicating at Table 3 that rural homes in China average three residents).
2. Jorrit Gosens, et al., Sustainability Effects of Household-scale Biogas in Rural China, 54
ENERGY POL'Y 273, 274 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Poverty, 36 ENv. & RES. 139 (2011); Lakshman
Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable Development, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 231
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A great deal has been written recently about China's energy policy 4 and its

biogas program. 5 These various books and articles, for instance, explore the
history of biogas, its regional distribution, and the social acceptance of biogas. At
the same time, there have been significant attempts to distill the laws and policies
that might be useful in addressing energy poverty. However, none of the prior
literature attempts, as this article does, to identify the policies that led to China's
success, nor do prior articles seek to identify the policies most amenable to
successful repetition elsewhere.
This article seeks, therefore, to contribute to the energy poverty discussion by
separating out the important factors that led to China's biogas success, while also
attempting to outline Chinese policies that might be of most use in other parts of
the world. The first and introductory part of this article identifies what biogas is,
how it is created, what it can be used to do, and also discusses some of its
environmental and social benefits and drawbacks. Part II sketches out the energy
dynamic in China and compares the figures in China to the worldwide situation
using the most recently available data. Part III sketches the question of energy
poverty, providing a simple fact-based analysis of the energy poverty felt keenly by
approximately one-third of humanity. Part IV analyzes Chinese law and policy

(2010). The term the "Other Third" is a reference to the fact that about one-third of the world's
population lacks access to energy resources. See id. For a fuller description of the issue of energy
justice generally, see Part Ill, infra.
4. See, e.g., Fangy Li, Zhouying Song & Weidong Liu, China's Energy Consumption Under the
Global Economic Crisis:Decomposition and Sectoral Analysis, 64 ENERGY POL'Y 193 (2014); Bao-Jie
He, Li Yang, & Miao Ye, Building energy efficiency in China rural areas: Situation, drawbacks,
challenges, corresponding measures and policies, II SUSTAINABLE CITIES & Soc'Y 7 (2014); CHINA'S
SEARCH FOR ENERGY SECURITY: DOMESTIC SOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (Suisheng
Zhao ed., 2013); PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENERGY IN CHINA: TRANSITION TO A
LOW-CARBON ECONOMY (2012); CHINA'S ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CARBON EMISSIONS OUTLOOK
(Bruno Skaali & Tomas Knezevic eds., 2012); ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN CHINA: OUTLOOK AND
DEMAND SCENARIOS (Brian A. Childers & Margret C. Downing eds., 2012); PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED,
ENERGY POLICY AND REGULATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2003).

5. See, e.g., Wei Qu, Qin Tu & Bettina Bluemling, Which Factors are Effective for Farmer's
Biogas Use? - Evidencefrom a Large Scale Survey in China, 63 ENERGY POL'Y 26, 30 (2013); Gosens,
et al., supra note 2; Bettina Bluemling, Arthur P.J. Mol & Qin Tu, The Social Organization of
Agricultural Biogas Production and Use, 63 ENERGY POL'Y 10 (2013); Ling Chen, Lixin Zhao,

Changshan Ren & Fei Wang, The Progress and Prospects of Rural Biogas Production in China, 51
ENERGY POL'Y 58 (2012); David Fridley, Nina Zheng & Nathaniel Aden, What Can China Do?

China's Best Alternative Outcome for Energy Efficiency and CO2 Emissions, in CHINA'S ENERGY
EFFICIENCY & CARBON EMISSIONS OUTLOOK 80 (Bruno Skaali & Tomas Knezevic eds., 2012); Wang

Yichao. Analysis on the Development History of and Research on China's Biogas. 3 AGRIC.
ARCHAEOLOGY 266(2012); Wang Fei, Cai Yaqing, Qiuhuanguang, Current Status, Incentives and

Constraintsfor Future Development ofBiogas Industry in China, 28 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CSAE 184
(2012); Li Jingming, Xue Mei, Review and Prospecton Biogas Development in China. 28 RENEWABLE
ENERGY RESOURCES I (2010); Yu Chen, et al., Household Biogas Use in Rural China: A Study of
Opportunities and Constraints, 14 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 545 (2010); Huang

Liming, FinancingRural Renewable Energy: A Comparison Between China and India, 13 RENEWABLE
& SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1096 (2009);

Lin Gan & Juan Yu, Bioenergy Transition in Rural

China:Policy Options and Co-benefits, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 531 (2008).

2014

CHINESE BIOGAS AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

429

regarding biogas focusing on governmental action, subsidies, extension networks,
marketing and advertising, market forces, educational factors, climatic factors, and
foreign investment. Finally, Part V attempts to extract potentially useful policy
prescriptions from the Chinese biogas experience. A brief conclusion brings this
article to a close. In summary, and as set forth herein, our research indicates that
China's biogas program is a model for action that might be useful as other nations
seek to overcome energy poverty.
II.

THE POTENTIAL OF BIOGAS

A biogas digester takes wastes from the fields and rural communities, like
straw, rice or corn husks, vegetable waste, animal waste, and human waste, and it
decomposes it in a controlled way that creates a substance very like natural gas,
but it is called biogas. 6 One or two cows, six to eight pigs, or four adult humans
can supply adequate daily feedstock for a single-household biodigester.' The
device is called a "digester" because it is designed to create a favorable
environment for "anaerobic" bacteria, which will "eat" the waste, giving off
methane as byproduct of their digestive process. 8 Anaerobic means "in the
absence of oxygen." In fact, the bacteria, which do the digesting, are very similar
to many of the bacteria existing inside the guts of mammals. 9 The biogas digester
is designed to facilitate the growth of these anaerobic bacteria, because without
them no biogas is created.
A biogas digester is a relatively simple device. It has no moving parts, and it
requires no input of energy-short of the waste feedstock-to operate.1o As a
result, biogas digesters are relatively inexpensive, and their construction is wellknown." The following is a diagram showing a typical rural biogas digester:

6. Christopher Higman & Maarten van der Burgt, GASIFICATION 83-84 (2d ed. 2008); Elizabeth
Price & Paul Cheremisonoff, BIOGAS PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 55-86 (1981) [hereinafter Biogas

Production].
7. Valerie Brown, BIOGAS: A Bright Idea for Africa, 114 ENVIRON HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 300,
301 (2006) [hereinafter Bright Idea].
8. See Biogas Production, supra note 6, at 87-117.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Because a biogas digester is designed to grow living organisms, its operation
and maintenance can be dynamic and complicated. Temperature is important.' 3
Likewise, the mix of waste, bacteria, and water will substantially affect the
efficiency and results obtained by the digester. 14
Just like natural gas, biogas can be used to cook, heat homes, light rooms,
power cars and other machines, and generate electricity. 1s Leftovers from biogas
can be a high quality fertilizer which may be valuable in a rural setting. 16 Because
biogas is produced from agricultural wastes that otherwise are discarded,
harnessing biogas can not only reduce water and air pollution, but the energy
source is also inherently "renewable." Moreover, biogas digesters treat pathogens,
reducing suffering from infectious diseases. 7
Biogas can have significant environmental benefits. In Nepal, biogas plants
serving 1.25 million people reduced black carbon and eliminated 630,000 tons of

12. Li Kangmin & Mae-Wan Ho, Biogas China, INST. SCI. INSOCIETY (Feb. 10, 2006), www.isis.org.uk/BiogasChina.php; see also Regina Gregory, China-Biogas, ECOTIPPING POINTS PROJECT
(Nov. 2010), http://www.ecotippingpoints.org/our-stories/indepth/china-biogas.html.
13. Id. at 87-88.
14. Id.
15. See Biogas, ASHDEN, http://www.ashden.org/biogas (last visited Aug. 5, 2014). Solar
technologies also have a significant contribution to make as ASETs for lighting. See, e.g., Firdaus
Kharas, 2012's Best Solar Lights In the Developing World, SOLAR CAMPAIGN (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.solarcampaign.org/2012s-best-solar-lights-in-the-developing-world/.
16. See, for example, BENJAMIN SOVACOOL & IRA MARTINA DRUPADY, ENERGY ACCESS,
POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE GOVERNANCE OF SMALL-SCALE RENEWABLE ENERGY IN
DEVELOPING ASIA 71 (2012), noting in relation to biogas development in Bangladesh that "[o]ne

interesting offshoot from the biogas program has been the production of high quality organic fertilizer,
made as a byproduct from . .. biogas plant[s]."
17. See Bright Idea, supranote 7 at 302 ("Properly designed and used, a biogas digester mitigates
a wide spectrum of environmental undesirables: it improves sanitation; it reduces greenhouse gas
emissions; it reduces demand for wood and charcoal for cooking, and therefore helps preserve forested
areas and natural vegetation; and it provides a high-quality organic fertilizer.").
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carbon dioxide emissions." Moreover, 420,000 tons of fuel wood was not cut
down, improving water quality in watersheds dependent upon a living forest.' 9
And, using biogas can eliminate methane would otherwise be created. Because
methane is a greenhouse gas twenty times more powerful that carbon dioxide,
burning the methane in biogas to make heat, light, or to cook actually reduces the
climate change potential of development. 2 0
On the other hand, biogas has its drawbacks. It concentrates nutrients, which
when not disposed of properly cause land-based water pollution. 2' Concentrated
22
pollutants can have more profound impacts on natural water systems. The biogas
itself is explosive. And, since biogas can displace air, digesters need to be placed
23
in well-ventilated areas to prevent asphyxiation. When not properly managed, or
when distribution systems are substandard, it can cause fires, damaging property,
injuring, or killing. 24 It is, therefore, imperative that biogas development be
accompanied with a management plan that adequately addresses these concerns so
that the drawbacks do not overpower the benefits. As we will see, China's biogas
system is successful in part because its government is attempting to
comprehensively address these management issues.
III. SOURCES OF ENERGY
China is a vibrant country, especially when viewed through the lens of
development and energy. China is the world's most populous country; it is
geographically enormous, and it is diverse in every sense. In broad terms, China is
the largest consumer of energy in the world.2 5 China's energy use has grown at a

18. See
Biogas
Sector
Partnership,
Nepal:
Domestic
Biogas,
ASHDEN,
http://www.ashden.org/winners/bsp (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
19. See id. ("One user's feedback was very simple 'I would never' she said, 'have contemplated
marrying a man whose home didn't have a biogas plant."')
20. Biogas is already a significant energy source in the United States. See Landfill Methane
Outreach Project, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/lmop (last updated July 7, 2014).
21. J.B. Holm-Nielsen, T. Al Seadi & P. Oleskowicz-Popiel, The future of anaerobic digestion
and biogas utilization, 100 BIORESOURCE TECH. 5478, 5478 (2009).
22. See, for example, Jessica Leet, et al., Assessing Impacts of Land-Applied Manure from
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations on Fish Populations and Communities, 46 ENvTL. Sa. &
TECH. 13440 (2012) for a discussion on the impacts, for instance of concentrated animal feeding
operation waste on minnows. While the article does not address biogassification, wastes from
concentrated animal feeding operations are often used as feed stocks for biogas units. Therefore, the
impact of these wastes on the environment, particularly after concentration by bio gasification, is a
relevant drawback.
23. Beginners Guide to Biogas, U. ADELAIDE, http://www.adelaide.edu.au/biogas/safety/ (last
updated May 8, 2014).
24. See, e.g., GERMAN AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY AGENCY, SAFETY

RULES FOR BIOGAS SYSTEMS (2008), available at http://www.biogaspro.com/assets/3rdparty/safetyrules-for-biogas-systems-2008.pdf
25. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY [lEA], 2013 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 46 ( 2013)

at
available
STATS],
IEA
KEY
[hereinafter
IEA's report uses
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2013.pdf.
2011 data. China is reported in 2011 to have a Total Primary Energy Supply ("TPES") of 2,728 Million
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stunning rate. For example, the International Energy Agency reports that in 1973
China accounted for 7% of the entire world's Total Primary Energy Supply
("TPES").26 The IEA's most recent data shows that in 2011 China accounted for
20.9% of the world's TPES.27 In that same time the world's TPES doubled, from
about 6,000 Million Tons Oil Equivalent ("Mtoe") to 12,000 Mtoe. 28 Since the
overall world energy supply itself doubled in the same time frame that China's
fraction increased by three-times, 29 China's actual energy supply increased six-fold
- all in just less than forty years.
China's growth is expected to continue. 30 Today, China's energy use per
person is much lower, for instance, than the United States'.31 Specifically, in 2011,
China's use of energy, expressed commonly in the literature as "Tons of Oil
Equivalent" ("Toe") per person - the amount of energy used per person - was
2.03.32 In just the four years since China exceeded the United States as the largest
emitter of Carbon Dioxide, 33 China's Toe per person increased by more than 0.5
Toe per person, from 1.48 Toe per person. 34 When GDP increases, it has been
observed that the Toe per person rate increases as well.3 s Comparatively, in 2011,
the United States' Toe per person was 7.02. Accordingly, as GDP increases in
China, rates of energy consumption would appear primed for growth, as well.
In China, the dominant source of energy is coal/peat-at 68% of the supply. 38
However, biofuels and waste are the third largest supply of energy (7.9%), behind
oil (16.2%)." Indeed, biofuels and waste supply more energy in China than
natural gas, nuclear, hydro, geothermal, solar, and wind-combined.40 The
following chart from the International Energy Agency ("IEA") illustrates China's
energy supply in 2011:

Tons Oil Equivalent (Mtoe). Id. The United States, which previously led the world in energy
consumption, is second, with a TPES in 2011 of 2,191 Mtoe. Id. For the most up to date statistics see
Statistics Search, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2014) where the lEA's available data for any country can be accessed easily.
26. See lEA KEY STATS, supra note 25, at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. DAVID G. FRIDLEY, NINA ZHENG & NATHANIEL T. ADEN, WHAT CAN CHINA Do? CHINA'S
BEST ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CO2 EMISSIONS 80 (2012).

31. lEA KEY STATS, supra note 25, at 57 (the United States' Toe/ per person was 7.02 in 2011more than 3-times China's per person use of electricity).
32. Id. at 49.
33. China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit. 1.6227564.html? r-0.
34. FRIDLEY, supra note 30, at 80.

35. Id.
36. lEA KEY STATS, supra note 25, at 57.
37. FRIDLEY, supranote 30, at 80.

38. See Share of total primary energy supply in 2011: People's Republic of China, lEA ENERGY
STAT., http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/CHINA4.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).

39. Id.
40. Id.
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China's energy mix is different from the worldwide experience. The IEA
reports that in 2012, oil was the world's largest source of energy (36.1%), while
biofuels and waste were fifth most abundant (5.2%), behind natural gas (25.7%),
coal/peat (19.5%) and nuclear (9.7%).
On a worldwide scale, biofuels (which
include biogas and other fuels) continued to be an important source of energy,
exceeding the input of hydro, geothermal, solar and wind, combined.43 However,
they do not have the same importance worldwide that biogas has in China. The
following chart from the IEA illustrates the world's fuel supply in 2012:

20 12

5 239 Mtoo
41. Id.
42. See IEA KEY STATS, supra note 25, at 7.
43. Id.
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IV. ENERGY POVERTY
The question of the sources of energy invariably leads to the inequitable fact
that less than 17% of the world's population consumes 80% of the world's
resources. 45 The inverse of that equation leaves about one-third of the world-the
"Other Third' 46-without access to energy resources that are essentially taken for
granted in the modem world. What this means is that approximately 2.6 billion
people 4 7 have little or no access to beneficial energy services for cooking, heating,
water sanitation, drinking water, illumination, transportation, or basic mechanical
needs. 48 Approximately 1.3 billion people lack access to electricity. 49 This lack of
access to energy services now bears the name "energy poverty,"50 and the
phenomena contributes to a feedback loop of ill health, economic hardship, and
reduced educational opportunities, particularly for women and for children. '
In China, the IEA reports that there is near universal access to electricity. 52
The IEA's definition of "energy access" as applied to electricity is "a first electrical
supply connection, with a minimum level of consumption (250 kilowatt-hours
[kWh] per year for a rural household ."......,,
This equates to enough
electricity to light perhaps two 60-watt light bulbs for slightly less than six hours
per day. Putting aside the question of the quality of electricity access in China (or
elsewhere in the developing world), the IEA reports that a full one-third of China's
population--446 million people-rely on biomass for cooking. 54
Therefore, China is home to nearly one-quarter of all the people worldwide
that lack access to modem energy services. Most of these people are in rural parts

44. Id.
45. See Social & Economic Injustice, WORLD CENTRIC,

http://worldcentric.org/conscious-

living/social-and-economic-injustice (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).

46. See The Other Third, U. COLO. BOULDER, http://www.colorado.edu/theotherthird/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2014).
47. The approximately 2.6 billion people are predominantly located in Africa, Asia, and South
America. See lEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, at 89, tbl.2.3 (2013).
48. Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable Development, 21 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 231, 231 (2010).
49. See lEA, supra note 47, at 88, 89, tbl. 2.3.
50. Patrick Nussbaumer, Morgan Brazilian & Vijay Modi, Measuring Energy Poverty. Focusing
on What Matters, 16 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 231, 232 (2012).
51. Guruswamy, supra note 48, at 240, 244.
52. See lEA, supra note 47, at 89, tbl. 2.3.
53. See lEA, supra note 47, at 530.
54. See lEA, supra note 47, at 89, tbl. 2.3. Given that there is universal electricity access, and that
still nearly 1/2 of China's population relies on biomass for cooking, and that about 15% of China's
population relies on biogas for heating and cooking energy, it is clear that the minimal energy supplied
by electricity is but one part of the equation.
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of China.5 5 Indeed, the only country in the world likely to have more people living
in energy poverty is India. 56 It is in the face of these stark and unrelenting facts
that we look at China's significant and meaningful efforts in developing the use of
biogas.
V.

CHINESE BIOGAS LAW AND POLICY

A. The History of China Rural Biogas Development
'

China has a long history of biogas utilization. In the 1880s, scientists
experimented with biogas in Chaomei area of Guangdong province.5 7 By the end
of the 19th century, small and simple biogas digesters were demonstrated. In the
1920s, Luo Guorui from Taiwan invented what was called the "hydraulic pressure
biogas pool" and in 1929, he established the first biogas promotion organizationthe Guorui Gas Lamp Company. 59 In 1931, when he moved to Shanghai, Luo
Guorui established a new biogas company.so The company grew, eventually
extending biogas production into thirteen provinces.
China's initial biogas
development was one of entrepreneurship.
Since the establishment of new China, the government has highly valued the
potential role of biogas. 62 Chinese biogas developed quickly. However, the
development was not steady. There were setbacks, which are discussed below.
The development of Chinese biogas in new China can be roughly divided into four
stages as set out herein.
B. InitialDevelopment (from the 1950s to the 1980s)
In 1958, Chairman Mao Zedong, upon learning that biogas can be used to
light lamps and for cooking, and that the byproducts can also be used as fertilizer,
A critical mass developed
undertook efforts to promote and develop biogas.
starting around the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1970s, when more than

55. Wei Qu, Qin Tu & Bettina Bluemling, Which Factors are Effective for Farmer's Biogas
Use?-Evidencefrom a Large Scale Survey in China, 63 ENERGY POL'Y 26, 30 (2013).
56. See IEA, supra note 47, at 88, n.19 noting that in 2012 India's total population estimates were
increased greatly, increasing the numbers of persons estimated to be living without access to modem
energy services.
57. Analysis on the Development History of and Research on China's Biogas, supra note 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao respectively inspected the rural
biogas work in 1958, 1980, 1991, and 2003. All of them gave instructions to develop Chinese rural
biogas. In 2002 and 2006, former Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the development of rural biogas.
63. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, QUANGUO NONGCUN
))
i-r(
4tr
FUWU TIXI JIANSHE FANG'AN (SHIXING) (±
[NATIONAL RURAL BIOGAS SERVICE SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (TRIAL)] (2007) [hereinafter
at
available
2007],
PROGRAM
CONSTRUCTION
TRIAL

ZHAOQI

http://www.fjagri.gov.cn/upload/File/20090626113917.doc.
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six million biogas digesters were built.M However, owing at least in part to
unknown technology issues, the design and construction, maintenance and
operation of these digesters was not standard. 5 There were failures with many of
the digesters, resulting in only a small percentage of them being used for any
substantial period of time.
In 1979, the State Council endorsed the Report of the Ministry of Agriculture
on Several Issues in the Contemporary Construction of Biogas in Rural Areas.
The State Council created the National Biogas Construction Leading Group.6 As
a result, China's biogas underwent another period of rapid development, and the
number of households with biogas digesters increased to seven million by the close
of the decade.6 9 However, the number abruptly dropped to four million in the
beginning of the 1980s owning to the re-adoption of indigenous methods that were
found preferable to the management of a biodigester.70
C. Adjustment and TechnologicalImprovement (from the mid-1980s to
2000)

In 1988, the Chinese Biogas Association was founded. 7' The Chinese
government called upon biogas technicians to cooperate and make breakthroughs
in the key biogas technologies. 72 At the same time, the government created a
uniform biogas digester construction policy centered on "suitable local conditions,
adhering to quality, paying attention to both construction and management,
comprehensive utilization, emphasizing practical results as well as active and
steady development." 73
From 1984 to 1991, a great deal of effort was dedicated to repairing the
previously built, but defectively made or poorly maintained digesters. During that

64. ZHONGGUO ZHAOQI CHANYE FAZHAN LICHENG HuIGU (
[FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT], FUJIAN SHENG NONGYE TING (VgtV\'Aff)
[REVIEW ON THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF CHINA'S BIOGAS INDUSTRY] (2011), available at

http://www.fjagri.gov.cn/html/hypd/stny/ncny/2011/03/01/65475.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Wang Fei, Cai Yaqing, & Qiuhuanguang (E T,
W {Jfl ), Zhongguo zhaoqifazhan
de xianzhuang, qudongji zhiyue yinsu fenxi (
(
JERti) [incentives
and constraintsfor future development of biogas industry in China], 28 J. AGRIC. ENGINEERING 184
(2012),
available
at
http://www.tcsae.org/nygcxben/ch/reader/viewabstract.aspx?flag-1I&fileno=20120133&journal-id=n
ygcxb.
68. DENG GUANGLIAN, (Yj61i), ZHONGGUO ZHAOQI JIANSHE XIANZHUANG YU FAZHAN DUICE
(

CHINA'S

BIOGAS

PRESENT SITUATION OF AND DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTIONS FOR
CONSTRUCTION
26
(2007),
available
at

http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=yvWB5cgQln7r7qNWZ wfk-UTjhJyOCFmFKOiAq6tJOAOQxLaCdgSl8CtjUiDuiBeiZhpq5u8eSLqCPPZ4DYktkskcZD2aOoGKGKS8xEEzu.
69. FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 64.

70. Id.
71. DENG GUANGLIAN, supranote 68.
72. FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 64.
73. DENG GUANGLIAN, supra note 68.
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time, about 100,000 household biogas digesters were built every year. 74 From
1992 to 1998, the benefit of biogas construction became more and more obvious as
the result of improvements in the technology that resulted from the policies
adopted in the prior decade.75 As a result, in the mid-to-late 1990s, the rate of
biogas digester construction increased drastically to about 500,000 each year. 76
In 1997, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Energy Conservation
was enacted,n encouraging and supporting the vigorous development of biogas in
rural areas. By the end of 2000, there were 9.8 million rural biogas household
digesters in China. 78
D. Rapid Development (from 2001 to 2006)
In 1999, the Ministry of Agriculture began to strongly promote biogas, not
just in the southern provinces, but in the northern ones as well. 79 The Ministry of
Agriculture carried out campaigns called variously the "Energy Environmental
Protection Project" and "Ecological Homestead Rich Peasants Project," among
others.80 These positively phrased names appear aimed to promote interest in
biogas. 81
Rural biogas development was also strengthened at this time by a number of
important central committee policies:
* The Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Several
Policies to Promote the Increase of Farmers' Income of 2004,82
* The Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Several
Policies to Further Strengthen Rural Work and Improve Agricultural
Comprehensive Production Capacity of 2005,

I
XIANZHUANG
ZHAOQI
FAZHAN
ZHONGGUO
YUNZHANG
(J @EQ,
74. TU
(41 M
9Z 0 3 #) [PRESENT SITUATION OF CHINA'S BIOGAS DEVELOPMENT] (2012), available
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=hiqsdCATnNaQOKoXUmLat
bubOQzyhu7zrRErw5MXTQJhsBtmofEa5MQHKH421FbW5UM5KlPtE5GVMfN2pliQlvbjm7ltdVtCQ
gMhThoUuNbG.
75. FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 64.
76. TU YUNZHANG, supra note 74 at 2.
ThiJ@
) [Law
77. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jieyao Nengyuan Fa ( $A
of the People's Republic of China on Energy Conservation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008) 2006 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.
GAZ. 258 Art. 59.
78. TRIAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 2007, supra note 63.
79. FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 64.

80. Review and prospect on biogas development in China, supranote 5.
81. Id.
82. THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ZHONGGONG
ZHONGYANG GUOWUYUAN GUANYU CUJIN NONGMIN ZENGJIA SHOURU RUOGAN ZHENGCE DE YIJIAN
[OPINIONS OF THE CPC CENTRAL
Rim.
(t A
COMMITTEE AND STATE COUNCIL ON SEVERAL POLICIES TO PROMOTE THE INCREASE OF FARMERS'
INCOME OF 2004] ( 2003), available at http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-07/04/content1I 1870.htm.
83. THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ZHONGGONG
ZHONGYANG GUOWUYUAN GUANYU JINYIBU JIAQIANG NONGCUN GONGZUO TIGAO NONGYE ZONGHE
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* Circular of the State Council on the Recent Key Work of Constructing
Conservation Oriented Society of 2005,84 as well as the
* Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Promoting
the Construction of New Socialist Countryside of 2006.
The Fifth Plenary Sessions of 16th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of 2005 required the vigorous expansion of rural biogas and the active
development of clean energy suitable in rural conditions. 86 In the 11th Five-Year
Plan Outlines for National Economic and Social Development (2006-2010), rural
biogas is listed as one of the key projects of new countryside construction." In the
12th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development, biogas is listed as one of
the eight key projects in renewable energy development. 88
At the same time, the government also created mechanisms to fund the
development of rural biogas. The Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the
State Council on the Development of Agricultural and Rural Work of 2003,89 the
Management Measures for Rural Biogas Construction Treasury Bonds Programme
(Trial) 90 as well as the 2006 Implementation Opinions on the Fiscal and Tax Policy
SHENGCHAN

NENGLI
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CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND STATE COUNCIL ON SEVERAL POLICIES TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN RURAL
WORK AND IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL COMPREHENSIVE PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF 2005] (2004),

available at http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/22/content_207406.htm.
84. THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GUOWUYUAN
GUANYU ZUo HAO JIANSHEJIEYUEXING SHEHUI JINQI ZHONGDIAN GONGZUO DE TONGZHI
(Si
i
UA
I'il)
[CIRCULAR OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON THE
RECENT KEY WORK OF CONSTRUCTING CONSERVATION ORIENTED SOCIETY] (2005), available at

http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-09/08/content_30265.htm.
85. THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ZHONGGONG
ZHONGYANG GUOWUYUAN GUANYU TUIJIN SHEHUI ZHUYI XIN NONGCUN JIANSHE DE RUOGAN YIJIAN
[OPINIONS OF THE CPC CENTRAL
f
A
(TFApr1
COMMITTEE AND STATE COUNCIL ON PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SOCIALIST

COUNTRYSIDE
OF
2006]
(2005),
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_254151.htm.
86. Id.

available

at

87. THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI FAZHAN DI SHIYI GE WU NIAN GUIHUA GANGYAO
(t4A
R)E R~ffW
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E Wif) [1ITH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT]
(2006),
available
at
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http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content268766.htm.
88. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Ke Zaisheng Nengyuan
Fazhan Shi'erwu Guihua Quanwen (F
[12th Five-Year Plan for
Renewable
Energy
Development]
(2013),
available
at
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/ny/zcjd/201302/01/t2013020121331890.shtml.
89. XINJIANG AGRICULTURE, ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG GUOWUYUAN GUANYU ZUO HAO
NONGYE HE NONGCUN GONGZUO DE YIJIAN (
U4
I
[THE OPINIONS OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE STATE COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF
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AND
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WORK
OF
2003]
(2003),
available
at
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to Support the Development of Bio Energy and Bio Chemical Industry9 clearly
strengthened the government's efforts by creating ways to fund biogas for rural
farmers, who do not usually have the funds necessary to install biogas facilities. 92
Provisions concerning the promotion of rural biogas construction were
incorporated into relevant laws. For instance, Article 52 of the Regulations on
Conversion of Farmland to Forests provides that local governments at various
levels shall, in the light of the actual situation, strengthen the rural biogas
construction, as well as small-scale hydropower, solar energy and wind energy to
meet the demands for energy by those who convert their farmland to forests. 93
Likewise, Article 57 of Agriculture Law of the People's Republic of China
contains a number of relevant provisions in relation to the development of
agriculture and the rural economy:
* Attention shall be paid to the rational use and protection of the natural
resources, such as the land, water, forests, grasslands and wild animals
and plants,
* Development shall include the use of renewable and clean sources of
energy such as hydro-energy, biogas, solar energy and wind energy,
* Development shall address the ecological aspects of agriculture, and
* Development shall protect and improve the ecological environment. 94
Article 39 of the Animal Husbandry Law of the People's Republic of China
states that Livestock and poultry breeding farms and small-scale breeding villages
shall "4) . . . have such facilities as biogas digesters or other harmless treatment

CIRCULAR ON STRENGTHENING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT QUALITY MANAGEMENT], NONGCUN
(SHIXING)
BANFA
XIANGMU
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GUOZHAI
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ZHAOQI
MEASURES
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[MANAGEMENT
(
at
(2003),
available
(TRIAL)]
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PROGRAM
TREASURY
CONSTRUCTION

http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/zxfb/201007/PO20100702547096593568.doc.
91. MINISTRY OF FIN. OF CHINA, CAIZHENG BU GUOJIA FAZHAN GAIGE WEl NONGYE BU GUOJIA
SHUIWU ZONGJU GUOJIA LINYE JU GUANYU FAZHAN SHENGWU NENGYUAN HE SHENGWU HUAGONG
YIJIAN
DE
SHISHI
FUCHI
ZHENGCE
CAISHUI

nL) [2006 IMPLEMENTATION OPINIONS ON THE
fUiMfr
AJI.MR
-5 T E AWfiLM
FISCAL AND TAX POLICY TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIo ENERGY AND BIo CHEMICAL
at
available
INDUSTRY]
(2006),
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/caizhengbuwengao2007/caizhengbuwengao200
71/200805/t20080519 26018.html.
92. China
Biogas
Project
Turns
Waste
into
Energy,
IFAD,
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/voice/tags/china/biogas (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
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facilities to comprehensively utilize livestock manure, waste water and other solid
wastes."95
The Renewable Energy Law of 2005 encourages biomass power generation
and states in Article 18 that the state shall encourage the development and
utilization of renewable energy sources in rural areas.96 Under the 2005
Renewable Energy Law, energy authorities of local people's governments above
the county level shall make renewable energy plans in rural areas on the basis of
local economic and social development, ecological protection and health needs,
and the promotion of biogas shall be included in these plans. 9 Meanwhile, under
this law the local people's governments above the county level are required to
provide financial support for project of renewable energy utilization in rural
areas.
In 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission enacted the
Provisions Concerning the Management of Electricity Generated from Renewable
Energy99 and the Trial Measures for the Management of Prices and Allocation of
Costs for Electricity Generated from Renewable Energy. 00 The two regulations
specifically provide that the State Council department in charge of prices shall
establish a benchmark price for different areas if the feed-in tariff for biomass
generating electricity is set by the government. 0 ' These tariffs provide for the
opportunity to encourage biogas to electricity projects.
Government funding for biogas development increased at the turn of the
millennium. From 2001 to 2006 the central government invested 6.12 billion
RMB in the construction and development of biogas, which resulted in thirteen
million households building biogas plants for their domestic energy needs.102 At
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availableat http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/I 112/2009-12/26/content_1533216.htm.
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100. Ke Zai Sheng Neng Yuan Fa Dian Jia Ge He Fei Yong Fen Tan Guan Li Shi Xing Ban Fa
(
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and Allocation of Costs for Electricity Generated from Renewable Energy] (promulgated by the Nat'l
Dev. and Reform Comm'n, Jan. 4, 2006) (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/200601/20/content 165910.htm.
101. See ProvisionsConcerning the Management of Electricity Generatedfrom Renewable Energy,
supra note 99; Trial Measures for the Management of Prices and Allocation of Costs for Electricity
Generated from Renewable Energy, supra note 100.
102. FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 64.
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the end of 2002, there were eleven million 0 3 rural households owning biogas
digesters and just four years later in 2006, the number doubled to twenty-two
million. 0 4
E. Managementand Strengthening (from 2007 until the Present)
With the development of China's rural biogas, new problems arose. The
biggest one was the lack of effective management of the biogas digester, causing
low gas production. 0 5 To deal with this problem, in 2007 and more recently, the
government issued a series of policies, regulations and laws to promote the
management of biogas digesters. In the Medium to Long-Term Renewable Energy
Development Plan of 2007, issued by the National Development and Reform
Commission, biogas is listed as a key energy source for China.' 0 6 In 2007, the
Ministry of Agriculture published the National Rural Biogas Projects Construction
Plan (2006-2010), which sets biogas construction goals. 0 7 In the same year, the
Ministry of Agriculture and the National Development and Reform Commission
jointly issued National Rural Biogas Service System Development Scheme' 0 8 and
Opinions on Further Strengthening Biogas Construction and Management09 in
which the two ministries put forward the specific requirement of consolidating
preliminary work, defining management responsibility, increasing the speed of the
construction progress, carrying out funding, management, and strengthening
quality control."l0
The central government emphasized the importance of biogas development in
the 12th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (20112015).' The government enacted Circular Economy Promotion Law in 2008, in
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which the State encouraged and supported agricultural producers and relevant
enterprises seeking to employ biogas technologies that make comprehensive use of
straw, poultry and livestock manure, or other agricultural wastes."12 It is pointed
out in the 2012 Opinions on Further Strengthening Biogas Construction in Rural
Areas that biogas management and service as well as overall biogas project quality
should be strengthened."'
The use of biogas for rural energy needs has grown steeply in the past two
decades. There are many elements contributing to this growth, among which,
policies, laws and regulations play a key role.
During the history of China's biogas development, the government issued
policies, regulations and laws covering various aspects of rural biogas construction
and development. Whenever a new situation arose, the government issued
guidelines to direct future action. For instance, the government issued a series of
policies, regulations and laws to promote new digester construction, especially
during the period from 1999 to 2006.114 However, when there were problems with
design, and the management of the digesters required improvement, the
government issued policies, regulations and laws meant to make the operation of
the digesters more efficient.'5 In recent years, with the urbanization of China,
some areas are in short supply of the waste feedstocks normally used in biogas
digesters.
More recently, as the management of biogas digesters improved, a
demand for a digester service system is increasing. The government issued the
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[Circular Economy Promotion Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 28, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) art. 34 (China),
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-08/29/content_1084355.htm.
113. OPINIONs ON FURTHER STRENGTHENING BIOGAS CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT, supra

note 109.
114. The following policies and laws were issued during this period: Opinions of the CPC Central
Committee and State Council on Several Policies to Promote the Increase of Farmers' Income of 2004,
Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Several Policies to Further Strengthen
Rural Work and Improve Agricultural Comprehensive Production Capacity of 2005, Circular of the
State Council on the Recent Key Work of Constructing Conservation Oriented Society of 2005,
Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Promoting the Construction of New
Socialist Countryside of 2006, Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the
Development of Agricultural and Rural Work of 2003, the Management Measures for Rural Biogas
Construction Treasury Bonds Programme (Trial), the 2006 Implementation Opinions on the Fiscal and
Tax Policy to Support the Development of Bio Energy and Bio Chemical Industry, Agriculture Law of
the PRC, Husbandry Law of the PRC and Renewable Energy Law of the PRC.
115. See id.
116. Bioenergy Transition in Rural China: Policy Options and Co-benefits, supra note 5, at 533
("This resource constraint becomes particularly severe with the operation of biomass power plants and
consequent demand rise for biomass resources.").
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2012 Opinions on Further Strengthening Biogas Construction in Rural Areas and
suggested concrete measures to deal with these issues. I17
F. Fundingfor Biogas Development
Since 2003, more and more funding has been provided by the Chinese
government for biogas development. It is stated in the Opinions of the CPC
Central Committee and the State Council on the Development of Agricultural and
Rural Work of 2003 that biogas construction in rural areas significantly increased
rural income, and improved rural living conditions." 8 As a result of those
findings, the Central Committee stated that, "[t]he development of biogas in areas
of converting cropland to forest shall be given priority."ll9 In the same year, the
Management Measures for Rural Biogas Construction Treasury Bonds Program
(Trial) was enacted.12 0 Under the Trial, the central government subsidized rural
biogas construction with treasury bonds.121 This greatly motivated the construction
of rural household biogas digesters because money was available for their
construction.
Likewise, the 2005 Renewable Energy Law requires the local people's
governments above the county level provide financial support for projects of
renewable energy utilization in rural areas.122 It is also clearly pointed out in the
2006 Implementation Opinions on the Fiscal and Tax Policy to Support the
Development of Bio Energy and Bio Chemical Industry that the state will
implement relevant fiscal and tax policy such as a flexible loss subsidy, raw
material base grants, demonstration grants and tax preferences to facilitate the
development of bio energy, among other things.' 23
Accordingly, the central government has been increasing its investment in
biogas development. In 2001 the Rural Infrastructure Project awarded 0.1 billion
RMB in subsidies for rural biogas development, and in 2002, it awarded another
0.2 billion RMB.124
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Rural
(

Biogas

Opinion"],

0h

119. Id.
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121. Id.
122. Renewable Energy Law (Amendment), supra note 96.
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Since 2003, the government has been increasing the funding level every
year.125 In 2007, the central government invested 2.5 billion RMB in biogas
development.126 In 2008 the amount reached three billion RMB.1 27 At the end of
2008, the central government added three billion RMB.1 28 In 2009 and 2010, the
central government invested five billion RMB each year specifically supporting the
construction and development of rural biogas industry.129 By the end of 2011, this
financing by the government, coupled with the favorable laws and policies
mentioned above resulted in 39.96 million households using biogas as an energy
source.1 30 It is predicted that the number of the rural biogas digesters supplying
households with their energy needs will reach between fifty million by 2015.'1'
In the new Opinions on Further Strengthening Biogas Construction in Rural
Areas of 2012 the local governments are also required to increase investment in
biogas projects.132
G. Standardizationin the Biogas Industry
From 1950 to 2011, China issued thirty-three standard specification
documents for rural biogas systems, forming basic standards systems for rural
biogas. 133 With the government's attention switching more to the management of
rural biogas, it has recently issued various documents to promote the construction
of service systems for biogas. 134
Various laws, policies, and regulations have been aimed in China at
technological standardization in biogas industry. For example, in 2010 the
National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture
initiated the Rural Biogas Science and Technology Support Project and special
funds were arranged to increase the gas production ratio, broaden the biogas

125. The funding from 2003 to 2005 was one billion RMB each year; from 2006 to 2007 the
funding was 2.5 billion RMB each year. Funding in the beginning of 2008 was three billion RMB and
at the end of 2008 three billion RMB funding was added. Funding for 2009 and 2010 was five billion
RMB each year. See Review and Prospect on Biogas Development in China, supra note 5.
126. Review and Prospect on Biogas Development in China, supra note 5.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Wuda Zhuanbian
i
)[Five Changes are Needed in Rural Biogas Construction], ADMIN. OF
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8:37AM),
http://www.grain.gov.cn/Grain/ShowNews.aspx?newsid=39567.
131. 12th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development, supra note 88.
132. National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture issued the
"Circular on Further Strengthening Rural Biogas Opinion, "supra note 117.
133. See, for example, National Energy Infrastructure and Management Standardization Technical
Committee and Second Editorial Office of Standards Press of China. Biogas and Related Standards
(Standards Press of China, Aug. 2008); see Policies and Regulations, CHINA BIOGAS SOC'Y,
http://www.biogas.cn/CN/BPolicy.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2014) for most of the standards.
134. See, e.g., National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture
issued the "Circularon Further Strengthening Rural Biogas Opinion, " supra note 117.
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application scope and improve biogas utilization benefits.135 The 12th Five Year
Plan for National Energy Technology of 2012 sets out goals and key tasks for the
development of new energy including biogas.136
Moreover, relevant policies, laws and regulations also motivate the
standardization of biogas systems. From 1950 to 2011, China issued thirty-three
standard specification documents for rural biogas systems, forming basic standards
system for rural biogas.' 37 With the government's attention switching more to the
management of rural biogas, it has recently begun to realize the importance of a
service system. Therefore, the government has recently issued various documents
3
to promote the construction of service system for biogas.1 8
H. Problems Existing in and Policy Suggestionsfor the Development of
China Rural Biogas Program
With the development of China's urbanization process, some new problems
appear to be arising in the rural biogas program. The first major obstacle to
continued success of the biogas digesters in China appears to be a lack of services
aimed at ensuring their smooth operation and continued efficiency. It appears that
needed service systems may not be totally in position in China.' 39 In the same
vein, the funding system has been focused on building digesters, but it appears that
the financial needs associated with the operation and maintenance of these forty
million biogas digesters may not yet be completely thought out.
Moreover, the changing landscape of China is likely to result in less small
farm animal husbandry.14 0 This will likely cause a shortage in feedstocks for
biogas digesters in rural settings. However, with the increase of centralized
livestock farms, it is likely that medium to large size biogas plants will be
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developed, which can either supply biogas, or electricity to meet rural energy
needs. 141
VI.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESS OF CHINA'S BIOGAS PROGRAM

The success of China's biogas program appears from our research to relate to
five main factors: 1) education and promotion, 2) technical improvement and
standardization, 3) supporting laws and policies, 4) funding, and 5) China's energy
needs. The first four factors, when China implemented them together, resulted in a
successful program that was intended to address the fifth factor. Moreover, each of
these factors appears interrelated and a necessary condition for the other. For
instance, technical improvement would not have occurred without initial
promotion, and the laws and policies supporting biogas would not have been
passed unless the technical bona fides of the program were established. Funding
itself was, and continues to be, dependent upon the other four factors-there would
be no reason to fund the program unless the community was aware of the benefits
(promotion), if the systems did not work (improvement), if the government was not
creating a conducive environment (supporting law and policy), nor would funding
exist of the energy need was not real.
Before addressing these factors, however, we wish to address a likely
misconception: that China's authoritarian central government is in fact the reason
for its success with biogas.142 While it is true the strong central government
contributed to the various laws and policies, the government's role alone does not
appear to be to be an independent factor leading to the success of biogas. During
the times of China's strongest central government, biogas systems struggled with
failure. 143 It was not until the government called for research and development that
addressed both construction and digester management that the systems began to be
successful. 144 In this way the government played a role, but that role was one of
encouraging solutions to problems, not mandating a result.
The most significant gains in the installation of biogas units occurred in the
last decade or so, and appeared to be related to funding that was made available for
biogas installation.145 This funding took the form of tax rebates, subsidies to offset
part of the cost, bonds, loans, and in some cases grants.146 While it is true the
government supplied the funding, that fact alone does not lend itself to
authoritarian criticism.
Governments everywhere often provide financial
incentives. An interesting dynamic in this case, however, is that the financial

141. The progress and prospects of rural biogas production in China, supra note 5, at 62
("Supported by the central government, the development of China's biogas plants will aim for
economies of scale, industrialization, and commercialization.").
142. For an accessible and comprehensive discussion of political governance in China, please see
Ming
Xia,
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Companion:
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N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2014).
143. FUJIAN PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT, supra note 64.
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145. See supranote 127 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 119-128 and accompanying text.
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incentives were successful among some of China's poorest-its agricultural
peasants who otherwise lacked clean cooking technologies.
Progressing past the question of the role of China's government directly, the
first factor that our research uncovered as an important element to the success of
China's biogas program was education and promotion. Two particular education
efforts stand out from our research: The Ministry of Agriculture's creation in 1979
of the National Biogas Construction Leading Group,147 and Ministry of
Agriculture's 1999 biogas promotion campaigns called variously the "Energy
Environmental Protection Project" and "Ecological Homestead Rich Peasants
Project." 48 The Leading Group provided a structure for dealing with the needs of
the biogas development campaign. The Leading Group addressed questions of
technical improvement, and also addressed questions relating to preferred use.149
Together these education and promotion efforts appear to have contributed to the
wave of biogas growth that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, while setting the
stage for interest in the various financial policies that were later enacted.150
The role of technical improvement as a factor impacting the success of biogas
development in China cannot be overstated. Initial development efforts centered
on technical innovation, and in fact those early innovations appear to have
captured the imagination of China's leaders, ultimately leading to the interest in
biogas development.' 5' Then, when development occurred, the large-scale efforts
were a failure because of technical reasons.' 52 When the digesters failed to operate
properly, and literally millions of them were abandoned.1 53 China's technical
response, creating thirty-three standard specification documents for rural biogas
systems, corrected the early problems and led to the opportunity to make biogas a
success.
Another important technical innovation that led to the success of biogas in
China was the development of digesters that work in cold climates. Anaerobic
bacteria do not "eat" when they are cold or frozen. If the bacteria do not "eat,"
they cannot make biogas. Chinese scientists tackled that issue, making it possible
to expand biogas into China's colder climates.154 This innovation, which might not
seem like much, is quite important. Much of China's agricultural production
occurs in more northerly climates.' 5 5 It is in these areas that the biogas is perhaps
of greatest utility, providing fuel for heating, lighting and cooking to rural

147. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 119-128 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
152. See Biogas and Related Standards,supra,note 137; Policies and Regulations, supra note 137.
153. See supra, notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
154. The Progressand Prospects of Rural Biogas Productionin China, supra note 5, at 59.
155. Bao-Jie He, Li Yang, & Miao Ye, Building Energy Efficiency in China RuralAreas: Situation,
Drawbacks, Challenges, CorrespondingMeasures and Policies, II SUSTAINABLE CITIES & SOC'Y 7, 89(2014).
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households. Without the significant work undertaken to extend biogas into colder
climates, the program would likely not be nearly the success that it is today.
The role of China's policies and laws that support biogas development cannot
be overstated. As addressed in Section IV, above, China implemented a full suite
of laws and policies surrounding biogas. These laws did not always have the
sophistication with which they are now imbued. Instead, the early laws,
metaphorically, put the cart before the horse, promoting the technology for wide
scale use without having already worked out technical and social issues. Problems
were encountered: the technology failed, or users found the operation to be less
appealing than their traditional alternatives.
China's problems in developing biogas appear to have been viewed as integral
parts of the solution. Rather than scrapping the program, the applicable laws and
policies were modified to address the growing needs.1 56 It appears that China was
successful in this regard because it used administrative agencies that had
specialized knowledge and a broad mission coupled with the opportunity to
flexibly address the issues. Accordingly, China's use of its agencies, like the
Ministry of Agriculture, appear to be a vital ingredient in promoting the dynamic
legal and policy responses necessary to successfully deploy biogas as an energy
technology on a wide, consumer-based scale.
China's process of funding of the biogas program seems to be the factor that
is most significantly contributing to the accelerated adoption of biogas in China.
While funding efforts appear to have always been significant, when the range of
funding started exceeding three billion per year, and when the methods of funding
were widened to include bonds, grants, loans, subsidies and tax rebates, the rate of
biogas expansion appears to have accelerated drastically.
This is quite an important feature of China's experience. The people who are
the audience-the customer base-are very poor peasant farmers. What might be
mistaken in the analysis of the world's poor is an assertion that they have no
money to afford modern energy services. That is not the case-the world's poor
have money. However, and in a common sense manner, it is reasonable to assume
the poor value the money they have. Accordingly, a Chinese peasant, who was
well educated on the issues of biogas, still often did not have enough incentive to
purchase a digester.' 5 7 One conclusion is that the money in hand, or the money
spent on something else is more valuable than the benefits to be obtained from
biogas. China's financial incentives appear to have tipped that scale,15 and the
success of funding in promoting biogas development clearly demonstrates that
financial incentives that make economic sense to the end user need to be adopted if
energy poverty is to be eliminated.

156. See supra, notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
157. See Gosens et. al., supra note 2, at 285 for a discussion on the role of subsidies in household
fuel use in China.
158. Bioenergy transition in rural China: Policy options and co-benefits, supra note 5, at 533
("China has made the most success in rural household biogas development, mostly through government
subsidies on technology dissemination.")
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What China's experience also shows is that economic incentives are not a
unitary solution even where they are the strongest catalyst for change. As China's
initial attempts to fund faulty digesters in the 1970s showed, all of the other
supporting aspects of program are necessary. Without education, technological
proof, and legal support, financial support merely causes failure and a waste of the
financial resources dedicated to the project.
Finally, one must look to China's energy needs, the sources of energy and
other necessary resources that the nation has ready access to in order to understand
the success of biogas. Indeed, this critical element of the discussion might in other
countries support the development of a different energy technology. In China, the
energy need that biogas is meeting is for the rural poor. The rural poor are largely
farmers, and as a result they have ready access to organic wastes that become the
feedstocks for biodigestion and the production of biogas. A biodigester also needs
water and a place to utilize the residue, both items usually available in an agrarian
landscape. Biogas therefore fits neatly within a Chinese farmer's energy needs and
resources. Conversely, biogas is not likely a useful technology for those living
nomadic lifestyles or who live in extreme climates like deserts, high mountains, or
the arctic where biological wastes or water resources are often not readily
available. 159
Another element of China's energy needs and sources that impact the use of
biogas is the relative paucity of natural gas in China. China's energy mix is
dominated by coal. 160 Where natural gas supplies 25.7% of the world energy
supply, in China, it supplies just 3.9%. 161 As many authors point out, China's
dependence upon coal requires the nation to find cleaner burning technologies.' 62
Biogas is uniquely well suited to fill this gap by creating what is for all intents and
purposes natural gas from agricultural and other biological waste.
Other countries may or may not have such energy and environmental
pressures impacting energy development. Nigeria provides an interesting contrast.
In Nigeria, there are substantial agricultural wastes, similar agricultural
frameworks, and similar rural needs for household energy services.' 63 However,
Nigeria contains immense quantities of natural gas that is flared without being
used.'" That difference might make it more sensible for energy development in

159. BENJAMIN SOVACOOL & IRA MARTINA DRUPADY, ENERGY ACCESS, POVERTY, AND
DEVELOPMENT: THE GOVERNANCE OF SMALL-SCALE RENEWABLE ENERGY IN DEVELOPING ASIA

(2012) (noting, for instance, the difficulty of providing energy services to nomadic Chinese).
160. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., David Fridley, Nina Zheng and Nathaniel Aden, What Can China Do? China's Best
Alternative Outcome for Energy Efficiency and CO 2 Emissions, in CHINA'S ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS OUTLOOK 80 (B. Skaali & T. Knezevic, eds., 2012).
163. See, e.g., Okeh Okeh, Chukwudi Onwosi & Frederick Odibo, Biogas Production from Rice
Husks Generated from Various Rice Mills in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, 62 RENEWABLE ENERGY 204
(2014).
164. Stephen C. Nwanya, Climate Change and Energy Implications of Gas Flaring for Nigeria, 6
INT'L J. Low CARBON TECH. 193, 193 (2011).
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Nigeria to focus on harnessing the wasted natural gas, rather than converting
biological wastes to gas. Even if that process to be the case in Nigeria, the
framework of development outlined by China's biogas experience could still
provide an important policy model that could help in the sustainable development
of energy resources and the improvement of living conditions no matter the energy
and resource mix confronted.
VII. CONCLUSION
China's biogas experience-truly a grand experiment that touches the lives of
approximately 120 million people-yields a model that should be considered in the
energy and sustainable development framework for lesser developed countries.
The very nature of China's approach-to experiment, to educate, to modify
policies to needs, to refine the technology, and to provide adequate fundingappears to define a useful process that might yield beneficial results when applied
to the need to make energy resources available for the Other Third.

DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ECONOMY APPROACH WITHIN A DEEP
DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK

HAIDER

I.
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KHAN*

INTRODUCTION

In Vienna in 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights recognized that
women's rights are human rights.' However, even today, the foundations of this
claim are not always made clear and it is seen as merely political. This, however,
is a simplistic position far from the truth. Sen has pointed out that the capabilities

* Haider A. Khan (hkhan@du.edu) is a John Evans University Professor and a professor of economics
at the Joseph Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has served as the chief
international adviser to Arab Trade and Human Development in Cairo, a senior economic adviser to
UNCTAD in Geneva, a consultant to IFPRI, UNDP, ILO, ADB, and the World Bank as well as to
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Tokyo and at WIDER, Helsinki. He has been a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Economics,
University of Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University, People's University, Beijing, and several US and
European Universities. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University. He has published more than
fifteen books and over one hundred articles in professional journals and received many international
awards. Professor Khan is also an award-winning poet , translator, and literary critic. He has written on
Rabindranath Tagore, Nazrul Islam, Shamsur Rahman, Octavio Paz, Picasso,Guillaume Apollinaire,
James Joyce and the Japanese Haiku master Basho as well as many modern and postmodern Japanese
poets.
I would like to thank Ved Nanda, George Shepherd, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum,Joseph
Stiglitz, Erik Thorbecke, Kaushik Basu, Debraj Ray, S. Gangopadhyay, James Foster, Steve Smith,
Chris Rodrigo, M.G. Quibria, Kazi Jalal, Y. Sawada, Katsuhito Iwai, Junji Nakagawa, Tonu
Yanagihara, Peter McCawley, Suisheng Zhao, Paul Viotti, Devin Joshi, Aaron Schneider, Victor Lippit,
Joyce Lippit, Aki Lippit, Seiji Lippit, Nader Hashemi, Danny Postel, Hasan Ferdous, Nafisa Ferdous,
Monzurul Huq, Izumi Otomo, Alan Gilbert, Richard Miller, Rachel Epstein, Micheline Ishay, Sally
Hamilton, David Goldfischer, Barry Hughes, Jack Donnelly, John Weiss, P.B. Anand, Ira Gang,
Anushree Sinha, Ilene Grable, Nilufer Cagatay, Yavuz Yasar, Chiara Piovani, George Demartino, M.
Irfan, Hazem Salem,Mariko Frame, Kausiki Mukhopadhyay, Yi-tsui Tseng, and my other colleagues
and students for valuable and stimulating discussions. All remaining errors are my own.
1. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme ofAction, 1118, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993); see also MICHELINE R. ISHAY,
THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 106-112 (2004)

(referencing a fairly comprehensive history of human rights including women's rights and modern
pioneers such as Mary Astell (1666-1731), Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), and Olympe de Gouge
(1748-1793), who are important precursors of the belated recognition in Vienna).
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approach provides at least a partial foundation for human rights. 2 This paper
claims that extensions of the capabilities approach can further progress a
theoretical foundation of women's rights.
Here I attempt to examine specifically this line of thought in providing some
theoretical advances for development and women's rights as human rights, that are
highly policy-relevant, by relying on an explicitly dynamic social version of the
capabilities approach called "the social capabilities" approach. This version of the
social capabilities approach extends important aspects of Sen's characterization of
development as freedom. 3 This approach also has the virtue of being grounded in
the ontology of difference that respects cultural differences and nuances within a
moral realist framework.4 An alternative set of economic and social policies with
an enabling legal-political environment for advancing women's rights and
development follow logically from the approach developed here.5 In this paper by
political economy, I mean the classical state and civil society-including their 2 0th
century extensions-and their interactions.6 By social economy, I mean the
underlying social basis of the political economy including the family structure and

2. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. OF HUMAN DEv. 151, 151-52 (2005)
[hereinafter Sen, Human Rights]; Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 315, 332-38 (2004) [hereinafter Sen, Elements].
3. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 17-18 (1999) [hereinafter SEN,
DEVELOPMENT] for a discussion on how the concept of personal "capabilities" interacts with
development and individual freedoms.
4. See LILA ABU-LUGHOD, DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING? (2013); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013); GLENN
C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a Moral
Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 181 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); FLIx GUATTARI &
SUELY ROLNIK, MICROPOLITICA: CARTOGRAFIAS DO DESEJO (1986), translatedin KAREL CLAPSHOW
& BRIAN HOLMES, MOLECULAR REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL (2008); GILLES DELEUZE & FELix GUATrARI,
MILLE PLATEAUX (1980), translated in BRIAN MASSUMI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS (1987); JACQUES
DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1972), translated in ALAN BASS, POSITIONS (1981); GILLES DELEUZE,
DIFFtRENCE ET REPETITION (1968), translatedin PAUL PATTON, DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION (1994);

Cille Kennedy et al., Mental Health, Disabilities,and Women: A Policy Oriented Data Review, 8 J.
DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 1, 1-2 (1997); U.N. Centre for Reg'l Dev., Transitional Economies and

Regional Economic Development Strategies: Lessons from Five Low-Income Developing Countries, 19
U.N. CENTRE FOR REG'L DEv. RESEARCH REPORT (Haider A. Khan & Asfaw Kumssa eds., Sept. 1996)
[hereinafter UNCRD].
5. The book by Lila Abu-Lughod in particular, based on her extensive fieldwork among the

Bedouins, illustrates powerfully why a dynamic view of difference accepted with humility is so
important for both the social scientist and the policymaker. See Abu-Lughod, supra note 4. This is also
important with respect to creating applicable democratic theory for Islamic societies. See id. Refer to
Nader Hashemi's book on the important issues regarding Islam, secularism, and democracy. NADER
HASHEMI, ISLAM, SECULARISM, AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC THEORY FOR
MUSLIM SOCIETIES (2009). An ontology of difference would suggest an endogenous generative power
regarding democracy in Islamic societies that can be creative in its own way that is different from what
happened elsewhere historically.
6. See HAIDER A. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY: LIMITS OF
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS IN THE AGE OF POSTMODERNISM, at ch. 7 (1998) [hereinafter KHAN,
TECHNOLOGY (1998)] for a discussion on "the classical idea of a polis for a modem polity."
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various overlapping communities in which the family and the individuals are
embedded.
I begin with the standard approach to human rights and discuss the Universal
Human Rights Model ("UHRM") before developing the nuanced social
capabilities approach followed throughout the rest of this paper. I present "deep
democracy" as a structure in addition to formal democratic apparatus such that the
8
practice of such democratic life can be reproduced with the basic values intact.
Change is not precluded. However, all such changes should deepen democracy,
not weaken it. 9 "Deep democracy" in this sense is intimately connected with
economic and social justice.' 0 As will be seen later in this paper, the social
capabilities approach, women's rights, and "deep democracy" are related in an
intimate way.
II.

THE STANDARD CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights, as they are usually and loosely conceived, are the rights that
one has because one is human. Before accepting this simple definition, a series of
questions must be asked. For example, what does it mean to have a right? How
are being human and having rights related? Are there alternatives to the simple
and usually minimalist definitions of human rights as the rights that one has
because one is human? How do women's rights relate to human rights?
As Donnelly explains:

7. Here, we need to be mindful of Gayatri Spivak's insightful remarks on "women's rights as
human rights" as a slogan only in Kolkata and the ontology of difference combined with actual
involved fieldwork and participation in actual women's movements from below. Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, Sunil Gangopadhyay Memorial Session-Kolkata Literary Meet 2013, YouTUBE (Feb. 13,
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-bl96CksnjEl. Spivak's remarks on human rights discourse in
civil society as a sign of failure of both state and revolution point towards the need for deeper reflection,
especially on the politics of the human rights discourse. See id. Clearly, one major evasion of
mainstream human rights discourse is the suppression of class differences. The differential ontology,
based among other things on a radical political and social economy approach of differentiation, brings
to light what is buried deep in the political unconscious-to use the term by Jameson-by bourgeois
humanism and presents the struggle for human rights of women as a differential struggle on the road to
emancipation that cannot ignore the class differential among both men and women. Id.; see also
FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT (1981).
8. See generally KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; Haider A. Khan, Deepening
Democracy During Crisis: Building on an Ontology of Difference, COSMOPOLIS (2012) [hereinafter
Khan, Deepening Democracy]; Haider A. Khan, A Theory of Deep Democracy and Economic Justice in
the Age of Postmodernism, I CONTEMP. READINGS INL. & SOC. JUST. 47-48 (2009) [hereinafter Khan,
at
available
(2009)],
Democracy
Deep
http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=3897d9e2-ca3a-4924-96dl -42f5d68a8ce8;
Haider A. Khan, A Theory of Deep Democracy and Economic Justice in the Age of Postmodernism,
CIRJE F-SERIES, NO. CIRJE-F-468, (2007) [hereinafter Khan, Deep Democracy (2007)], available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/tkyfseres/2007cf468.htm.
9. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at
14 (providing a list of conditions or changes that must be made for democracy to be deepened).
10. See generally KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009),
supra note 8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8.
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"Right" in English, like equivalent words in several other languages,
has two central moral and political senses: rectitude and entitlement. In
the sense of rectitude, we speak of "the right thing to do," of something
being right (or wrong). In the narrower sense of entitlement we
typically speak of someone having a right."
Rights claims imply both a right-holder and a duty-bearer. There is a strong
presumption that the duty-bearer must attend to the right-holder's entitlement.12
A Hohfeldian conception of rights defines a field of rule-governed
interactions centered on, and under the control of, the right-holder."
Thus,
Donnelly tells us:
"A has a right to x (with respect to B)" specifies a right-holder
(A), an object of the right (x), and a duty-bearer (B). It also outlines the
relationships in which they stand. A is entitled to x (with respect to B),
B stands under correlative obligations to A (with respect to x), and,
should it be necessary, A may make special claims upon B to discharge
those obligations.
Rights are not reducible to the correlative duties of those against
whom they are held. If Anne has a right to x with respect to Bob, it is
more than simply desirable, good, or even right that Anne enjoy x. She
is entitled to it. Should Bob fail to discharge his obligations, besides
acting improperly (i.e., violating standards of rectitude) and harming
Anne, he violates her rights, making him subject to special remedial
claims and sanctions.
Neither is having a right reducible to enjoying a benefit. Anne is
not a passive beneficiary of Bob's obligation. She is actively in charge
of the relationship, as suggested by the language of "exercising" rights.
She may assert her right to x. If he fails to discharge his obligation,
Anne may press further claims against Bob, choose not to pursue the
matter, or even excuse him, largely at her own discretion. Rights
empower, not just benefit, those who hold them.14
The social capabilities approach to women's rights that I develop here
emphasizes the positive freedom to achieve crucial aspects of socially grounded
individuality of the right bearer and, in this sense, provides a social foundation for
women's rights. However, first I must discuss the UHRM, which can also be
justified from the social capabilities point of view.

11. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (3d ed. 2013); see
also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 188 (1977) explaining, "the word 'right' has
different force in different contexts."
12. DONNELLY, supranote 11, at 7-8.
13. See id. at 7-12; see also Rights, The Form of Rights: The Hohfeldian Analytical System, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July 2, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.1.
14. DONNELLY, supranote 11, at 8.
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III. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS MODEL

In recognition of the central role of the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights"' 5 in establishing the contemporary consensus on internationally recognized
human rights, one can justify calling it the Universal Human Rights Model.
However, it is not thereby implied that the model is complete. In fact, extensions
to women's rights are an example of a good use of the universalizing tendencies in
the UHRM. As is well known, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, by a vote of 48-0
(with eight abstentions). 16 Since then virtually all states have endorsed it regularly
and repeatedly." This phenomenon accounts for the wide acceptance of the idea
that for the purposes of international action, "human rights" means roughly, what
is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 8
The purpose of presenting the list below from UHRM is to examine the
implications for women's rights in the UHRM. This paper examines these
implications not just for the sake of understanding the connection between UHRM
and women's status, though this is one of the goals of this paper, but for the goal of
learning something about the specific policies of the state apparatus in light of its
human rights obligations and commitments. As mentioned earlier, this paper bases
its approach to human rights on the social capabilities theory, which follows
immediately after this section. Therefore, interpret the UHRM presented below in
that light.
This list from the UHRM includes all rights that receive explicit mention in
both the Universal Declaration and its Covenants or receives a full article in one of
these three instruments: the Universal Declaration (U), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (C), or the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (E). References are to the article by number in the
respective instrument.' 9
* Nondiscrimination (U2, E2, C2)
* Life (U3, C6)
* Liberty and security of person (U3, C9)
* Protection against slavery (U4, C8)
* Legal personality (U6, C16)
* Equal protection of the law (U7, C14, C26)
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(lll)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
16. Irving
Samoff,
U.N.
Declaration,
L.A.
TIMES
(May
14,
2001),
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/14/local/me-63234; see generally UDHR, supra note 15; ISHAY,
supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing the origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
17. See generally ISHAY, supra note 1, at tbls.A.3 & A.4 for a demonstration of the continuance of
various countries convening to create human rights-related documents.
18. See id. at 18.
19. UDHR, supra note 15; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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Legal remedy (U8, C2)
Protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (U9, C9)
Access to independent and impartial tribunal (U 10, C14)
Presumption of innocence (Ul 1, C14)
Protection against ex post facto laws (Ul 1, C15)
Privacy (U12, C17)
Freedom of movement (U 13, C12)
Nationality (U 15, C24)
Marry and found a family (U 16, C23)
Protection and assistance of families (U 16, E10, C23)
Marriage only with free consent of spouses (U 16, E10, C23)
Equal rights of men and women in marriage (U 16, C23)
Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (U 18, C18)
Freedom of opinion and expression (U19, C19)
Freedom of assembly (U20, C21)
Freedom of association (U20, C22)
Participation in government (U2 1, C25)
Social security (U22, E9)
Work (U23, E6)
Just and favorable conditions of work (U23, E7)
Trade Unions (U23, E8, C22)
Rest and leisure (U24, E7)
Adequate standard of living (U25, El1)
Education (U26, E13)
Participation in cultural life (U27, E15)
Self-determination (El, Cl)
Protection of and assistance to children (E10, C24)
Freedom from hunger (El1)
Health (E12, U25)
Asylum (U 14)
Property (U17)
Compulsory primary education (E14)
Humane treatment when deprived of liberty (C 10)
Protection against imprisonment for a debt (Cl1)
Expulsion of aliens only by law (C 13)
Prohibition of war propaganda and incitement to discrimination
(C20)
Minority culture (C27)
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THE SOCIAL CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Various theorists drawing upon the insights of Adam Smith have proposed a
theoretically rigorous and elaborate evaluation of well-being. 20 Sen is the
originator of this "capability approach" in recent times. 2 1 The theoretical
criticisms of the utilitarian approach by Sen, Nussbaum and others that this
approach reduces all qualities into quanta of utilities are serious ones. 22 Nussbaum
gives a graphic example of this by quoting the exchange between Mr. Gradgrind,
economist and grief-stricken father, and his pupil Bitzer.2 3 Bitzer outdoes his
mentor by adhering to a strict code of utilitarian rationality that cannot comprehend
a father's grief.24 Khan has pursued a similar line of criticism in a number of
recent papers and in the book Technology, Development and Democracy.25 This
approach makes the capabilities explicitly social and asks what concatenation of
economic (real and financial) and other (e.g., political, social etc.) institutions will
allow capabilities to be both increase steadily on the average and tend to equalize
them among diverse individuals? 26 In effect, as the following discussion makes
clear, we are asking how can we increase and equalize real, positive freedom for
individuals in specific social contexts?
In discussing the well-being implications of human rights for women in
particular, I wish to take on a version of the social capabilities approach. It is not
my intent to present how human rights policies for women affect detailed empirical
indicators of well-being. I simply wish to pose clearly the conceptual problem of
evaluating the problems of denying women their rights and the possible
consequences of human rights based reforms. The institutional reforms and
changes proposed later in this paper, and by feminist scholars who suggest

20.

See

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

IV (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776);

ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL

SENTIMENTS Part I (Dover Publications, Inc. 2006) (1759).
21. Sen, Elements, supra note 2, at 332-38. See also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED,
at xi (2012); SEN, DEVELOPMENT supra note 3, at 18; Sen, Human Rights, supra note 2, at 152.
22. See

MARTHA

NUSSBAUM,

WOMEN

AND

HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT:

THE CAPABILITIES

APPROACH 11-15 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN].
23. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 1, 13,

22, 23 (1995).
24. Id. at 23 (describing Bitzer as a "good student" because of his "remarkably flat and abstract
description" of a horse that was devoid of emotion).
25. See KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; UNCRD, supra note 8; Haider A. Khan &
Hitoshi Sogabe, Macroeconomic Effects of IMF Adjustment Policies, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN AFRICA:
ADJUSTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at ch. 11 (George W. Shepherd & Karamo N.M.
Sonko eds., 1994); Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 1; Haider A. Khan & Mariko
Frame, China's Energy Security: National Security, Ecological Balance and Regional Co-operation,
CIRJE-F-482 (2007), available at http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2007/2007cf482.pdf;
Haider Khan, Technology, Modernity, and Development: Creating Social Capabilities in a POLIS, in
MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 327 (Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey, & Andrew Feenberg eds., 2003).

26. See generally KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOLUME I, at chs. 1-10 (1867) for a discussion on
commodities, exchange, money, the circulation of commodities, the general formula for capital, the
buying and selling of labor-power, the labor process, the producing surplus value process, constant and
variable capital, the surplus-value rate, and the working day.
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alternative non-patriarchal structures, must be proven to be capability-enhancing
for women, or at least not to be capability-reducing for them. First, we still need to
ask what social capabilities means both abstractly and concretely.
In a number of influential and insightful contributions, Martha Nussbaum has
developed an Aristotelian interpretation of capabilities. 27 The connections between
capabilities and a distinctly Aristotelian conception of human flourishing are
indeed striking. Later in this section, we will discuss a list of general capabilities
drawing upon both Sen and Nussbaum. The Aristotelian connections will become
quite clear through this exercise in comparison and contrast.
In my article Technology, Development and Democracy, I point out some
Hegelian connections as well.28 In particular, the Hegelian conception of freedom
as an interactive arrangement in society where concrete institutions of family, civil
society, and state all play definite roles seems a specifically modem way of
viewing the possibilities and limits of human flourishing in a liberal society based
on private property.29 Hegel's Philosophy of Right is a landmark contribution, in
this sense, to the elucidation of the problem of freedom in modem societies.30
The equally interesting thesis of Gilbert that Marx was an Aristotlean in his
critique of alienation illustrates that such a conception of the theory of alienation
supports the emphasis on the capabilities as a non-alienated set of qualities that are
potentially attainable, but may actually be largely unachievable- particularly for
women-under the existing institutional arrangements. 3 ' Gilbert points out that in
some parts of Marx's Capital "compared productive activity in general with labor
under capitalism in a precisely Aristotelian way." 32 Marx's characterization of
Milton's labors on the Paradise Lost as self-motivated, non-alienated labor and his
contrast of such labor with that of a hack writer who writes only for the money he
receives from the capitalist publisher underlines the good of genuine life-affirming
labor.3 3 Ironically, in real life under capitalism and in bourgeois political economy
Milton's labor is "unproductive" 34 while the hack is a "productive" wage-laborer.
In Capital, Marx shows how the accumulated dead labor in the form of capital
dominates workers.
Workers are mere means of further accumulation. Under
the sign of capital, death dominates over life and denies the workers the necessary
opportunity to realize their potential to be free, creative beings.3 8 In particular,

27. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN supra note 22, at I1.
28. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 7-8.
29. G.W.F. HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (1821),

DYDE, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT xlviii-xlix (Dover Publications, Inc. 2005) (1896).
30. Id.
31. ALAN GILBERT, DEMOCRATIC INDIVIDUALITY 41,239-40 (1990).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 265.
Id. at 250, 265.
That is, under the strict assumption that no wage payments were made.
GILBERT, supra note 31, at 265.
MARX, supra note 26, at 281.
Id. at 247-48, 289-91.
Id. at 246-48.

translated in S.W.
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Marx argues that going beyond abstract labor means recognizing the use
value/exchange value distinction as emerging in a historically specific, alienated
and alienating, mode of production. 39 Going beyond such a distinction ultimately
means going beyond the value form itself in the political economic sphere, or
rather more broadly, a transvaluation of values 40 in a society of the future that can
result from a transformation of capitalist social relations historically. 41 As Gilbert
points out, Marx's seemingly non-moral starting point of analyzing commodities
ultimately leads to a moral critique of capital as a social relation.4 2 Interestingly, a
qualitative labor theory of value ("QLTV") that is currently being developed by a
Hegelian group of thinkers would seem to imply such a moral critique as well. 43
Taking the QLTV as the central explanatory framework and connecting it
with eudemonism can help illuminate Foucault's important insights about the
societies of discipline and control that form a part of his critique of modernity.
From this point of view, such developments are consistent with the reproduction of
the value form under the domination of capital. Foucault shows how the discipline
of the army served as the model for discipline in the factory. 44 In fact, for
Foucault, this disciplinary mode of functioning will permeate virtually every
institution with a more subtle and manipulative until a system of control can be
developed.45
Foucault's concept of bio-power46 is a particularly powerful way of
characterizing how the production and reproduction of life itself can become an
object of control under capitalism. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzes in
detail how the human body can be objectified.47 The fundamental goal of the
disciplinary power was to create a "docile body". 48 At the same time, this docile
body also needed to be a productive body. 49 Looked at from the perspective of
QLTV, this implies nothing less than the total alienation of flesh and spirit.5 0 Once
again, the problem from the human point of view-in spite of the ironically

39.
40.
can find
41.
42.

See MARX, supranote 26, chs. 1-10.
The Nietzschean language is intentional. A radical interpretation of both Marx and Nietzsche
important similarities in exploring the nature of freedom.
See MARX, supranote 26, chs. 1-10.
GILBERT, supranote 31, at 268-69.

43. See, e.g., PETER C. DOOLEY, THE LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE 16 (2005).
44. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 142 (2d

ed. 1977).
45. Id.
46. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); Michel

Foucault, The Politics ofHealth in the Eighteenth Century, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed.,
1980); Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique in DITS ET ECRITS (1994). Foucault's debt to
Nietzsche as far as the exploration of biopower among other things, through a genealogical study is
concerned, has been acknowledged by Foucault himself.
47. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON (1975) translated in
ALAN SHERIDAN, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH : THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (2d ed. 1995).

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. ch. 1.
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avowed "anti-humanism" of early Foucault 51-then becomes how to overcome this
alienation?
We now turn to this problem: If, as I have argued so far, the abolition of
alienation requires the abolition of capital as a relation of domination, can QLTV
throw any light on how to abolish capital as a social relation? Could capabilities
then be reconstrued in a more radically critical way by following this AristotelianHegelian-Marxian connection? In the rest of this paper, I show that this can be
done and explore the further implications of this move for development theory and
policy. In what follows, I first give a characterization of capabilities following
Sen, Nussbaum and others. Then I discuss the fully social and political nature of
these capabilities. One can construe capabilities as general powers of human body
and mind under specified social, economic, and political structures that can be
acquired, maintained, nurtured, and developed.52 Capabilities can be diminished
and even completely lost under circumstances such as malnutrition or severe
confinement. 53 I have emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social (not merely
biological) character of these human capabilities. Sen himself emphasizes "a
certain sort of possibility or opportunity for functioning" without always carefully
specifying the institutional setting.
In order to assess the critical reach of such a fully social capabilities
perspective we need to go further and try to describe more concretely what some of
the basic capabilities may be. David Crocker has given an admirable summary of
both Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to capabilities in a recent essay. 54 Mainly
relying on Nussbaum but also on other sources (shown below), he has compiled a
list that is worth reproducing here:
Basic Human "Social" 55 Capabilities
(N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen," respectively; the quoted items
come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted)
1. Virtues in Relation to Mortality
1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete
human life, so far as is possible
1.2. N: Being able to be courageous
2. Bodily Virtues

51. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 88-89.

52. Id. at 95.
53. Id.; see David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and
Nussbaum's Development Ethic, Part 2, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF

HUMAN CAPABILITIES 153, 157-60 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Johnathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Crocker, Functioning and Capability]; David A. Crocker, Toward Development Ethics, 19 WORLD
DEV. 457, 465-66 (1991) [hereinafter Crocker, Development Ethics].
54. See Crocker, Functioningand Capability, supra note 53, at 157-64.
55. Our usage of social is akin to Gilbert's use of "social" in social theory. Important political
features are also included in the category of "social." GILBERT, supra note 31, at 16-18. However, as
above, I will use "social and political" also to underline the salience of both political ideas and
practices.
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2.1.

N and S: "Being able to have good health"

2.2.

N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished"

2.3.

N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter"

2.4. N: "Being able
satisfaction"
2.5.
3.

have

opportunities

for

sexual

N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place"

Virtue of Pleasure
3.1.

4.

to

N and S: Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful
pain and to have pleasurable experiences

Cognitive Virtues
4.1.

N: "Being able to use the five senses"

4.2.

N: "Being able to imagine"

4.3.

N: "Being able to think and reason"

4.4. N and S: Being "acceptably well-informed"
5.

Virtues of Affiliation I (Compassion)
5.1.

N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons
outside ourselves"

5.2. N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and
gratitude"
6.

Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency)
6.1.

N: "Being able to form a conception of the good"
S: "Capability to choose,"
commitments, values"

"ability

to form goals,

6.2. N and S:" Being able to engage in critical reflection about
the planning of one's own life"
7.

Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice)
7.1.

N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various
forms of familial and social interaction"
7.1.1. N: Being capable of friendship
S: Being able to visit and entertain friends
7.1.2. S: Being able to participate in the community
7.1.3. N: Being able to participate politically and being
capable ofjustice

8.

Ecological Virtue
8.1.

9.

N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to
animals, plants and the world of nature"

Leisure Virtues
9.1.

N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational
activities"

10. Virtues of Separateness
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10.1. N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's"'
10.2. N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and
context"
I1. Virtue of Self-respect
11.1. S: "Capability to have self-respect"
11.2. S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame"
12. Virtue of Human Flourishing
12.1. N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to
the limit permitted by natural possibilities"
56
12.2. S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings"

As Crocker correctly points out, we can facilitate this ordering by requiring
that "it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to 'infuse' but not
'organize' the other virtues." 57 Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with
Sen's: 5
Sen's and Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points. For Sen, the bodily
capabilities and functionings are intrinsically good and not, as they are
in some dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental means to
other (higher) goods. In interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes
between bodily functionings that are chosen and intentional, for
instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that form
part of a reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as
59
digestion and other "functioning of the bodily system in sleep."
Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items such as "being able to have
attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" and "being able to live with
concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature,"60 for which
Sen has no counterparts. These items are welcome features. Item 8, "ecological
virtue," is an especially important addition to Nussbaum's outlook.6 ' Crocker
points out that:
In a period when many are exploring ways of effecting a convergence
between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is important
that an essentially anthropocentric ethic "make room" for respect for
other species and for ecological systems. Worth considering is whether
Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough. Perhaps it should be
formulated to read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and nature as intrinsically valuable." Item 9 injects

56. WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES (Martha C.

Nussbaum & Johnathan Glover eds., 1995); Crocker, Functioning and Capability, supra note 53, at
174-76 (footnotes and citations omitted).
57. Crocker, Functioningand Capability,supranote 53, at 176.
58. Id. at 176-77.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 155, 175.
61. Id. at 175.
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some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise marked by the "spirit of
seriousness." What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's
list, their absence on Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete
texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions? One hypothesis is
that the differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention . . . to the

limits, vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence. Further, it may be
that Nussbaum's richer conception of human beings derives from
making use "of the story-telling imagination far more than the scientific
intellect." On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of selfrespect, a virtue that enables him to find common ground with Rawls
and to establish links with the Kantian ethical tradition, in which moral
agents have the obligation to respect all persons, including themselves,
as ends-in-themselves.62
Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct
and of central importance. 63 One cannot easily trade off one dimension of
capability against another. At most, one can do so in a very limited way. One
cannot reduce capabilities to a common measure such as utility. As Crocker points
out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights, and justice going far
If one accepts the
beyond simple distribution of income considerations.6
capability approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows
that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the
impact of economic policies.
In evaluating any policy regime-for instance international financial regimes
national
economic policies under globalization-from this perspective not
and
do
I
wish
to pose the question of efficiency, but also the whole set of
only
human freedom, in particular, the positive human freedom to
regarding
questions
things.
Thus, creation of markets and efficient production by
or
to
do
certain
be
little
if it led to a lopsided distribution of benefits. Worse
would
mean
very
itself
led to phenomena such as reduced life
other
institutions
if
markets
and
yet,
reduced
consumption levels for many, and
unemployment,
increased
expectancy,
as
women
and minorities then they will not
groups
such
for
certain
deprivation
On the contrary, under such
structure.
global
economic
be
weakly
equitable
even
institutions will be strongly
other
financial
global
markets
and
the
circumstances,
inequitable from the capability perspective.
It is because of this perspective that the existing positive analysis of the
problems of political economy such as those of global financial markets and
institutions from the perspective of Social Capabilities Approach to Women's
Rights need to be put in a completely transparent "social capabilities" framework.
Such a framework is openly normative and makes a strong ethical case for helping
the disadvantaged increase their capabilities towards achieving equality of
capabilities. Thus, for instance, poorer nations and poor people in the global
62. Id. at 177.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 153.
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economy deserve a special ethical attention within any proposed global financial
architecture.
As I showed in my keynote paper delivered at conference on
Financial Crisis, in Bali, Indonesia, in the context of adopting innovation structures
leading to increased productivities, ultimately the aim of any increase in
productivity needs to be the increase of freedom. 66 Such freedom, as Sen points
out has both an instrumental value and an ultimate value. 67 Instrumentally,
freedom as social capabilities can lead to a further increase in productivity.68 Thus,
even a hard-nosed, efficiency driven analysis must address this aspect as an
empirical issue. Therefore, an Aristotelian interpretation of Sen-Nussbaum
conceptualization of capabilities can go a long way towards a social democratic
regime of development as freedom, and this is much to be applauded.
However, pushing the concept of social capabilities in the Hegel-Marx
direction of overcoming alienation by achieving freedom as a concrete universal
right requires a very radical form of global social democracy. An added strength
of such an approach will be to go some distance towards bridging the gap between
the process aspect of human and women's rights and the capabilities approach. I
now turn to a demonstration of this thesis.
V.

FROM UTILITARIAN WELFARE ECONOMICS TO A SOCIAL CAPABILITIES BASED
ETHICS FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

The utilitarian tradition in economics, as Sen correctly reminds us, is based on
three distinct components. 69 One of these components is consequentialism: 70 all
choices of actions, rules, institutions etc. must be judged by the consequences of
the particular choice made. In this sense, consequentialism is merely results
oriented. However, it does rule out purely or exclusively rights-based or
deontological decision rules. A second constituting element of utilitarianism is
what Sen has termed "welfarism." 7' According to Sen welfarism "restricts the
judgments of state of affairs to the utilities in the respective states. . . ."72
Combining welfarism with consequentialism, one can derive the proposition that
"every choice must be judged by the respective utilities it generates." 73
Finally, the third element of utilitarianism, namely, sum-ranking of utilities,
imposes an aggregation scheme whereby utilities of different people can simply be
summed together without bothering about their distribution over the entire

65. Haider A. Khan, Global Financial Governance: Towards a New Global Financial Architecture
for Averting Deep Financial Crisis 32, Keynote paper delivered at conference on Financial Crisis, in
Bali,
Indonesia
(Sept.
24-26,
2013),
available
at
http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/49275/l/MPRApaper 49275.pdf [hereinafter Khan, Global Financial Governance].
66. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 97.
67. SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 157-58.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 59.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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population. 74 This neatly sidesteps who gets what; but it is clearly the greatest
good under the three conditions when utility is the only good to consider. Notice
that Robbins attacked the classical utilitarian idea of interpersonal comparability
and, by implication, the sum-ranking of utilities in the 1930s. 75 However, the
alternative, radically subjective view of personal utility also sidesteps the issue of
distribution. No two Pareto optimal states are, strictly speaking, comparable. In
general, equilibrium theory, the second theorem of welfare economics, merely
states that under a suitable redistribution of initial endowments, one can achieve
every Pareto optimal state as a competitive equilibrium. However, there is no bias
towards-or, for that matter, against-an egalitarian distribution.
Sen's radical critique of utilitarianism and his replacement of utility with
capabilities have changed the paradigmatic terms of discourse. 76 It is no longer
necessary to debate the various meanings of utility and how best to distribute the
utilities. Positive, concrete freedoms, such as the Sen-Nussbaum list of capabilities
above demonstrates, have replaced the talk about utilities."
A new set of questions arise with this radical shift of the terrain of discourse.
What are the social, political, and economic conditions under which capabilities
are best promoted for all the people in an equalizing direction? Both the levels and
distribution of capabilities are important. Perhaps responding in an indirect way to
earlier criticisms, Sen has outlined the "perspective of freedom" more definitely.78
Freedom is important both for evaluative and for effectiveness reasons.
Evaluation of societies by the actual amount of substantive freedoms enjoyed by
people is radically different from using utility, procedural liberty, real income
etc.8 o Effectiveness reason rests on Sen's claim that freedom enhances the
"agency" of the individual leading to greater individual initiative and social
effective social participation.8 ' Thus, freedom can be viewed as both the primary
end and the principal means for development. Sen also gives a five-fold
classification of instrumental freedoms as consisting of political freedoms,
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective
security.82

In the rest of this section, I argue that a perspective of global "deep
democracy" consistent with Sen's characterization of freedom83 leads us to a
consistent critique of the existing political and socioeconomic arrangements
74. Id.
75. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE, at
vii, 136-139 (3d ed. 1932).
76. See generally SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3.
77. Id.
78. Compare SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 62-63, with Crocker, Functioning and
Capability, supra note 53, at 174-76.
79. SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 18.
80. Id. at 19.
8 1. Id. at 18.
82. Id. at xii.
83. Id. at 3-4 (alleging that freedoms are not limited to narrow views of development, but also
include social and economic arrangements and political and civil rights).
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globally and furthermore it can be a pointed critique of the unjust treatment of
women in developing world in particular at present. Following the enlightenment
project as formulated by Kant, 84 and the critique of Kantian understanding by
Hegel,8 5 and finally, the "this-sided" worldly critique of Hegel by Feuerbach 86 and
the dialectical critique of Feuerbach's one-sided materialism by Marx87 takes us to
a questioning of the existing institutions when these fail to promote and equalize
social capabilities. My piece Deepening DemocracyDuring Crisis: Building on an
Ontology of Difference captures many of these concerns.
Building on the contributions of classical thinkers from Rousseau to modern
theories of participatory and strong democracy advanced by scholars such as
Barber," "deep democracy" advances the thesis of equalization of capabilities as a
central concern of global economic justice. Most important from this perspective
is the work by scholars such as Alan Gilbert on radical democracy that is
internationalist and welcomes mass activism. 90
Extending the important earlier work of Gilbert, in a number of my essays and
books I establish the claim of equalizing social capabilities along with global
justice as central elements of a sufficiently rich conception of democracy that
respects the rights of citizens underlying the core concept of democracy. 9'
Conceiving rights following Sen as "goal rights" is one way to defend the
centrality of capabilities. Another way is to view these rights-most importantly,
the right to self-determination-as self-sustaining is if and only if movement
towards a global sustainability of equalization of capabilities occurs. Extending
Gilbert's cluster conditions for democracy, 92 I establish that three clusters are of
particular significance: political, economic, and cultural. 93
The political cluster begins with formal democratic principles of universal
suffrage and elections, but does not stop there. Although this "formal democracy"
must be defended vigorously, it is seen as one aspect of a deeper form of
democracy that various polities are moving towards. In order to gain insight into
this deeper form, we need to ask what conditions can sustain freedom-

84. IMMANUEL KANT, AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT is ENLIGHTENMENT?" 1-3 (1784),
available at https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/What isEnlightenment.pdf.
85. GEORG HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 213-14 (T. M. Knox trans., 1969).
86. FREDERICK ENGELS, LUDWIG FEUERBACH UND DER AUSGANG DER KLASSISCHEN DEUTSCIIEN
PHILOSOPHIE (1886), translated in LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF CLASSICAL GERMAN
PHILOSOPHY
(Progress
Publishers
1946),
available
at

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1 886/ludwig-feuerbach/.
87. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, in EARLY WRITINGS (T. B.
Bottomore trans., 1964).
88. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 123; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009), supra note

8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 1-2; Khan, Deepening Democracy, supranote 8.
89. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117 (1984).
90. GILBERT, supra note 31.
91. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 8, at 95-99.

92. GILBERT, supra note 31; see also George Kateb, Democratic Individuality and Claims of
Politics, 12 POLITICAL THEORY 331 (1984).
93. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supranote 8, at 92.
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particularly for women in developing countries-which underlies the core idea of
democracy. The answer is that as soon as freedom is conceived positively, and not
just as mere absence of coercions, capabilities come to the fore.
However, probing deeply into the project of enhancing and equalizing the
capabilities of citizens even in rough, practical sense, economic and cultural
conditions come to be seen as crucial. For example, education, including critical
ethical and political education, is recognized as of utmost importance. In so far as
democratic movements for a just society-women's rights movements being an
important part of these movements-have been schools for political education.
Schools of political education starting with at least the political movements from
17th century onwards including major movements in the 20th century and the new
social movements of this century are not just disruptive moments, but are complex
struggles where much political learning about freedom takes place. Thus, "deep
democracy" will necessarily involve a continuous engagement with the past,
present, and future of the democratic movements in a pluralistic context. Periodic
individual and mass, nonviolent civil disobedience movements will be a necessary
part of a "deep democratic" agenda.
Economically, the provision of leisure time for both personal private interest
and the exercise of citizenship responsibilities will be necessary. Workplace
democracy is also a salient condition, since production is socially necessary and
will occupy a certain amount of time for all able bodied and mentally competent
adults. The capabilities literature has not always been clear on this point. 94
However, it is logical to think that a person's capabilities will suffer deprivation if
working conditions do not allow discussion, participation, and "ownership" of
work conditions. The literature on flat organizations in knowledge economy
generally makes a case that organizations should treat the newer, "intellectual"
labor in this way.9 5 Alternatively, the social capabilities approach leads to the
conclusion that organizations large and small should treat all workers this way so
that organizations can overcome workplace alienation without necessarily using
labor saving capital-intensive technologies.
Overcoming alienation also requires a vibrant non-patriarchal culture where
artistic and other forms of individual and collective expressive activities are as
open as possible. Capabilities in this dimension are vital for the protection of
democratic values and practices, since these also involve internalization of mutual
respect, integrity, tolerance, and creativity. One can see that using the advances in
cognitive, social psychology and some schools of psychoanalysis capabilities can
be further advanced through a therapeutic approach to social problems. A
"postmodern" insight is also the need to recognize the limits to certain types of

94. See, e.g., KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 95-99; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009),
supra note 8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 4-5; Crocker, Functioning and
Capability, supra note 53; Khan, Global Financial Governance, supra note 73.
95. See, e.g., KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6 at 95-99; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009),
supranote 8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8; Crocker, Functioningand Capability,supra
note 53; Khan, Global Financial Governance, supra note 73.
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economic growth. As Daly and others have pointed out, the scale of production
counts in a globalized, interdependent planet in a significant way.9 6 Ecological
issues will often require a just, global democratic procedure for deliberation and
policymaking. In short, all of the cluster conditions-political, economic, and
cultural-require a theory of global justice as an underpinning and justification.
I have proposed such a theory in the context of a postmodern world by
building on elements of Rawls and Sen, using the ontology of difference to take it
beyond a simple Eurocentric framework. 97 In brief, the structural forces in the
global economy push towards integrating markets and regions. However, many
markets are embedded in national economies; there are also non-market aspects of
social and cultural lives of people that are threatened.98 As a result, we find the
contradictory phenomena of McWorld and Jihad. 99 The creation of a genuine
global society, which many see as the ultimate outcome of globalization, then
necessitates meeting the requirements of global justice. I mention at least five
areas, where the norms of global justice must evolve (among others): 00
1. International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric
system of payments that penalizes the deficit countries by forcing only
them to bear the costs of adjustment needs to evolve into a global burden
sharing institution. The World Trade Organization similarly needs to
acknowledge the historical imbalances in the world trading system. For
example, specialization according to static comparative advantage may
lock the developing countries in a relatively backward situation in the
emerging global division of labor. 1
2. Internationalcapitalflows: From the perspective of many people in the
developed economies, capital flight to least developed countries ("LDCs")
(with or without free trade agreements) may constitute a barrier to wellbeing, at least in the short-run.102 At the same time foreign direct
investment in LDCs may create only low-wage, marginal jobs.'o3 A just
approach to foreign direct investment must consider the effects on both
the north and south in terms of self-determination. A controlled capital
flow accompanied by improvements of wages and working conditions in
the south may be the most desirable solution.104
3. Internationalecological considerations:Global interdependence has been
increasingly recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what justice

96. See HERMAN E. DALY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE
SELECTED ESSAYS OF HERMAN DALY (2007).
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97. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 124-25.
98. Id.
99. BENJAMIN

(1995).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 128-29.

Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 131.
Adrian Wood, How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 57,61 (1995).
KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6.
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demands in terms of the relationship between the north and south. All
other things being equal, the enforcement of strict environmental
standards would seem to be just. However, some argue that such
standards may destroy the livelihood of some people in the south. A
global tax and transfer scheme would seem to be the precondition for
applying a global set of environmental standards. The transfer of
ecologically sound technology systems from rich to the poor countries is a
precondition for justice in this sphere. 0 5
4. Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing
discussion pinpoints the need for giving people the economic wherewithal
in order for them to develop their social capabilities. Most studies have
discovered that non-redistribution of assets to the poor hampers poverty
alleviation strategies. 0 6 Redistributing assets and developing their human
capital so that the poor can have access to markets becomes a major
necessity in our normative framework. In most parts of the world, this
will require structural reforms rather than marginal policy interventions.
5. Gender justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be
assessed carefully.
The well-documented facts regarding gender
inequalities, that so far have affected women's capabilities negatively,
demand unequivocally that policymakers pay careful attention to
enhancing (or at least not decreasing) women's capabilities. 107 Will
globalization help women to overcome social limitations such as lack of
nutrition and limits on participation in social, economic, and political life?
Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. As far as many developing country
women do not possess skills for the global market place, globalization is
already hurting them.
These five examples are illustrative and by no means do they exhaust all the
pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For example, we
could add or highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with globalization and its
implications for justice). Nevertheless, they do illustrate both the problems and
prospects for justice in the age of globalization. One of the major political
problems we have not discussed so far is the weakening of national sovereignty
that the call for global economic justice entails. Agreeing to a global mode of
production and distribution constrained by the principles of justice does mean
surrendering considerable authority to international agreements, conventions, and
ultimately, perhaps to new international organizations. It should be observed,
however, that even without the constraining role of justice, the globalization
process weakens national sovereignty, even for advanced industrialized countries

105. Id.
106. See, e.g., IRMA ADELMAN & SHERMAN ROBINsON, INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF KOREA (1978); Jeffrey James & Haider A. Khan, The
Employment Effects of an Income Redistribution in Developing Countries, 21 WORLD DEV. 817 (1993).
U.N.
DEV.
PROGRAM.
Reports
(2000-2012),
107. See
Human
Development
http://hdr.undp.org/en/global-reports (last visited July 20, 2014).
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(e.g., NAFTA). Thus, the call for a just economy must confront this (as well as
other issues, such as weakening of traditional cultural modes of living) head on in
the light of reasonable principles. The fundamental message is that among these
principles, freedom as rational autonomy of the individual must be the principal
one. This is one rational approach (perhaps the only one) if we are to avoid both
the Scylla of Jihad and the Charybdis of McWorld.
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real
economic, financial and technological integration. 08 Following the collapse of the
Bretton Woods Agreement in the early 1970s, the financial market (including
interest rates and exchange rates) was deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of
capital between nations.' 09 Until then the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945
governed the world financial system, which provided for fixed exchange rate that
The Nixon
expressed currency values in terms of dollars and gold.'Ho
administration laid the foundation for a global market when it abolished the
Bretton Woods system in 1971 and replaced it with a floating exchange rate."'
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation that became the "only game in town"
following the ascendance of political conservatives-Reagan in the U.S. and
Thatcher in Great Britain.' 12 The collapse of the former socialist countries and the
emergence of the neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged school of
thought further reinforced the global market foundation. All these factors created
an environment conducive for the free movement of goods, including capital
goods, and services as well as finance, thereby seemingly creating an integrated
global economy. In various articles, I have discussed the main causes of this
contradictory, but nonetheless integrating, moment in the world economy."
However, an alternative set of policies that can address the problems of slow
growth and external payments while promoting the equalization and enhancement
of social capabilities is also possible, as the discussion in Section 5 below will
show.
Before discussing these, however, I discuss the links between "social"
capabilities and process aspects of women's rights. Sen points out correctly that
while his version of capabilities approach is superior to others-e.g., the Rawlsian
primary goods framework-in terms of opportunities and positive freedom aspects,
it is weak concerning the procedural aspects of freedom and justice.11 4 Indeed,

108. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6.

109. Khan, Global Financial Governance, supra note 73, at 57.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Haider A. Khan, Using Macroeconomic Computable General Equilibrium Models to Assess
the Poverty Reduction Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies, (ADBI, Tokyo: Japan, Discussion
at
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available
No.
12,
2004)
[hereinafter
Paper
http://www.adbi.org/files/2004.07.dpl 2.macroeconomic.equilibrium.models.poverty.pdf.
114. See Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, supra note 2; Sen, Elements, supra note 2.
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Rawls's "first principle" of justice centers on the priority of liberty.'
The first
part of his "second principle" involves procedural fairness. In particular, it
demands "positions and offices [be] open to all."" 6
If we take Rawls seriously, we must properly emphasize the process aspect of
liberty in any foundational theory of human rights that claims to have some degree
of comprehensiveness.
Here the attraction of the "social" and political
interpretation of capabilities is that to some extent the social rules that respect this
emphasis on process can be included. A full articulation of this position is beyond
the scope of this paper. The intuition behind this claim, however, is that a
Hegelian approach that explicitly recognizes the importance of social and political
institutions in defining freedom and social individuality in incorporating the
process aspect within the ethical community (sittlichkeit).''"
VI.

THE ROLE OF A NETWORK OF INSTITUTIONS IN CREATING SOCIAL
CAPABILITIES FOR WOMEN: FREEDOM AS THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL
CAPABILITIES EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS

From our normative analysis so far it would appear that a nuanced, broad
consequentialism of the sort Sen advocates-"a goal rights system with
consequence based reasoning"-is superior to a narrow deontological view of
rights and freedom such as Nozick's." 8 However, the modern Hegel-Marx
connections push us further in the direction of a critical assessment of institutions
and the need for radical institutional change if necessary. The necessity for such
changes is obvious in predatory regimes such as the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia,
or Saudi Arabia under corrupt princes. A wide range of institutional changes is
necessary even in formally democratic regimes such as India, or Bangladesh." 9
The central point about deepening democracy is that it is an evolving,
dynamic network of institutions, and not just an agenda for piecemeal reforms.
Although individual reforms are welcome and should be supported vigorously, a
movement for "deep democracy" must advocate deeper, systemic changes along
with the specific reforms that people are fighting for at any given moment.
Therefore, the role of the new social movements for gender justice is, from this
perspective, positive and encouraging; but in order to be fully effective, these
movements must have a deep democratic agenda and fight for it openly.
The network of social, political, and economic institutions necessary for
promoting such wellbeing freedoms and agency freedoms as are necessary for the
full self-determination of women can be both historically and culturally specific,
thus respecting the ontology of difference. However, in keeping with a moral

115. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (1971).
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118. Sen, Rights and Capabilities,supra note 2, at 152-153; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
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119. See Haider A. Khan, Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability, 9 J. BANGL.
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realist theory of moral progress, they must involve the actual provisioning of
adequate amounts of resources and safeguards for women's rights all around
development. Along with the constitutionally liberal guarantees of physical safety
and freedom from arbitrary coercion, there must be positive guarantees of being
able to pursue a political life of citizenship that gives social and political
opportunities to all. In the age of globalization, this implies, ultimately, that
nothing short of a global charter of rights for all humans with implementing
institutions at international, national, and local levels are called for.
This may seem hopelessly utopian to many. Therefore, let me observe that
the strategic positioning of fighting for a global citizenship does not negate the
many small, local struggles for extending well-being and agency freedoms, but
rather the strategy is predicated upon active participation in whatever capacity it is
possible, across the national boundaries in these myriads of ongoing struggles.
The more farsighted people in the anti-globalization movements around the globe
are already moving in this direction. The positive policy changes from above for
promotion of the capabilities of the disadvantaged in particular-by the
International Financial Institutions, developed country governments, and
developing country governments-are always welcome developments. However,
the partial and limited nature of these policy initiatives needs to be recognized. It
is also doubtful that without mass democratic movements from below even limited
reforms from the above will be forthcoming.
The economic struggles for better wages and working conditions in both
domestic and transnational firms are of great significance in the age of
globalization. The social capabilities of women will remain greatly stunted even
under conditions of full employment if low wages and dangerous, unhealthy
working conditions are the norm. A more radical step, which is consistent with the
logic of development as freedom, is the overcoming of domination in the
workplace. Such struggles for the overcoming of domination in the workplace can
then be connected with the broader democratic movements around the world.
The important point that emerges from this perspective is that freedom is
positive, concrete, and dynamic. It is positive in the sense of alerting us to the
need for promoting social capabilities. It is concrete in two senses. One is the
concreteness in the identification of specific functionings and capabilities that the
"development as freedom" approach calls for explicitly. The second concrete
aspect-here freedom is finally, a "concrete universal" in Hegel's
terminology' 20-is the absolute necessity to embody social freedom in concrete,
interrelated, historically specific social, political, and economic institutions. It is
dynamic in the sense that such institutions, and to some extent, the idea of freedom
itself, may undergo further changes in the direction of promoting further
capabilities as the future unfolds. In the next section, I attempt a concrete
illustration of this idea by looking at the problems of women's capabilities.

120. HEGEL, supra note 29, at 152.
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VII. WOMEN'S CAPABILITIES PROMOTION AS A SPECIAL POLICY IMPERATIVE:
PRESENT TASKS AND A MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE FUTURE

Within this project of promoting global "deep democracy" through the
progressive equalization and enhancement of social capabilities defended above,
certain items such as ecological justice, sharing of wealth across borders, and
gender justice have proved to have both logical and normative salience. Here, I
develop one theme-namely, the problem of developing women's capabilities as
an important aspect of global justice-as an example to illustrate the practical
relevance of the capabilities approach.
Here, too, the two important modern pioneers are Sen and Nussbaum. Sen's
Inequality Reexamined has an important chapter on Gender and Capabilities.121
Sen has contributed to a rigorous examination of the connections between gender
and capabilities both conceptually and through empirical work in collaboration
with others. Women, Culture andDevelopment-Nussbaum's edited volume with
Jonathan Glover as the coeditor-is another landmark contribution to the field of
gender and development.122 Nussbaum's Women and Human Development: The
Capabilities Approach is also a most illuminating contribution, but here I will
focus on her pioneering contribution, Human Capabilities,Female Human Beings,
in Women Culture,and Development for the most part.123
Incidentally, Nussbaum also takes issue with certain relativist postmodern
criticisms of "essentialism" and defends an Aristotelian "essentialist" conception
of capabilities in Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings as well.124 My
approach here dispenses with "essentialism" in favor of ontological difference but
defends the human flourishing for women cogently by conceptualizing capabilities
as fully social within a history of struggles for moral progress that accord with the
theory of moral realism of Richard Boyd in particular.125
The Nussbaum-Glover book begins with a concrete case study of a woman's
right to employment in India and Bangladesh based on her fieldwork by Martha
Chen.126 Apart from the editors, the book presents a number of different
perspectives
equality.127

on methodology and foundations of conceptualizing

women's

For example, Onora O'Neill presents a vigorous case against using
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preference satisfaction as the normative criterion in economics. 128 She couples this
with an equally vigorous defense of the capabilities approach.1 29 She is, however,
a Kantian and weaves skillfully the capabilities approach with a form of the
Kantian principle that we not act on principles that we cannot act upon by all and
argues that such a Kantian principle can serve as a valuable test for viable social
policies. Her arguments result in showing that victimization, "by violence, by
coercion, by intimidation . . ."130 is simply unacceptable. Inter alia, this is also a
powerful condemnation of the victimization of women.
I have already mentioned David Crocker's meticulous essay on the concept of
capabilities.' 3 ' Hilary Putnam also defends a pragmatic approach close to John
Dewey's position that there could be a rational basis for articulating and holding
onto an ethical position.' 32 Although, as Linda Alcoff points out in her comments,
some feminists have followed philosophers such as Nietzsche and Foucault in
order to criticize the kind of "rationalistic" approach Putnam defends, the point
that democratic processes are necessary in Putnam's argument seems to be
intact.
In my defense of a deeper form of democracy, I have emphasized the
need for respecting differences, as well as the role of power and desire, without
making the last two items either epiphenomena or overwhelmingly arbitrary.
Indeed, the recognition of the Dionysian aspects of human nature leads to the need
for a structure and procedures for democracy that will both protect individuals
from tyranny and promote their social capabilities in an interactive, causally
reciprocal, and efficacious manner.
Respecting differences among cultures does not preclude a consideration of
cross-cultural standards of justice. This is an important conclusion drawn by Seyla
Benhabib in the Nussbaum-Glover volume.134 There are internal debates within
each culture about justice, as Sen and others have also pointed out.' 35 There may
be sufficient common ground among seemingly different cultures in their critical
and reflective discourses on ethics and justice. This points to the possibility of
discussing women's capabilities from a global and objective perspective. There
are a number of other essays-conceptual and empirical-including the highly

128. Onora O'Neill, Justice, Capabilities, and Vulnerabilities, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 140, 141-44 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan
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relevant and important essays in Part IV, which give regional perspectives on
women's equality from China, Mexico, India, and Africa. From matters of basic
functionings, such as health and survival, to issues related to political voice-in
short, the whole spectrum of functionings related to self-determination-there is
by now compelling recorded evidence of discrimination against women almost
In developing countries, along with general
everywhere in the world.
important
regional variations. For example, even
discrimination, there are also
less gender discrimination in basic
Africa
shows
with great poverty, Sub-Saharan
the Punjab. This also allows us to
Indian
state
of
health matters than the wealthy
in
some
Asian countries in particular.
of
such
discrimination
illustrate the severity
The female-male ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa is 102.2 to 100.136 The same
ratio for many Asian, Latin American, and North African countries is much
lower-in fact, the female percentage is less than male percentage. 137 In order to
dramatize the issue, Sen has expressed this gap as the absolute number of "missing
women."' 38 Following this approach, in the 1990s, the number of missing women
in Southeast Asia was 2.4 million; in Latin America it was 4.4 million; in North
Africa, 2.4 million; in Iran, 1.4 million; in China 44 million; in India 36.7 million;
in West Asia, 4.3 million.139 According to Dreze and Sen, in India there are more
girls dying than boys; i.e. mortality rates are higher for the girls. 140 Additionally,
the mortality rates are higher for women than men in all age groups until the late
thirty.141 As Chen, Nussbaum, and others have pointed out, income poverty alone
cannot explain this tragic fact.14 2 Social and political arrangements, including what
commonly goes under the names of customs and culture, are also implicated.143
The limits of cultural relativism become apparent in such a defining case as
women's mortality. Increasingly, the women and the poor themselves are
speaking out and asking for solutions.'"
Does this imply that "enlightened" policy makers and foreign aid workers,
including the NGOs, have the moral right to impose their policies on the women in
poor communities? Far from it. What we really need are new institutions
inclusive of women, led by them locally and working cooperatively with the other
democratic institutions. In other words, promotion of "deep democracy" at the
local level with active participation and leadership from local women is a
necessary condition.

136. Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF
CAPABILITIES 1, 3 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter
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It is also an implication of this type of policy and institutional approach that a
serious attempt must be made to collect and interpret the relevant information
regarding the functionings and capabilities of women. Indicators such as life
expectancy, females as a percentage of total population, and other demographic
data are, needless to say, as relevant as ever. Social indicators for education and
rights to participate in social life are also crucial. Additionally, political indicators
of democratic rights and democratic participation are of great importance. Only
when women have rights and are actually participating at all levels of political
organization, and indeed leading many of them, is it possible to claim that positive
political freedoms for women are an actuality.
VIII.CONCLUsIONS: THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL CAPABILITIES APPROACH AS AN
EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

In the end, we must recognize both the ontological basis in differential social
history of women for a social capabilities approach to women's human rights as
freedom and its normative and practical policy implications. This is why I try to
defend the concept of social capabilities in the book Technology, Development and
Democracy in a non-foundational and presuppositionless way while drawing out
the policy lessons.145 Furthermore, as the pioneering work of Sen and Nussbaum,
among others, have shown elegantly, there are many philosophical defenses of the
basic capabilities approach. The ontology of difference can do this by focusing on
women both as human beings and as a particular type of human beings with full
claims to individuality in the John Duns Scotus' sense of haecceity.146
The more important real world issue now is to make the many policy
implications of this approach subject of debate and discussion. This is already
happening to some extent. We have mentioned the human development index and
its various refinements.147 There are also periodic conferences at various
universities around the world to discuss theoretical advances and applications of
the capabilities approach. The World Institute for Development Economics
Research ("WIDER") has an ongoing research agenda that corresponds quite
closely to the social capabilities approach.14 8 One hope that emerges out of all
these activities is that policy makers in the International Financial Institutions and
the various regional and national organizations will attempt seriously to implement
a social capabilities-based approach. Two most important areas are poverty
reduction and overcoming women's particular deprivations. Needless to say, these
are related areas where policy approach must engage in active dialogues with
women and formulate policies with their full democratic participation.
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These do not cover all of the applicable areas, but are paradigmatic in the
sense that the clear and present relevance of the approach logically leads to an
agenda for action ranging from income transfers, public and private employment
creation to political freedom and activism.
One broad area of practical application, as even the International Financial
Institutions move away from the so-called Washington Consensus is the design
and implementation of alternative structural adjustment policies ("ASAPs").
Basically, the conventional structural adjustments policies ("SAPs") focus on short
to medium run results regarding inflation and balance-of- payments equilibrium.' 49
In the case of many impoverished economies, privatization itself may have become
a goal for structural reform. Likewise, market-making can also become a goal in
itself.15 0 Not enough recognition has been accorded to the economic side effects
such as unemployment or (at least a temporary) lowering of output. Social
dimensions of adjustment came to be recognized even later. The status of
vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the poor do not often figure
explicitly in these programs. From the arguments presented in this paper, it seems
that in order to design a capability-enhancing ASAP the following elements must
figure prominently:
1. A clear recognition of the status of the different socio-economic groups in
developing countries in terms of their economic and overall level of wellbeing.
2. A list of priorities in terms of economic and social goals must be
prepared. In the case of incompatibilities of some of these goals, the
question of trade-offs must be raised and resolved explicitly rather than
implicitly through the logic of the market.
3. In particular, issues of fair inter-regional allocation of resources or
opportunities must be addressed explicitly.
4. Human development indicators based on the capability framework must
become an integral part of ASAPs.
5. As our discussion in the previous section shows, the record of developing
countries concerning gender disparities is not flattering. Therefore,
gender-justice must become a central part of ASAPs-not a peripheral
issue to be ignored or to be resolved later after enough growth has taken
place.
6. As alluded to in the brief discussion of ecology, environment, and
sustainable development, with ecological effects of adjustment included,
must become the conceptual center of thinking about ASAPs in these
economies.

149. In Khan & Sogabe, supra note 71, we have attempted a statistical evaluation of the impacts of
the IMF programs for a large number of LDCs.
150. Market-making here refers to the idea that creation of markets for anything, i.e. commodifying
everything, is the solution. This has led to the privatization of water and protests against it among other
privatization and market-making moves.
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It follows then that an ASAP must explicitly address ecological and
distributional issues related to women in particular. This implies that
there will be a need for careful inter-disciplinary studies on probable
impacts of a policy package before its implementation. It also implies the
need for follow-up studies in order to assess the after-effects of an ASAP.
The crucial aspect here from the perspective of development as freedom is
to ascertain which substantive freedoms are enhanced or diminished and
then to assess their overall significance.
Looking further beyond the current economic problems with SAP, we might
ask if the freedom-centered perspective of women's rights and development will
survive. For not only is the world divided between the rich and the poor, there are
also dark and destructive political and cultural forces ranging from arms race to
global terrorism. Indeed, it will be naive to pretend that recognition of what is
good will automatically lead to that good. Here again, the argument cannot stop at
simply establishing the validity of the women's rights as demands for enhancing
the social capabilities as freedom approach, but it must furnish grounds for
thinking that there is a fighting chance of getting there.
The emphasis here on both achieving constitutional guarantees of freedom
and on the need for an ever vigilant politically aware and active mass democratic
movement will, I hope, focus attention on the crucial political and cultural aspects
of equalizing capabilities for women. Without a vigorous, self-aware, and selfcritical democratic movement that genuinely respects social individuality and its
all around development, the approach discussed here can only be just another
academic discourse. The substantive approach to social capabilities underlined in
this paper gives me hope that combining a critical theory with all around social
practice and movement from below will make women's rights as human rights an
achievable project in our lifetime.
7.

WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE RIGHT TO FOOD, FOOD WASTE AND
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
ANASTASIA TELESETSKY*

I.

INTRODUCTION
If we want farmers to grow a surplus, they need processing and safe
storage facilities so they are not forced to watch their harvested crops be

eaten by pests or spoil in un-insulated sheds. They need roads that are
not only paved but able to withstand more frequent and extreme
weather. And they need reliable access to electricity and clean water, as
well as links to markets and information.'
Food producers and companies that support these producers would have us
believe that there is not enough food quantity to feed the growing human
population and so they urge an expansion of agricultural production.2 Yet, these
same producers give little thought to systematically reducing food waste even
though this is one of the understated tragedies for our times. The Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO") estimates that one-third of global food
production for humans is lost or wasted.' With 1.3 billion tons of food being either
lost or wasted,4 this is a topic that has shocked the moral conscience of global
thought leaders. Pope Francis gave a passionate oration on waste when he spoke
in St. Peter's Square on World Environment Day in June 2013, observing that:
The culture of waste has made us insensitive even to the waste and
disposal of food, which is even more despicable when all over the
world, unfortunately, many individuals and families are suffering from
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hunger and malnutrition ... Throwing away food is like stealing from
the table of the poor and hungry. 5
As Pope Francis insists, we have globally become inured to various food
waste practices across the community of nations that leave individuals and families
hungry. Yet food waste is not simply a topic of moral concern, it is also, as this
essay will argue, a topic of serious legal magnitude. Food waste has been
historically the largest overlooked component of achieving the internationally
recognized "right to food." Creating a zero food waste sustainable development
goal to measure progress towards achieving global food security is an appropriate
and progressive step to achieving the "right to food."
The problem of food loss and waste ("food waste") 6 is not simply an affliction
of the wealthy nations. Even those countries most in need are losing food at
unsustainable rates that are exacerbating existing shortfalls of food supplies. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is projected that at current population growth rates and
current production rates, the region will only be able to produce twenty-five
percent of its own food.7 At the same time, recent FAO statistics indicate that due
largely to production loss close to 150 kilograms of food is lost or wasted per year
per person in Sub-Sahara Africa and South/Southeast Asia, two of the most
vulnerable regions to food insecurity.! United Nations Environment Programme
("UNEP") reports that thirty million tons of fish are annually discarded, which
accounts for about one-quarter of the annual marine landings. 9
Food insecurity is a chronic problem, particularly in the developing world
where droughts or floods may devastate food crops and there is no automatic
government benefit plan to fill the shortfall for the dependent families. Between
2011 and 2013, about one in eight people in the world (842 million people)
continued to suffer from chronic hunger particularly in areas such as Sub-Saharan
Africa.'o While there are estimates that food production will need to increase
5. Joe Phelan, Pope Declares that Wasting Food is Akin to Stealing from the Poor, CHARTERED
INST. WASTE MGMT. JOURNAL ONLINE (June 29, 2013), http://www.ciwm-joumal.co.uk/archives/1 609.
6. FAO defines food waste and food loss as two different concepts. FAO, FOOD WASTAGE
FOOTPRINT:
IMPACTS
ON
NATURAL
RESOURCES
8-9
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3347e/i3347e.pdf. Food loss refers to an inadvertent decrease in mass
or quality of food intended for human consumption. See id. Food waste refers to the deliberate
discarding of food that is appropriate for human consumption. Id. at 9. While FAO refers to the
concepts of food loss and food waste together as "food wastage," this paper will simply use the plain
language term of "food waste." Id.
7. GLOBAL HARVEST INITIATIVE, 2013 GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY REPORT:
SUSTAINABLE PATHWAYS TO SUFFICIENT NUTRITIOUS AND AFFORDABLE FOOD 10 (2013), available at
http://globalharvestinitiative.org/GAP/2013_GAP ReportBOOKONLINE.pdf.
8. Gustavsson et al., supra note 3, at 5, fig.2.
9. U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME [UNEP], THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS: THE
ENVIRONMENT'S ROLE IN AVERTING FUTURE FOOD CRISIS: UNEP RAPID RESPONSE ASSESSMENT 29
(C.
Nellemann
et
al.
eds.,
2009),
available
at
http://www.grida.no/files/publications/FoodCrisis-lores.pdf.
10. FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF
FOOD SECURITY 8 (2013) [hereinafter THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013], available
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/0I8/i3434e/i3434e.pdf.
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somewhere between fifty percent by 2030 and seventy percent by 2050 to meet the
needs of an increasing population," it becomes clear that states can and should
invest in reducing and preventing food waste rather than simply investing in new
production to meet the increased needs.
This article urges the development of a global economic development strategy
based on the human "right to food" that takes into consideration the chronic and
pervasive global food waste problems. Specifically, this article argues that the
Sustainable Development Goals offer a significant vehicle for achieving the human
"right to food" by focusing global attention on eliminating food waste. This article
argues for increasing human prosperity not by pursuing new growth (literally, in
this case), but rather by investing in the full protection of already existing
agricultural resources. In international food policy, the adage "waste not, want
not" should be the foundation upon which all other food decisions are made.
II.

REDUCING FOOD WASTE AS PART OF THE PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO FOOD IN A "GREEN ECONOMY"

While most intergovernmental attention has focused on increasing food
availability,12 relatively little attention has been given to creating international,
regional, and national legal frameworks for food waste reduction. In fact, only five
percent of agricultural development money is allocated to storage and processing
solutions with the remainder focused on new production.1 3 This lack of support is
surprising because food storage does not require substantial financial investments
on the part of either host governments or donor governments in order to make a
measurable impact on improving livelihoods.14
According to the FAO, we produce enough food for each person to have

approximately 2,700 calories each day and yet there is still chronic hunger. '5
While part of the disconnect between the available calories and the hungry
communities may be attributed to ongoing civil wars leading to internal
displacement or to environmental catastrophes correlated with climate shifts, part
of the story is also one of waste due in part to a lack of basic economic
infrastructure to properly manage and store food along the entire food chain from
production to consumption. Food is wasted at a number of different steps along
the food chain, beginning with production losses due to either poor harvest

I1. LUCIA WEGNER & GINE ZWART, OXFAM INT'L, WHO WILL FEED THE WORLD? THE
PRODUCTION CHALLENGE 3 (2011), http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/who-will-feedthe-world-rr-26041 I-en.pdf, FAO, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE TOWARDS 2050, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/ssuespapers/HLEF2050 Global Agriculture.pdf.
12. THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013, supra note 10, at 10.
13. See UNEP, TOWARDS A GREEN ECONOMY: PATHWAYS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND

(2011),
available
at
54,
Box
5
POVERTY
ERADICATION
http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/ger/ger final dec_2011 /Green%20Economy
Report FinalDec2011 .pdf.
14. Id. (finding that an investment of between $20-$100 for either a small-capacity or large
capacity metal grain silo would increase the price of grain per 100 kilograms from $13 to $38).
15. JEAN ZIEGLER ET AL., THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2012).
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practices or bycatch discard practices. Waste problems are compounded by losses
due to a lack of adequate storage, processing capacity, or available markets. The
consumer is the last link in the waste chain with food discarded due to a lack of
storage capacity or wasteful cultural practices. While there is less food wasted in
the Global South at the consumer end than in the Global North, where the problem
of food waste is particularly acute, there is still approximately 120-170 kilograms
of food wasted per person per year in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia with
approximately six to eleven kilograms of that waste directly attributable to
consumers.16
Given the high population densities in the Global South, the cumulative loss
of food in the Global South is noteworthy. For example, researchers from China
Agricultural University observed that edible food thrown out by restaurants in
China between 2006 and 2008 accounted for almost ten percent of the country's
annual crop production during that time period, or enough to feed 200 million
people.' 7 FAO calculates that 300 million individuals could be fed with the lost
and wasted food from Africa alone." Much of this loss can be attributed to
"financial, managerial and technical limitations in harvesting techniques, storage
and cooling facilities in difficult climatic conditions, infrastructure, packaging and
marketing systems." 9 Some food products are more problematic than others.
Cassava, which is typically sold as a fresh root and tuber in the Global South, is
highly perishable, and there have been insufficient efforts to address post harvest
handling and storage.2 o Over half of the fruits and vegetables produced in Africa
and non-industrialized Asia are wasted.2 ' Most of this waste occurs at the postharvest and processing stage due to perishability in the humid climate of many
states.22 Milk is also frequently wasted in the Global South due to a lack of easily
available cold storage facilities.2 3
Unlike some global challenges that require member states to make sacrifices,
reducing food waste is a relatively tractable problem that depends largely on
coupling targeted government food security interventions with pro-poor
community agriculture investment programs. Reminding individual states of their
ongoing obligations to fulfill the "right to food" for their citizens and to support
other states in achieving their efforts to achieve the "right to food" may be one
means of improving food security.

16. Gustavsson et al., supra note 3, at 5.
17. Zhou Wanging, From Famine to Food Waste: Time to Reflect, CHINA DIALOGUE (Feb. 12,
2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/5697-From-famine-to-food-waste-time-to-reflect/en.
18. Save Food: Global Initiative of Food Losses and Waste Reduction-Key Findings, FAO,
http://www.fao.org/save-food/key-findings/en/ (last visited June 29, 2014).
19. Gustavsson et al., supranote 3, at v.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 7 fig.6.
22. Id. at 7-8.
23. Id at 9, 12.
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A. Right to Food
This lack of systematic attention to reduction of food waste reflects in part a
lack of international commitment to progressively implementing the "right to
food" enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the "Declaration of
Human Rights"). Article 25 of the Declaration of Human Rights provides that,
"[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food . . . .24 Article 11 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (the "Covenant")
provides for State recognition of "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living . . . including adequate food . .. and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions." 25 States are expected to "take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of this right" which includes "recognizing . . . the essential importance

of international co-operation based on free consent." 2 6 The Covenant provides one
narrow reference to reducing food waste. Parties to the Covenant are expected
"individually and through international co-operation" to "improve methods of
production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical
and scientific knowledge . . . by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such

a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural
resources."27 The choice of the words "conservation . . . of food" suggests an
obligation to use existing knowledge to protect existing food resources from waste
so as to ensure "efficient ... utilization of natural resources." While this language
may have been intended to be narrowly tailored to the food waste that happens as
food loss in the fields as part of agricultural systems, it can also be read to apply to
a lack of storage, markets, commodity networks, and small-scale processing
industries since the obligation includes "developing or reforming agrarian
systems." A connection between Article 11(2)(a) and the global efforts to reduce
food waste has not been explicitly made, but is essential because it provides a
needed legal catalyst for action beyond moral motivations.
General Comment 12, drafted by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, further refined the legal content of the "right to food" by
indicating that the right included an obligation on the part of the State to respect,
protect, and fulfill access to adequate food. 2 8 Each of these operative terms was
further defined to provide guidance to states about basic content of the obligation.
Regarding the obligation to "fulfill" the "right to food," states are specifically
expected to "pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen people's
access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood,

24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, art. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(lll) (Dec. 10, 1948).
25. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art.
11(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1976).
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 11(2).
28. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 12:
The Right to Adequate Food,1 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
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including food security." 29 This language when viewed in the context of
continuing food losses and food wastage implies a defined obligation for states to
actively protect food sources from wastage to ensure that its populations will have
optimal use of existing food resources.
1. World Food Summit and Plans of Action
The "right to food" was further refined in the 1996 Rome Declaration at the
World Food Summit (the "Rome Declaration") with commitments by 180 nations
to reduce the number of people with inadequate food by 2015.30 To implement the
Rome Declaration, states were expected to nationally "adopt actions .. . to enhance
food security" as well as to "improve sub-regional, regional, and international
cooperation" in order "to mobilize, and optimize the use of, available resources to
support national efforts ....
In the "World Food Summit Plan of Action" agreed to by the states to
implement the Rome Declaration, there were four significant references to food
waste. In the most important food waste reference in the Plan of Action, states
agreed to "formulate and implement integrated rural development strategies . . .
that promote rural employment, skill formation, infrastructure, institutions and
services, in support of rural development and household food security . . . ."32
Specifically "governments, in partnership with all actors of civil society, and with
the support of international institutions, will, as appropriate ... reduce post-harvest
losses and ensure safe storage, food processing and distribution facilities and
transportation systems." 33 In the second reference, states and civil society groups
agreed to "[d]evelop and promote improved food processing, preservation and
storage technologies to reduce post-harvest food losses, especially at the local
level." 34 In the third reference, states agreed "[t]o pursue .

.

. reduced wastes and

losses, taking fully into account the need to sustain natural resources" 35 without
any further explication of how they would achieve this commitment. In the final
reference to waste and loss, states agreed to "combat environmental threats to food
security" and specifically to reduce bycatch waste from fishing. 36
After the World Food Summit, the FAO Committee on World Food Security
was assigned the charge of monitoring, evaluating, and consulting on the
implementation of the Plan of Action (the "Action Plan").37 The specific

29. Id.
30. FAO, ROME DECLARATION ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY AND WORLD FOOD SUMMIT PLAN OF

at

(1996),
available
ACTION
1
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/lead/toolbox/indust/romedec.pdf.
31. See id. 11158-59.
32. Id. 1|136.
33. Id.
34. Id.1121(d).
35. Id.1132.
36. Id. 1133.

37. World
Food
Summit
and
its
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x2051 e/x205 I eOO.HTM.

Follow

Up,

FAO

(June

1999),
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commitments under Objective 2.3 and Objective 3.5 of the Action Plan reflect an
explicit understanding by 1996 that more needed to be done at every stage of the
food cycle including the final stages where food is wasted and lost, particularly
post-harvest. Yet it was over a decade before countries began to engage in
designing community-based infrastructure to address the ongoing tragic loss of
food to spoilage. At the international level, post-1996 until almost 2004, there
appeared to be little large-scale systematic effort on reduction of food waste or
losses. In fact, as recently as 2012, FAO indicated in its Action Plan to Improve
Agricultural and Rural Statistics that more attention needs to be given simply to
statistically calculating post-harvest losses.3 In the Mid-Term Review of the
World Food Summit, ten years after the original summit, there was not a single
mention of the need to curb food losses or food wastes. Rather, the lessons learned
by states as reflected in the report of the Committee on World Food Security
continued to focus on agricultural growth with the emphasis on enhancing the
"performance of the productive sectors." 39 No mention was made of tackling food
waste in spite of the earlier commitments within the Action Plan.
2.

Voluntary Guidelines on the Progressive Realization of the Right
to Food

Only one mention is made indirectly to food waste reduction in the Voluntary
Guidelines on the Progressive Realization of the Right to Food (the "Guidelines"),
even though the guidelines were supposedly designed "to provide practical
guidance to States in their implementation of the progressive realization of the
right to adequate food in the context of national food security, in order to achieve
the goals of the World Food Summit Plan of Action." 4 0 Paragraph 27 provides that
states will promote adequate and safe food supplies through, inter alia, storage and
distribution. 41 Appearing under the subtitle of "economic development policies," it
is unclear whether states are undertaking voluntarily the commitment to build more
storage facilities and public markets for insecure food producers. With only one
reference that remains ambiguous in terms of what states obligations are more
specifically, the disconnect between the Plan of Action's specific provisions on
reducing post-harvest losses and the Guidelines' generalizations seems to reflect a
lack of political interest in addressing food waste as a human rights concern.

38. FAO, THE WORLD BANK & THE UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL COMMISSION, ACTION PLAN
OF THE GLOBAL STRATEGY TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL STATISTICS: FOR FOOD
SECURITY, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 46 (2012), available at

http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3082e/i3082e.pdf
39. FAO Committee on World Food Security [CFS], Mid-Term Review of Achieving the World
Food
Summit
Target,
CFS:
2006/3
1 74
(Aug.
2006),
available
at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/01 I/j8303e.pdf.
40. FAO, THE RIGHT TO FOOD: VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES TO SUPPORT THE PROGRESSIVE
REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY 2

(Nov.
2004)
[hereinafter
THE
RIGHT
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/y7937e/y7937e00.pdf.
41. Id. at 10.

TO

FOOD],

available

at
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Only recently has political attention to food waste begun to gain some traction
as a priority topic for national governments making specific investments in food
industries. In the past five to ten years, a number of countries issued national
reports based on their implementation efforts under the 1996 Global Plan of
Action. 42 Most of these reports indicated that the states were still struggling with
reducing post-harvest losses that were resulting in food wastage. In most cases,
these losses were directly correlated with insufficient linkages between
geographically dispersed producers and markets. For example, Bangladesh in its
2008-2015 National Food Policy Plan of Action explicitly noted that
"[d]eficiencies in transportation/connections with markets, packaging, handling
and storage facilities .

.

. continue to prevent farmers from getting full returns on

their produce." 43 In Pakistan, where twenty-five to thirty-five percent of food is
lost to post-harvest losses, the government noted the need for "better harvesting,
handling, storage, packing and packaging and transportation of the produce" with
investments in "cold chain transportation and modern ware-house storage
systems." 44 Likewise in Malaysia, which is generally food secure when compared
to Bangladesh and Pakistan, the Government emphasized the need for creating
near production areas farm collection centers, packing house facilities, trading
centers, and wholesale markets in order to reduce post-harvest losses.4 5 A number
of countries, such as Indonesia with high poverty rates and high food wastage,
reported no efforts to examine food losses in their follow-up reports. 4 6 Generally,
follow-up to the World Food Summit has been relatively poor or at least not very
public. 47
While food waste and food loss is a known problem that has been identified
by decision-makers over the course of the past two decades, it has received, at best,
passing global notice until 2011 when the Swedish Institute for Food and
Biotechnology at the request of the FAO published the report, "Global Food
Losses and Food Waste."" This report observed that food in the Global South was
42. FAO, THE RIGHT TO FOOD IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD
FOOD SUMMIT PLAN OF ACTION 23 (1998).
43. FOOD PLANNING & MONITORING UNIT MINISTRY OF FOOD & DISASTER MGMT., GOV'T OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGL., THE NATIONAL FOOD POLICY PLAN OF ACTION (2008-2015), at

43

(2008),

available

at

http://www.nfpcsp.org/agridrupal/sites/default/files/TheNational FoodPolicy Plan-of Action_(2008
-1 5).pdf.
44. MINISTRY OF FOOD, AGRIC. & LIVESTOCK, Gov'T OF PAK., COUNTRY REPORT FOR THE
FOLLOW-UP OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WORLD FOOD SUMMIT-PLAN OF ACTION 18 (Aug. 2004),

available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/Meeting/008/aeO I 4e.pdf.
45. MALAYSIA MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & AGRO-BASED INDUS. FOLLOW-UP OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD FOOD SUMMIT PLAN OF ACTION I (May 2008), available at

ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/Meeting/0 I 3/AI699c.pdf.
46. See THE AGENCY FOR FOOD SEC., MINISTRY OF AGRIC., REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, FOLLOWUP OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD FOOD SUMMIT PLAN OF ACTION 3 (Dec. 22, 2005),

available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/0 I 0/ag3 1Oe.pdf.
47. MICHAEL WINDFUHR & JANNIE JONSEN, FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN
LOCALIZED FOOD SYSTEMS, at xi-xii (2005).
48. Gustavsson et al., supra note 3.
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largely wasted either some point between production stage and the processing
stage. 49 The authors recommended government investment in roads, energy and
market accompanied by private investments in transportation, storage, cooling and
markets.5 0 Additional investments should be made to link farmers with either
processors or consumers to reduce food losses.5 1 Current market facilities in the
Global South are often unsanitary and lack appropriate storage equipment to
maintain perishables. 52
3.

2013 Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition

When the non-binding Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and
Nutrition was drafted in October 2013 to improve coordination between the
recently reformed Committee on Food Security and stakeholders, food waste was
briefly identified as a cause of chronic hunger.5 3 The Committee on Food Security
noted that states must "reduce high levels of post-harvest losses and food waste
through investment in improving rural infrastructure, including communications,
transport, storage, energy . . . "54

In spite of this explicit recognition of the waste

problem, reducing waste did not play a primary role in the overall framework.
Only two mentions were made in the document. First, the drafters concluded that
waste needed to be addressed as a strategy for avoiding excessive food price
volatility by increasing food production and availability.5 5 Second, waste is
addressed as a small-scale food production problem with states, international
organizations and regional organizations encouraged to implement policies
"reducing post-harvest losses and increasing post-harvest value addition, and on
fostering smallholder-inclusive local, national and regional food markets, including
transportation storage and processing." 56 Curiously, the management of the food
chain to avoid waste was identified as a potential food security and nutrition issue
in a final section of the report for issues "that may require further attention" with
the caveat that it may not be an issue to be handled by the Committee on Food
Security.
The lack of prominence given in the framework to reducing food waste is
surprising. While other food security themes, such as increasing sustainable
agricultural production and climate-proofing agriculture, received their own
sections,5 8 the mention of reducing waste was extremely brief. The idea in the
concluding section that reducing food waste may not be a priority for the
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id.

53. FAO COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY, GLOBAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR FOOD
SECURITY
AND
NUTRITION
9
(2013),
available
at

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docsl213/gsf/GSF Version_2_EN.pdf.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at18-19.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id. at 23, 34.
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Committee can be construed as irresponsible and reflects a lack of strategy on the
part of the international community for achieving short-term food security. With
food waste being downplayed in the document that reflects the most current
thinking on international food security, there needs to be other means of tackling
what seems to be both an obvious and a tractable problem requiring only limited
new resources and technologies. One potential important venue for advancing the
human rights agenda underlying the legal imperative to reduce food waste is the
emerging concept of the "green economy." As will be suggested in the final
section of Part I, linking a "right to food" that includes an obligation to address
food waste with the concept of the "green economy" holds great promise for
restoring potentially up to one-third of our food stocks.
B.

Green Economy

Wasting food is a multi-resource problem. The waste associated with food
extends beyond simply the food products to include irrigation water, fossil fuel,
agricultural inputs, soil, and labor.5 9 FAO estimates that the ecological footprint
for 1.3 gigatonnes of wasted food is 3.3 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide, 250 cubic
kilometers of wasted water, and 1.4 billion hectares of typically monocropped land
that could have been put to other uses.o In January 2014, scientists observed that
croplands are continuing to expand at expense of savannah, forests, and grassland,
with little consideration for how to use existing agricultural land more
effectively.6' The use of these resources to make food that is never consumed is
likely to have other unintended external consequences. For example, in China,
agriculture has a greater impact on water pollution than any other industrial
sector.62 Where food is produced and then never consumed because of waste,
states will find themselves confronting the social costs of food production such as
overexposure to pesticides without reaping equivalent social benefits from
consumption.
The perpetuation of the food waste problem runs counter to the basic
principles of the "Green Economy," an idea actively promoted by the UNEP as a
mechanism for achieving sustainable development and ensuring that per capita
welfare does not decline over time.63 As understood by policymakers, the outcome
of a "green economy" is a low-carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive
economy supported by public and private investments in improving resource

59. FAO, FOOD WASTAGE FOOTPRINT: IMPACTS ON NATURAL RES., supra note 6, at 10.

60. Id. at6.
61. UNEP INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PANEL, ASSESSING GLOBAL LAND USE: BALANCING
CONSUMPTION
WITH
SUSTAINABLE
SUPPLY
13
(2014),
available
at

http://www.unep.org/resourcepanel/Portals/24102/PDFs//FullReportAssessingGlobalLandUseEnglish_%28PDF%29.pdf.
62. UNEP, TOWARDS A GREEN ECONOMY: PATHWAYS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
POVERTY
ERADICATION
50
(2011),
available
at

http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/ger/ger
ReportFinalDec2011 .pdf.
63. Id. at 17.

final dec_2011 /Green%20Economy
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efficiency.64 In relation to food waste, UNEP recognizes that increasing postharvest storage and processing facilities are aspects of "the greening of
Food recovery may be improved "through simple targeted
agriculture."65
In particular, UNEP promotes
investments in post-harvest supply chains."6
"village-level processing of farm products and by-products" 67 which would include
taking food clippings and scraps from processing and processing them into organic
For foods that do not need to be immediately processed such as
fertilizers.
grains, UNEP suggests concerted efforts to provide appropriate storage facilities or
packaging processes to prevent waste.
Unlike the food security agenda with the legally cognizable "right to food,"
there is no legal framework negotiated for the implementation of a "green
economy." The concept of the "green economy" is instead a signifier to encourage
the building of a normative bridge between the existing "business as usual"
approach and a socially inclusive, environmentally protective economy. While this
article suggests that UNEP's vision of a "green economy" can be valuable in
catalyzing food waste reduction, the "green economy" idea has many critics who
consider it to be either not radical enough of a normative approach69 or believe that
it fails to take sufficient account of social aspects of growth and remains fixated on
economic models. 70 One means of addressing both of these critiques is to connect
the "green economy" explicitly to the achievement of the "right to food."
UNEP suggests that states may be able to effectively mainstream green
economy principles through the negotiation of a combination of environmental and
social indicators that might be adopted by states as indicators of progress on
achieving "green economy" sustainability.71 Among the proposed factors with
relevance to food waste are water stress, land conservation, material productivity,
water productivity, carbon dioxide productivity, fossil fuel subsidies, water
subsidies, and access to resources.72 If these indicators were ever to become the
basis for creating new legal obligations for states based on national "green

64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 42.
66. Id. at 47.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 54.
69. Donald K. Anton, The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and the
Future of InternationalEnvironmental Protection , 7 CONSILIENCE: J. SUSTAINABILITY 64, 69 (2012)
(urging for global leaders to focus on environment and not merely "green economy").
70. Barbara Unmfifig et al., Critique of the Green Economy: Toward Social and Environmental
Equity,

22

HEINRICH-BOLL-STIFTUNG

ECOLOGY

1,

32,

35-36

(2012),

available

at

https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/Critique of the GreenEconomy.pdf (arguing that none of the
deliberations on a green economy include considerations relating to human rights, issues of distribution
or democratic rights of participation as key components of a green economy).
71. Andrea Bassi et al., Green Economy: Measuring Progress Towards a Green Economy 8
at
2012),
available
June
Working
Paper,
Draft
(UNEP,
http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/researchproducts/MeasuringProgress.pdf.
72. Id. at 10-11, 14.
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economy" laws,n eliminating food waste and those practices that contribute to
ongoing food waste would transition from being marginal issues in national,
regional and international policymaking to human security and sustainability
priorities. Specifically, a "green economy" effort focused on these indicators
would be an appropriate measure to achieving specific obligations of states to
achieve "conservation . .. of food" under the "right to food."
C. Connecting the Right to Food with the Green Economy
The World Food Summit Plan of Action and the "green economy" described
above are products of international political consensus.
What this means
practically is that neither of the efforts have binding effect on states and
achievement depends entirely on political will. They are merely guidance
documents that may or may not be considered priorities for states. Based on the
national plans by countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, there is an explicit
recognition of the connection between practices that lead to food waste and food
security. 74 While this is significant in terms of demonstrating government
awareness of the problem, it does not mean that governments must initiate actions
under the plans. In fact, a State can argue that because reducing food waste is just
one alternative among many for achieving food security goals, it has instead
chosen other paths for achieving food security such as increasing food production
through, for example, large agribusiness investments.75 For communities that
currently lack appropriate food harvesting technology, food storage, food
processing capacity, or access to markets, there are few means to ensure
government accountability under the national plans.
Linking food waste to the fulfillment of a "right to food" might create new
channels for accountability. The value in approaching the food waste challenge
through the well-accepted legal "right to food" is that it makes explicit that states
have legal human rights-based obligations not just to ensure opportunities for
individuals to produce food but also to protect food that has been produced. This
presents an important policy development because it opens the possibility for
private ventures such as family farms to receive public support probably in the
form of subsidies for the construction of food storage and processing facilities as
well as the facilitation of food transport and marketing networks. While countries
may prefer to pursue this type of infrastructure via public-private partnerships
73. See e.g., CAMERON ALLEN & STUART CLOUTH, A GUIDEBOOK TO THE GREEN ECONOMY,
DIVISION

FOR

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

(2012),

available

at

http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/GE%20Guidebook.pdf;
Keshore
Kumar
Heeramun, National Initiatives on Green Economy: The Case Study of Mauritius, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Presentation%20on%20Green%/ 20Economy%/o20%20MauritiusK.Kumaro20Heeramun.pdf (explaining how Mauritius is mainstreaming "green
economy" principles in existing laws and emerging policy frameworks).
74. FOOD PLANNING & MONITORING UNIT MINISTRY OF FOOD & DISASTER MGMT., supra note
43; MINISTRY OF FOOD, AGRIC. & LIVESTOCK, supra note 44.

75. Fact
Sheet-IFC
and
Food
Security,
INT'L
FIN.
CORP.
(2011),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/837565804cf33c85aal2eff81ee631cc/Fact+Sheet+IFC+and+Food
+Security.pdfMOD=AJPERES.
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because it requires less financing from the government, the inclusion of food waste
within the contours of the legal "right to food" does not rule out the possibilities of
these types of liaisons between the public and private sector. Instead, the inclusion
of food waste in a legally cognizable "right to food" centers attention on the
adequacy of the government's policies to address its most impoverished
populations who have for over a decade lived marginal lives without fundamental
publicly-supported community infrastructure to assist them in achieving basic
economic development objectives.
Addressing the food waste concern has the potential to also contribute to
progressive realization of other human rights including the right to water.
Agriculture, particularly in the developing world, is one of the lead users of
water.76 To the extent that freshwater that has already been applied to grow food,
eliminating food waste will also conserve water resources rather than lead to
unnecessary water losses that benefit neither humans nor ecosystems. While
statistics are not easily available in the Global South, one analysis found that the
water and energy contained in food waste represent twenty-five percent of the total
water usage and four percent of the total oil consumption in the United States.7 7 If
the numbers are equally high in the Global South, then addressing food waste
becomes even more imperative given the concerns over an impending freshwater
crisis.7
Finally, explicitly connecting food waste to the achievement of the "right to
food" may trigger the obligations of states both individually and as members of
intergovernmental organizations to transfer technology and provide financing.
While some organizations such as the International Fund for Agriculture and
Development may already be pursuing efforts to reduce food waste in the
programs that they oversee, there is no obligation for them to act. Linking food
waste to the "right to food" makes it explicit to the states individually and as
members of international organizations that there is an affirmative obligation on
the part of each organization to cooperatively assist states in their efforts to achieve
the "right to food." The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
indicated that international organizations "have a strong and continuous
responsibility to take whatever measures they can to assist governments to act in
ways which are compatible with their human rights obligations and to seek to
devise policies and programmes which promote respect for those rights." 79 In the

76. U.N. WATER, WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3: WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 8

(2009),
available
at
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR3_Facts and Figures.pdf.
77. Kevin D. Hall et al., The Progressive Increase of Food Waste in America and Its
Environmental Impact,
PLoS
ONE,
Nov.
25,
2009,
at
4,
available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2Fl 0.1371%2Fjoumal.pone.0007
940&representation=PDF.
78. Stewart Patrick, The Coming Global Water Crisis, COUNSEL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 8, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2012/05/the-coming-global-water-crisis/256896.
79. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Globalization and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 5, U.N. Doc. E/1999/22 (May 15, 1998).
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case of food waste, this applies not just to food-specific organizations such as the
Food and Agriculture Organization or the World Food Programme, but also to
financing organizations such as the regional development banks and trade
organizations such as the World Trade Organization. Each international institution
should consider how a "right to food" that includes elimination of systemic food
waste can be effectively implemented using the functions and powers of the
international institution. As will be explored in Part III below, the most immediate
need for states in the Global South is small-scale financing for small-scale harvest,
storage, and processing technologies.
III. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, ZERO HUNGER CHALLENGE,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND FOOD WASTE

International social and environmental indicators as measures of sustainable
development achievement do not yet exist.so At the close of 2015, there is a global
expectation that states will agree to a series of sustainable development goals
("SDGs") in order to extend some of the successes of the millennium development
goals ("MDGs") in motivating states to make systemic changes. This article
argues that reduction of food waste should be made a top priority in the ongoing
negotiations for SDGs. The inclusion of a SDG on reduction of food waste with
long-term and short-term objectives would clarify that eliminating food waste is
essential to achieving a robust "fight to food" not just for this generation but also
for future generations.8'
A. Millennium Development Goals
The current normative regime for achieving human development objectives is
shaped by the MDGs. Four of the MDGs have direct relevance to reducing food
waste particularly in the Global South. The most relevant goal for food security is
Goal 1, which encourages states to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by
halving the number of people who suffer from hunger by 2015.82 Goal 4 urges
states to reduce by two-thirds the number of children dying before the age of five
by 2015.
Goal 7 suggests that states should "integrate the principles of
sustainable development into country policies and programmes" in order to
"reverse the loss of environmental resources." 84 Finally, Goal 8 requests states to
"[a]ddress the special needs of least developed countries."8 s Measured progress
80. See UNEP (2011), supranote 62, at 43, suggesting proposals for establishing indicators.
81. See, for example, Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligationto Future Generations, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 198, 198-207 (1990), for a description an intergenerational obligation principle called
"conservation of options."
82. U.N. Dept. of Public Info., Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 Fact Sheet:
Goal I (Sep. 2013), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goallfs.pdf.
83. U.N. Dept. of Public Info., Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 Fact Sheet:
Goal 4 (Sep. 2013), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_4_fs.pdf.
84. U.N. Dept. of Public Info., Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 Fact Sheet:
Goal 7 (Sep. 2013), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_7_fs.pdf.
85. U.N. Dept. of Public Info., Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 Fact Sheet:
Goal 8 (Sep. 2013), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_8_fs.pdf.
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has been made on each of these goals, though it is unclear that concerted efforts to
reduce food waste played much of a role in any the progress that has been made. 86
Even with the reduction in number of chronically hungry individuals, it remains to
be seen whether Goal 1 on hunger will be achieved. The 2013 UNDP report on the
status of the MDGs indicated that many smallholder farmers are net buyers of
food." While the report does not indicate whether this is the result of a lack of
arable land, a lack of seed, or climate events, it is also reasonable to assume that
smallholder farmers may also be victims of food waste where seasonal crops are
unable to be processed or sold during to a lack of basic storage and transport
infrastructure. In the short term, addressing food waste caused by inadequate
community infrastructure also has the potential to contribute to climate adaptation
for communities that continue to go hungry in the face of unpredictable weather."
B. Zero Hunger Challenge
Full implementation of the MDGs would still not eliminate chronic hunger
faced by millions. 89 In fact, while states have collectively almost met the MDG
goal on hunger, there are still 870 million people (one in eight people) who lacked
adequate food between 2010 and 2012.90 Most of these individuals are in the
Global South, where some regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania are
struggling with meeting the targets for MDG Goal 1.91 At least fifty-seven million
children in Southern Asia and thirty million children in Sub-Saharan Africa lack
sufficient food.92
In response to this ongoing hunger crisis, General Ban Ki-Moon launched the
Zero Hunger Challenge in 2012 at the United Nations Convention on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20). 93 Supporting the argument in this article that a "right to
food" requires reducing food waste as part of the implementation of the right, the
Secretary-General's multi-stakeholder initiative includes among his five specific

86. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, at 11

(2013) [hereinafter MDG Report] (referencing food waste in the report by discussing FAO's
investments to improve the quality of basic data on food production and food storage).
87. Id.
88. See, for example., U.N. News Centre, Over 2 Million People in Zimbabwe to Require Food
Assistance,
Warns
UN
Agency
(Sep.
3,
2013),
http://www.un.orglapps/news/story.asp?NewslD=45756&Cr-zimbabwe&Crl=#.UuQlF-vTlcw,
indicating that some of the shortfall for grain is due to adverse weather conditions and the unavailability
of agricultural supplies such as seeds and fertilizers which could be addressed in part through
construction of community-based adequate storage facilities that could be used to store harvests for

multiple seasons as a sort of rural food bank.
89. Millennium Development Goal 1, supra note 82 (intending to halve the proportion of people
who suffer from hunger and not to fully eliminate hunger).
90. MDG Report, supra note 86, at 10.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 11.
93. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at the Launch of the Zero Hunger Challenge (June 21,
2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments full.asp?statlD=1580#.UuQ9CvTlcw.
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objectives a call for Zero Hunger Challenge partners to take measures to prevent
food from being lost or wasted.94
Unlike previous global efforts such as the World Food Summit Plan of Action
or the MDGs, the challenge is open to more than just states. It was initiated in part
as a call for involvement from civil society and businesses in meeting the hunger
reduction targets. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon is doing an admirable job in
focusing high-level political attention on the need for even more progress towards
global food security. Yet it remains to be seen whether this approach will yield
results where they are needed most - in food insecure states. However, a review of
the webpages linked to the Zero Hunger Challenge reveals surprisingly little about
how any of the named participants are seeking means to reduce waste. 95 Only a
handful of countries have adopted the challenge 96 and it is unclear what they have
done or are planning to do in response to the challenge.
Based on the limited results of two years of implementation, there is some
question as to whether the multi-stakeholder approach is an ample approach for
reducing food waste, particularly for those countries where the food waste is a
systemic problem because of a lack of basic infrastructure. In the end, states, not
NGOs or businesses, need to be held accountable for their failures to seek longterm solutions to the food waste problems. While NGOs and businesses can
contribute to the realization of the "right to food" through financial support or
contributions of technical resources that will provide the needed storage and
processing of food in the Global South, it is the states themselves that have the
legal obligations to fulfill their citizens "right to food" and to support other states
in their efforts.
There is one interesting twist to the Zero Hunger Challenge that needs to be
mentioned in light of the call for accountability. More than just states, NGOs, and
intergovernmental groups have pledged to meet the challenge. So too have global
leaders who have committed to language in signing the pledge "to hold myself
accountable to deliver on my promise." 97 While it is the position of this paper that

94. Id.
95. Most of the webpages simply link to general homepages. The Food and Agriculture
Organization has a specific webpage designed to highlight FAO efforts. FAO: ZERO HUNGER
CHALLENGE, http://www.fao.org/zhc/en/ (last visited June 29, 2014). None of the highlighted efforts
deal with implementation of infrastructure to address food losses in the Global South. See, for example,
Reduce Your Food Waste and Save Money and Our Natural Resources, FAO (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.fao.org/zhc/detail-events/en/c/211072, providing the following advice which is unlikely to
be of any practical use to members of the Global South: "Buy only what you need .... Don't throw
away perfectly good food .... Store food properly .... Reduce or share your portions."
96. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at Closing Session of the High-Level Consultation on
Hunger, Food Security and Nutrition in the Post-2015 Development Framework (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statlD= 1810#.UzR8cfldWSo.
97. Global Leaders From Business and Civil Society Sign Zero Hunger Challenge at Davos, U.N.
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (January 24, 2014), http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/global-leadersbusiness-and-civil-society-sign-zero-hunger-challenge-davos; ZERO HUNGER CHALLENGE: JOIN THE
CHALLENGE, http://zhc.feedingideas.com/join-the-challenge/ (last visited June 29, 2014) (oining the
Challenge individuals declare: "I am actively working to eradicate hunger; I align myself with all
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only states under their obligations to achieve the "right to food" can and should be
held legally accountable for any failures to address food waste, the Zero Hunger
Challenge introduces a second set of potentially accountable actors-the
individuals who have made the pledge to reduce food waste. On the one hand, this
is an exciting development to have business and government agency leaders
making these commitments. The choice of the word "accountable" in the pledge,
however, seems to be a strange choice in light of its technical legal meaning. Is the
pledge empty rhetoric or is there some possibility that those individuals with
decision-making power 98 who have signed the pledge could be held accountable
when there are gaps in implementation? What if the U.S. Agency for International
Development ("USAID") Administrator Rajiv Shah, one of the signatories to the
Zero Hunger Challenge, does not prioritize food loss as part of the agency's
development financing programs? What if Unilever Chief Executive Officer Paul
Polman fails to make a good faith effort to reduce food waste associated with
processing from Unilever factories in spite of his pledge? Can these individuals
really only be personally accountable to themselves for their individual consumer
food waste choices or can they be held socially accountable for their professional
decisions that have system-wide implication? It is an intriguing puzzle; even if
governments have the legal obligations under the "right to food," it will ultimately
be non-state actors who will have the power to effectively reduce waste at key
junctures in the food production business.
While it is difficult to critique a well-meaning and ambitious initiative such as
the Zero Hunger Challenge, the effort does raise questions about short-term
effectiveness for communities who are currently relying on food aid because of a
failed crop and no stored provisions. In an effort to create collective willpower
across all sectors of society and perhaps achieve some of the positive features
associated with polycentric governance such as adaptability,9 9 will the international
community fail to reach out to those who need help the most possibly because of
coordination challenges among the various regional and national actors? While
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is today actively championing the challenge and
providing necessary leadership, what will come of the challenge in 2017 when the
Secretary-General's term has ended? If we have not achieved the Challenge, then
who will be responsible? Arguably, responsibility will remain with the states,
most of which have not taken on the challenge. Since it is the states that have
ongoing human rights obligations to realize a "right to food," there is an urgent
need for states to accept and act upon the objectives of the Challenge. One means
for generating system-wide food waste reductions might be the adoption of a SDG
focused on zero food waste.
elements of the Zero Hunger Challenge; I encourage others to join in my activities and to take the
challenge; I advocate for actions and policies that deliver Zero Hunger; and I will hold myself
accountable to deliver on my promise.").
98. Global Leaders From Business and Civil Society Sign Zero Hunger Challenge at Davos, supra
note 97.
99. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010).
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C. SustainableDevelopment Goals
In July 2014, parties in a U.N. open working group negotiated SDG 12 which
may, if adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, "[p]romote sustainable
consumption and production patterns." too Target 12.2 to achieve this goal calls for
states to "by 2030 reduce by half global food waste and production and postharvest food losses and those along food supply chains." lot
This outcome of a target rather than a food waste goal is somewhat
disappointing given the attention that food waste had been receiving from
intergovernmental groups and non-governmental groups. In the case prior to 2014,
food waste was specifically called out as a development problem by the U.N.
Secretary-General's High-Level Panel Of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015
Development Agenda, including such politically influential individuals as the
President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.102
Including a food waste goal as one of the SDGs rather than simply as a target for a
vaguely worded goal would have reflected a reasonable policy-making trajectory
based on the already existing efforts under the MDGs to reduce hunger by half and
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's Zero Hunger Challenge clear objective to
reduce food waste. 0 3
When the High-Level Panel suggested focusing on food waste as a
development problem, it did not recommend any specific percentage for states to
reduce food waste. Instead it suggested a universal goal of ensuring food security
and good nutrition with a national target to "[r]educe postharvest loss and food
waste by x%.',104 In notes, the High-Level Panel explained that further research is
needed to decide what the appropriate indicator for food waste might be.'os While
100. Introduction and Proposed Goals and Targets on Sustainable Development in the Post 2015
2014)
14,
(July
10
at
Agenda,
Development
Proposed
[hereinafter
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4523zerodraft.pdf
SDGs].
101. Id.
102.
NEW

HIGH-LEVEL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONS ON THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, A

GLOBAL

PARTNERSHIP:

ERADICATE

POVERTY

AND

TRANSFORM

ECONOMIES

THROUGH

available at http://www.post20l5hip.org/wp(2013),
content/uploads/2013/05/UN-Report.pdf [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report] (discussing the
appearance of the stresses of unsustainable production and consumption patterns, in areas like
deforestation, water scarcity, food waste, and high carbon emissions).
103. In fact the Zero-Hunger Challenge is not just a political initiative of the UN but also a personal
initiative of Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon who has recently pledged to actively ensure the adoption
of the challenge. In a set of remarks at the World Economic Forum, he made the following public
pledge "I am actively working to eradicate hunger. I align myself with all elements of the Zero Hunger
Challenge. I encourage others to join in my activities and to take the Challenge. I advocate for actions
and policies that achieve Zero Hunger. I will hold myself accountable to deliver on my promise." See
U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at World Economic Forum World Food Programme Dinner (Jan. 23,
2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments full.asp?statlD=2115#.UuREmevTlcw
(indicating that the Zero Hunger challenge is a personal initiative of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon).
104. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 102, at 30.
105. Id.
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there may be food losses or waste that occur because of droughts and whether
events, these types of unanticipated events would not covered by the proposed
collective effort to end food waste, which the High-Level Panel suggested should
only apply to "postharvest" losses. Therefore, the goal have been proposed to be
"zero food waste" with "food waste" specifically defined to encompass any crop or
meat product ordinarily consumed by humans in the country where it is produced.
Even though a "zero food waste" target supporting a "zero hunger" goal will
be likely difficult to implement due to the realities of food distribution and current
consumption habits, it will still be important to set the standard for food waste at
zero as a clear expression that states are obliged to take affirmative steps to
eliminate to the greatest extent possible both waste and wasteful practices. A
useful analogy for "zero food waste" is the "no litter" policy in many countries.
While the reality may not be an environment free of litter due to the inattention and
the malfeasance of various actors, there is a shared understanding that it is better
for communities to have a standard of "no litter" than an arbitrarily negotiated
acceptable amount of litter. A complete prohibition on post-harvest food waste has
a greater chance of creating a normative shift in states that have not prioritized
basic food protection as well as helping the states to raise financing more quickly
to address the problems.
Food waste is not being given the attention it deserves in the SDG process.
While a negotiated target reflects some level of institutional commitment, each
proposed target under the proposed SDGs will end up competing for the attention
of policymakers operating with limited budgets. In the case of Goal 12, efforts to
reduce food waste will also compete for funding and support on hazardous
chemical reduction and other broader recycling efforts. Food waste should have
been assigned its own goal with targets on how to achieve food waste reductions to
indicate that it is a priority issue. The current proposed goals lack the needed
clarity and structure for creating national and collective action on critical
environmental security issues. In addition to the problem of setting vague goals, it
is regrettable that the various U.N. stakeholders in their outcome document opted
to characterize food waste as a primarily consumption and production issue under
National
Goal 12 rather than as a food security issue under Goal 2.
implementation of these goals will likely be assigned to individual national
agencies. Because the extent of existing food waste is a problem for long-term
hunger and nutrition, it would have been better classified as a target for Goal 2 to
06
"[e]nd hunger, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture"' so that
food and nutrition related national agencies would be in charge of identifying
opportunities to reduce food waste. Assuming that food waste remains as a target
rather than being designated a s a goal when the U.N. General Assembly reviews
the goals, the food waste target really should be incorporated across multiple goals
including Proposed Goal 2, Proposed Goal 6 on ensuring availability of water, and
Proposed Goal 14 on conserving ocean resources.'o7
106. Proposed SDGs, supra note 100, at 4.
107. Id at 4, 7, 11.
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If the U.N. General Assembly in September 2014 adopts any of the proposed
SDGs, it is likely that states will adopt the abstract goal of ensuring sustainable
consumption and production. Event with the adoption of such a goal, there will
remain the question of what the next steps might be and what role, if any,
international laws, regional laws, and national laws will play in achieving the food
waste reduction targets. The final part of this article shares a number of
suggestions about why law matters in systematically reducing food waste.
IV. NEEDED LAW AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS TO ACHIEVE A GOAL OF NEAR
ZERO FOOD WASTE
Reducing food waste is not a panacea for achieving food security but it is a
critical first step to re-establishing a baseline from which rational food production
decisions can be made about where and how to invest in additional food
production. Law plays a number of key roles in achieving a new sustainable
development goal based on waste at the international, regional, and national level.
Assuming that a state has some (albeit not much) financial capabilities, the most
important interventions to be taken are those at the national level.
A. Internationalinterventions
At the international level, as described in Part II, most states accept a human
"right to food." Implementing this right in relation to reducing food waste
particularly in food insecure countries has two parts. States that are chronically
food insecure due to large levels of post-harvest waste resulting from of lack of
storage processing infrastructure or market infrastructure have a legal obligation to
their citizens to ask for international assistance. Countries that are capable of
delivering overseas development assistance have an obligation to support the
efforts of states to assist their communities in reducing post-harvest waste. Part III
of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food provides that, "[c]onsistent with
the Monterrey Consensus, developed countries should assist developing countries
in attaining international development goals, including those contained in the
Millennium Declaration, by providing adequate technical and financial
assistance." 08 Countries that receive aid are expected to spend the money
effectively to achieve development goals and targets and be accountable for the
aid. 09
In the context of food waste, this means that states, either individually through
their development aid agencies, or collectively through multilateral financial
institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development
Bank, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank, should be supplying
loans and grants to states to address pro-poor reduction of food waste. The current
structure of agricultural aid that puts close to ninety-five percent of support funds
into crop production and only five percent into post-harvest challenges needs to be

108. THE RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 40, at 36, 1 12.
109. Id.
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reconceived. 0 States are beginning to make contributions targeted at addressing
the chronic food waste problems associated with poor storage options. For
example, the United States through the USAID Program as part of its "Feed the
Future" program is creating opportunities in Rwanda for strengthening the food
chain post-harvest and avoiding waste by providing funding for rehabilitating rural
feeder roads so that farmers will be able to better transport their crops."' While
this support should make a definite positive contribution to "field to market"
transportation, the strategy paper also raises some interesting tensions regarding
which activities are best underwritten by development donors and which activities
belong in the realm of private capital. In order to counter the post-harvest losses of
beans and maize, which can be as high as thirty percent,11 2 the USAID "Feed the
Future" program has been supporting the Government of Rwanda with investments
to improve "post-harvest handling practices and technologies, engaging private
investors in the construction of new storage infrastructure, and linking farmers to
This program may indeed
storage, conditioning, and processing centers.""
deliver better food security at a national level but its approach raises some
questions for individual food-poor communities. Should storage infrastructure be
under the control of private investors as the Rwanda program seems to provide?
Are these investors required to make any concessions to the most vulnerable
farmers to ensure that their crops can be stored? Equity needs to be a primary
factor in developing food loss programs that support the most marginalized and
likely most food-deficient groups. Otherwise, infrastructure programs may end up
creating new and unintentional sharecropping relations.
Therefore, any international cooperation programs designed to reduce food
waste must not interfere with the priorities of individual states to create long-term
national food security strategies. Even though many donor states condition their
aid in part to protect against corruption practices, recipient states should have some
control over how aid will be distributed to the public. Depending on the ideology
of a given state, recipient states should have the ability to directly invest greater
resources in publicly shared benefits, such as a government facilitated market
designed for the most vulnerable populations, rather than being required to
indirectly support private investors such as the owners of storage warehouses.
International interventions in law that are undertaken for the purpose of achieving
a "right to food" should focus on creating an inclusive economy. The "right to
food" creates not only positive obligations for states to ensure access to food for its
citizens by eliminating waste, but also creates obligations of restraint for third-

110. UNEP, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS, supra note 9, at 35.
Ill. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., RWANDA: FY 2011-2015 MULTI-YEAR STRATEGY 23 (2011),

available
http://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/country/strategies/files/RwandaFeedtheFutureMultiYearStrategy.pdf

112. Id. at 21.
113. Id.

at
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party cooperating states who provide financial and technical support to states
needing external assistance.11 4
The "Feed the Future" program is an important United States' development
program. But more needs to be done to ensure that producers are supported in
protecting what they are already growing. The United States keeps a scorecard of
its progress to reduce global poverty and hunger as part of its internal
accountability." 5 Surprisingly, the scorecard does not address waste as one of its
metrics. 116 One recommendation for the future of "Feed the Future" is for USAID
to include specific reduction of post-harvest food waste as one of its key indicators
of success. Until waste is systematically tackled, future new food production may
also end up being inadvertently wasted.
B.

Regional Interventions

One of the recurring triggers for food waste in developing countries is the
lack of a viable market for surplus goods. Presently, groups of African farmers sell
their goods into European markets because European companies have assisted
them with creating distribution chains. This very same food could be consumed
regionally with lower transportation emissions and lower waste rates. Due to a
variety of aesthetic standards that have been imposed on food," 7 there have been
repeat incidents of food waste. Once a shipment has been rejected on potential
aesthetic quality grounds then it is difficult for local wholesalers or growers to
locate an alternative market in a timely fashion.
Regionally, greater attention needs to be given to growing functional
intraregional markets among some of the low value regional economic
communities, including the Economic Community of West African States and the
Economic Community of Central African States,' so that growers will have a
broader array of alternatives markets where they can sell their produce, livestock,
114. Carmen Gonzalez, International Economic Law and the Right to Food, in RETHINKING FOOD
SYSTEMS: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES, NEW STRATEGIES AND THE LAW 1, 4 (Nadia Lambek et al. eds.,

2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2315311 (arguing that states contracting in bilateral and
multilateral trade and investment agreements have an obligation to "ensure that these agreements do not
violate the right to food of vulnerable populations in other nations").
115. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., FEED THE FUTURE: PROGRESS SCORECARD 1-2, 5 (U.S.
Agency
for
Int'l
Dev.
eds.,
2013),
available
at
http://feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/feed-the-futurescorecard_2013.pdf (including
specific metrics on reducing poverty rates and stunting rates in certain States with targets of reducing
poverty and stunting by 20% by 2017).
116. Id.
117. TRISTRAM STUART, WASTE: UNCOVERING THE GLOBAL FOOD SCANDAL

106-107 (W.W.

Norton & Co. eds., 2009) (some aesthetic standards in the European Union were removed in 2008 so
that a banana for the EU market does not need to curve and a cucumber does not need to be straight;
other standards remain in place for apples, citrus fruits, peaches, pears, strawberries and tomatoes).
118. Mwangi S. Kimenyi et al., Introduction: Intra-African Trade in Context, in ACCELERATING
GROWTH THROUGH IMPROVED INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE 1, 3 (The Brookings Institution eds., 2012),

available
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2012/l/intra%20african%20trade/01
ican trade full report.pdf.

at
intra afr
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or dairy. In Africa as of 2009, intra-African trade only accounts for ten percent of
the trade, which is a far lower intraregional trade rate than in other regions of the
world.119
Achieving these potential common markets will require a high degree of legal
harmonization in rules and regulations involving customs, transport, trade tariffs
and cross-border financing. For example, one of the current barriers to regional
trade in Western Africa is interpretive differences between Francophone and
Anglophone banking regulations leading to a lack of exchange. 12" With chronic
technical barriers such as these, there is an urgency for the introduction of a
combination of regional public and private law mechanisms coupled with public
education to help create new markets that may absorb some of the food products
that are currently going to waste. Some of the tools already exist but there has
been a lack of attention by states in entering into legal arrangements that would
bolster individual state efforts to fulfill their "right to food" obligations by
eliminating waste. For example, in 1970, an international agreement was
introduced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe requiring
states to handle any perishable food using the appropriate equipment necessary for
handling the given food product.121 By December 2011, among the North African
states who would otherwise be eligible, only the government of Tunisia has signed
the agreement.122 The non-participation of the other North African states might be
interpreted as a reflection that food waste arising through trade is not a priority.123
A second regional intervention that may generate concrete opportunities for
food waste reduction is South-to-South technology transfers. For decades, there
has been an assumption that the flow of technology transfer is from the Global
North to the Global South. Yet, there are a number of innovations designed in the
Global South to handle geographical and climate specific challenges that should be
mainstreamed throughout the Global South. FAO is well-positioned to organize a
Global South learning network to reduce food waste. Three recent technologies
with their roots in the Global South are illustrative of the value of a South-to-South

119. Id. at 1-2 (citing Asian intraregional trade at 17% of total trade and European Union
intraregional trade at 60%).
120. African Trade Policy Centre of the U.N. Econ, Comm'n for Africa, Gender and Intra African
available
at
Africa,
2,
No.
9
(2010),
Trade:
The
Case
of
West
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/atpcpolicybriefs9.pdf (prepared by Amal Nagah
Elbeshbishi).
121. Agreement on the International Carriage of Perishable Foodstuffs and on the Special
Equipment to be used for such Carriage (ATP), Sept. 1, 1970, 1028 U.N.T.S. 121, available at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/main/wp1l/wpI1doc/ATP-2013_e.pdf (even though this
treaty might be considered primarily a health and safety treaty, it is also a treaty that can lead to a
reduction in waste if properly implemented.).
122. U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR AFRICA, HARMONIZING POLICIES TO TRANSFORM THE TRADING
ENVIRONMENT: ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA VI, at 27, U.N. Sales No. 14.ll.K.1

(2013), available at http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria vienglish full.pdf
(citing Table 4.3).
123. Id. (stating the countries that have not yet signed include Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and
Mauritania).
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technology network. First, Cede Greenhouses in South Africa has designed a
tunnel greenhouse called the Africa house, which is designed to withstand harsh
growing conditions based on fluctuations between savannah winds and scorching
heat.12 4 Second, researchers at Universiti Sains Malaysia have developed
FruitPlast by converting tropical fruit waste into flour.125 This material can be
fabricated into a biodegradable plastic film that can be used like normal plastic
wrap.12 6 The material will naturally degrade in three to six months, will last one to
two years on the shelf, and will cost ten percent less than the current nonbiodegradable plastic bags commercially used.127 Finally, there are also refined
technologies based on traditional designs that can be widely disseminated in areas
where high-tech solutions are not viable. In Sudan, Mohammed Bah Abba
designed a "zeer," which is an evaporative cooler based on two vessels separated
by wet sand which is re-wet twice a day, and which extended shelf life of
vegetables from two days up to twenty days.128 This technology has been further
refined to create a "zero energy cool chamber" that is capable of cooling up to 100
kilograms of food.' 29 Each of these technologies has a role to play in food waste
reduction and can be incorporated into national strategies.
Law should play a role in South-to-South technology networks not just by
creating distribution chains for the new technologies, but also in protecting the
intellectual investment in new ideas with potentially large markets, such as
Malaysian researchers' FruitPlast idea. In order to support this type of food loss
reduction innovation, the donor states discussed in the subpart above may want to
invest through structured grants or regional business enterprise contests in
supporting dissemination of technology within the Global South.
C. NationalInterventions
While this section started with international and regional interventions, the
most important interventions in eliminating food waste will ultimately be at the
national level, since this is where decision-makers are likely able to respond
swiftly to the demands of "ordinary" food insecurity.' 3 0 While states may work

124. Community, CEDE GREENHOUSES, http://cedegreenhouses.co.za/Community.html
(last
visited
June
29,
2014);
see
also
Structures,
CEDE
GREENHOUSE,
http://cedegreenhouses.co.za/images/Basic-Structure-Design.jpg (last visited June 29, 2014) (describing
additional UVA and wind protection to address Southern African weather conditions).
125. Andrea Filmer, USM Invents Cheap Biodegradable Plastic Bags, ECOTOURISMHUB.COM
(May 14, 2010), http://ecotourismhub.com/fruitplast.htmi.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Musa Elkheir, The Zeer Pot: A Nigerian Invention Keeps Food Fresh Without Electricity,
SCIENCE INAFRICA (Sept. 2004), http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2004/september/refrigeration.htm.
129. Brian Lipinski et al., Reducing Food Loss and Waste, Working Paper 14 (UNEP World Res.
Inst., Working Paper, June 2013), availableat http://pdf.wri.org/reducingfoodloss-and waste.pdf.
130. As noted earlier in this paper, there are numerous causes for food insecurity including armed
conflict, internal displacement, and unusual disasters. This paper is not addressing food waste in the
context of these extraordinary tragedies but is focused instead on "ordinary" food insecurity caused by
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cooperatively in seeking financial and technical cooperation, much of the effort to
fulfill the human "right to food" by eliminating systemic food waste will be
territorially based. The situation in Kenya in 2011 exemplified the need for greater
national political investment, particularly in infrastructure.
During 2011,
communities in North Kenya were going hungry from a lack of access to basic
foods while farmers in the Rift Valley had surpluses that were going to waste. 131
The most urgent national need is for physical infrastructure. Farmers need
storage units, and, depending on the product, the units may need to be refrigerated,
or at least designed to keep food relatively cool. The same farmers (if they do not
sell to wholesalers) will need to have access to either processing facilities for
surpluses or to markets that can absorb the surplus. In either case, there is likely to
be a need for a reliable transport network. Africa is a young region with much of
the available infrastructure being either a product of European colonialism or the
Chinese expansion.132
But physical infrastructure alone will not serve to reduce waste; law has a
facilitative role to play. In a number of instances, law, or at least what is perceived
as "law", may be contributing to systems of food waste. In some regions of Africa,
it is difficult to get food to market not simply because of the hurdles of
infrastructure but also due to frequent police roadblocks and checkpoints where
taxes might be collected and bribes are often paid.133 In other parts of Africa such
as Tunisia, burdensome licensing processes can prevent food from coming to
market.134 These roadblocks and licensing requirements may be sufficiently
onerous to prevent sellers from putting their surplus goods into the channels of
commerce.
Just as existing law and legal practices may end up encouraging waste, the
law can also remove hurdles by creating incentives or removing disincentives. For
example, as an incentive for communities to invest in food waste reduction
technologies, the national government could make available pro-poor grants or
loans that would supply a public subsidy for farmers in need of storage or cooling
facilities. Governments must also contribute to planning for intermediary markets,
not just subsistence farmers. Here, governments can provide assistance in the form
of producer organizations that can coordinate production among members to
lack of community infrastructure and lack of government support to rural food producers. See supra
Part II.
131. Olumide Taiwo & Nelipher Moyo, Eliminating Barriers to Internal Commerce to Facilitate
Intraregional Trade, in ACCELERATING GROWTH THROUGH IMPROVED INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE 8 (The

at
available
2012),
eds.,
Institute
Brookings
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2012/l/intra%20african%20trade/01-intra-afr
ican trade fullreport.pdf.
132. Id. at 10 (describing the boom in road infrastructure in Africa due to Chinese investments).
133. Id. at II (describing a particular problematic stretch of road in Cameroon with forty-seven
roadblocks and twenty-seven from Mombasa, Kenya to the Ugandan border).
134. How a Fruit Seller Caused Revolution in Tunisia, CNN (Jan, 16, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/0i/i6/tunisia.fruit.seller.bouazizi (describing the individual
who sparked the protests in Tunisia that started the revolution in that State as a fruit/vegetable retailer
who was unable to easily obtain a vendor permit from the government).
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ensure a diversity of products that can withstand fluctuations in market prices.
With sufficient numbers, a producer organization may have sufficient clout to
lobby for future public sector investment in food processing and food storage.
Producer organizations may also be able to better share risks associated with being
a farm producer. East African dairy farmers represent a successful example of the
economic clout of a medium sized producer organization.13 5 Operating within a
collective governance framework, East African dairy farmers who previously
competed against each other now operate group owned and run refrigerated milk
collection centers and milk processing facilities. 136
In terms of removing disincentives, states can create regulations that eliminate
existing unfair trading practices, particularly between Global North companies and
Global South producers. Global South countries may forbid contracts that
currently permit large processing companies or retailers from rejecting products on
the basis of aesthetics. 3 7 If the companies cannot prove that they are rejecting
goods on the basis of human safety reasons, then the companies will be expected to
fully perform on their contracts. This intervention will be particularly important in
the case of resource-limited countries that export food needed to other countries
where "quality" regulations continue to dictate appearances of products and not
just the nutritional values. Arguably, this approach could lead to a reduction in
off-shoring of agriculture to Africa from certain retailers who may insist on certain
food aesthetics. Given the pressures that this export-oriented agriculture has
already placed on parts of Africa's food chain, the focus on Africa's food markets
rather than foreign markets may be the needed stimulus to generate production for
regional markets.
Given that the government has limited funding and many Africa states
confront ongoing challenges with petty corruption, one possible way of funding
national food waste reduction reforms is social impact bonds. These bonds could
be funded by private investors who would receive bond payments from the
government when specific service providers deliver on pre-defined service goals.
In the Global North, these bonds have been used to cover the gamut from prisoner
rehabilitation 3 8 to asthma management.139 Using a social impact bond to reduce

135. Jennifer Wheary, In East Africa, Milk is Money, WORLD ARK MAG. (Spring 2013),
http://www.hei fer.org/join-the-conversation/magazine/201 3/spring/in-east-africa-milk-is-money.html.
136. Id.
137. See Sarah Bentley, Who's to Blame for Supermarket Rejection of Ugly Fruitand Vegetables?,
2011),
29,
(Dec.
ECOLOGIST
http://www.theecologist.org/News/news analysis/I 174157/whostoblame for supermarket rejection
of uglyfruit and vegetables.html, for a description of the 90% of a wasted crop in a UK field
because of the failure to meet aesthetic standards described as "technical specifications."
138. David W. Chen, Goldman to Invest in City Jail Program, Profiting if Recidivism Falls
Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/nyregion/goldman-toinvest-in-new-york-city-jail-program.html?_r-0.
139. Press Release, Social Finance, Inc., The California Endowment Awards Grant to Social
available
at
25,
2013),
(Mar.
Collective
Health
Finance
and
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/Fresno%20Asthma%20Demonstration%2
OProject%20Press%20Release.pdf.
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hunger by reducing food waste would be a conceivable investment that NGOs and
private investors particularly through corporate social responsibility programs
might finance.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is essential that any discussions of the human "right to food" contain some
recognition that states have an obligation to reduce food waste based on the
already existing human "right to food." With nearly 1.3 billion tons of food being
wasted annually, there is room for improvement at many levels. This essay
assumes that because of the attention being given to problem with excessive food
waste as part of the Zero Hunger Challenge, international policymakers will adopt
at least a SDG target that will prioritize eliminating food waste. This is significant
because the SDGs will provide the needed international framework for creating an
accountability regime to measure progress towards sustainability.140
Unfortunately, the specific goal and target that have been proposed by the
international community to reduce food waste are inadequate to address the food
security challenges related to the massive inefficiencies that currently exist in the
food production, distribution, and retail system. As part of food security strategies,
insufficient funding has been allocated to address food waste elimination; most
funding is provided instead to increase production that may eventually go to waste.
A zero food waste SDG or target would prioritize the political need for protecting
long-term food resources by reducing waste and should contribute meaningfully to
achieving a green economy.
Due to limited technical and financial capacities, states in the Global South
experience greater challenges with reducing food waste in part because of a lack of
both commercial infrastructure and access to basic storage technologies that will
protect agricultural yields. There are a number of legal interventions that are
possible from increasing targeted aid from the Global North to the Global South
for food waste reduction, creating regional markets, and introducing national "fair
trade" laws that prevent food from being wasted on the basis of aesthetics. With
population projections at nine billion by 2050,141 and much of this growth in the
Global South, we collectively must do more to achieve the "right to food" in order
to "waste not, want not."

140. SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR, INT'L POLICY CENTRE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH, GLOBAL GOALS AS
1 (2013), available at
A POLICY TOOL: INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/864IPCOnePagerl93.pdf.
141. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INTERNATIONAL DATA BASE WORLD POPULATION: 1950-2050 (June

2011), availableat http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/worldpopgraph.php.
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